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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume LIII June, 1951 Number 3-4
COMMON LAW PLEADING MODIFIED VERSUS
THE FEDERAL RULES*
Marlyn E. Lugar**
IV. PLEADING LEGAL AND EQUITABLE RIGHTs-
UNION OF LAW AND EQUITY
T HE preceding parts of this paper have dealt with West Virginia
rules which may unnecessarily delay or defeat a hearing on
the merits of claims between parties to litigation, but the rules
there discussed pertained to actions on one side of the court.
Primarily the application of those rules on the law side or to
actions at law has been treated, for it is there that the existing
procedure is most restrictive. This part of the paper will also
deal with limitations on the assertion of rights between the parties,
but here will be discussed only those restrictions which resulted
from the historical accident that established two systems of courts
when one might have been sufficient. The text which follows
demonstrates that all rights of the parties may be as adequately
protected in one as in two systems.
A. The Federal Rule
The major reform accomplished by the Federal Rules to
prevent the necessity of multiple actions is embodied in one of
the shortest of the rules. Rule 2 provides that "there shall be one
form of action to be known as 'civil action'. ' '  It abolishes the
distinctions between law and equity as separate and distinct
* This is the fourth and last of a series of articles by the writer on this
subject. The first concerned the joinder of parties and causes of action
[52 W. V.A. L. REv. 137 (1950) ), the second discussed amendments [53 W. VA.
L. REv. 27 (1950) J, and the third dealt with counterclaims [53 W. VA. L. REv.
142 (1950)].
"Associate professor of law, West Virginia University.
. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.CA. (1950).
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systems of justice and abolishes the forms of action of common
law pleading. For West Virginia courts the rule might expressly
provide, in part, that "the distinctions between actions at law
and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits,
heretofore existing, are abolished." This combined procedure
is found in most code pleading states.:
To those who have not had experience with a system which
makes no distinction in pleading between legal and equitable
rights, it may be profitable to state initially that this procedure
does not abolish legal and equitable remedies.4  No change in
substantive rights is involved.5 In West Virginia remedies both
legal and equitable are available to the parties in the same court.
The change would mean merely that both types of remedies would
be available in the same proceeding and that there would be no
distinction in pleading whether either or both types or remedies
were sought.0
2 This was the language of the first statute abolishing the distinc-
tion between actions at law and suits in equity. It further provided that
in the future there should be but one form of action for the enforcement
or protection of private rights and the redress of private wrongs, which would
be denominated "a civil action". N.Y. Laws 1848, c. 379, § 62. For other
representative statutes, see 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 2.02 n. 13 (2d ed.
1948). Citations to other similar statutes are collected in CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
ING 82 n. 24 (2d ed. 1947). A simpler statement of the rule accomplishing
the same results was necessary for the federal courts when the rule was adopted,
for by virtue of the Conformity Act the common law forms of action were
procedurally unimportant in federal courts sitting in code states. 2 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 2.06.
Compare the language of the West Virginia rule governing all proceedings
to obtain relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which reads:
"... all procedural distinctions between the forms of actions at law and
between claims and causes, at law and in equity, are hereby abolished." 128
W. Va. xv. See also the West Virginia statute quoted in the text at note
199 infra.
3 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 82.
4 "While the formal distinction between proceedings in law and in equity
is abolished by the new rules of civil procedure, . . . yet remedies both at
law and in equity are available to parties in the same court and in the same
case. Neither legal nor equitable remedies have been abolished. What was
an action at law is still an action at law, and what was a bill in equity is
still a civil action founded on principles of equity. ... New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 39 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D. Ala. 1941).
5 "All distinctions as to forms in the federal courts between actions at
law and suits in equity have been abolished; but the difference in substance
in federal judicial power between law and equity is imbedded in the Con-
stitution and remains unaltered -. .. Commercial Nat. Bank in Shreve-
port v. Parsons, 144 F.2d 231, 240 (5th Cir. 1044). Other cases supporting
this proposition are cited in 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAGCcE 304 n. 7.
6 See notes 4 and 5 supra. There would no longer be a law side and an
equity side of the court; there would be no actions at law or suits in equity;
there would be only a "civil action" in which all relief would be obtained
that formerly could have been obtained on either side of the court.
2
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B. West Virginia Procedure Compared
1. Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,7 the pleading
rules in West Virginia are comparable to those which apply in
all actions under the Federal Rules. Effective April 1, 1947, the
Supreme Court of Appeals, under its rule-making power,s pre-
scribed that in all proceedings under the act all procedural
distinctions between the forms of action at law and between
claims and causes, at law and in equity, were abolished.9 Since
declaratory relief is strictly neither equitable nor legal, in principle
being sui generis,1o the adoption of this rule for proceedings under
the declaratory judgments act cannot alone be urged as a com-
pelling reason for the adoption of similar procedure where the
remedy to be enforced is clearly legal or equitable.
However, some of the problems which will be encountered in
this combined procedure are no different from those involved in
a combined procedure for all civil actions. This is recognized
in part in the rule itself. It is provided that any party shall have
the right to a trial by jury of any disputed question of fact as
to which he is entitled to a trial by jury under existing law.11
As will appear more fully herein, the question of right to trial by
jury is the only serious problem involved in a merger of law and
equity pleading.'" If this difficulty can be surmounted by the
bench and bar in one phase of the practice, there is no reason to
believe that any greater difficulty will be encountered if the
combined procedure is adopted for all civil actions.
W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 13 (Michie, 1949).
s Id. at c. 51, art. 1, § 4.
s 128 W. Va. xv.
10 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 289, 399, 439 (2d ed. 1941).
11 Compare the following provision in the act: "When a proceeding under
this article involves, the determination of an issue of fact, such issue may
be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is
pending." W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 13, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
1 Judge Clark states that the most striking problem in the adoption of
one form of action is the form of trial in view of the constitutional right of
trial by jury. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 89. Professor Moore terms this right
of jury trial "the outstanding feature and problem of code pleading." 2
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrcE 812 n. 4. Stated in a more succinct manner:
"... Only two things can prevent a complete procedural union of law and
equity in cases properly before the federal courts: (1) a psychological attitude
which goes back to the historical conflict between Coke and Ellesmere, and
(2) the Seventh Amendment. The Amendment is not an obstacle; it is only
a fact to be considered .... .. 2 MooR, FEDERAL PRACICE 305.
3
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2. Equitable Defenses
To a limited extent it has long been recognized in West
Virginia that in any civil litigation two proceedings ought not
to be necessary merely because rights are involved which originally
were enforceable only by separate courts. From the formation of
this state statutes have provided for the use of certain so-called
equitable defenses at law, making unnecessary a separate pro-
ceeding in equity to assert these matters against the law plaintiff.
The defendant was permitted, but not required, to set up as
defenses in the law action matters which would entitle him to
relief, by a separate proceeding, in equity from the remedy sought
in the law action.1 3  These statutes, however, have always been
greatly limited in scope. One statute now provides that the
defendant may set up in any action on a contract any matter
which would entitle him to relief in equity, in whole or in part,
against the obligation of the contract.14 However, this statute
does not permit the court to use a form of relief which would be
peculiar to equity. Therefore, the defendant must institute a
separate suit, if the "defense" which he desires to assert would
involve more than a judgment in common law form. For example,
he can not assert a defense in a law action which would involve
recision of a contract for the sale of land if he has previously
acquired the title, for the law court can not reinvest the title
or compel or supervise the conveyance.' 5 The other statutes now
permitting equitable defenses are limited to actions of ejectment
1L Article XI, section 8 of the West Virginia Constitution of 1863, pro-
vided that such parts of the common law and of the laws of the State of
Virginia as were in force within the boundaries of this state when the con-
stitution became effective, and were not repugnant thereto, were to be the
law of this state until altered or repealed by the legislature. Equitable defenses
at law had long before this been permitted, but not required, within the
boundaries of this state. VA. CODE C. 135 §§ 20-22 and c. 172, §§ 5-6 (1849).
14 "In any action on a contract, the defendant may file a plea alleging...
any other matter, as would entitle him either to recover damages at law from
the plaintiff, or the person under whom the plaintiff claims, or to relief
in equity, in whole or in part, against the obligation of the contract; or, if
the contract be by deed, alleging . . . any such other matter, as would entitle
him to such relief in equity .... " W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
15 Tyson v. Williamson, 96 Va. 636, 32 S.E. 42 (1899); Mangus v. McClel-
land, 93 Va. 786, 22 S.E. 364 (1895). Both of these cases were decided under
statutes which are identical with the present West Virginia statute. For a
more detailed discussion of the limitations under this statute resulting from
the narrow scope of common law judgments, see BURKS, PLEADING & PRACrICE 409
(3d ed., Williams & Burks, 1934); Moreland, Counterclaim and Equitable
Defense in Virginia, 3 W. & L. L. 1Ev. 47, 54 (1941).
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and unlawful entry and detainer.16 They permit the defendant,
under certain circumstances, to prevent a judgment against him in
these actions if he would be entitled to a decree in equity vesting
the legal title to the land in him.17
These statutes not only are limited in their applicability;
none of the statutes permit the defendant to obtain in the same
proceeding affirmative relief against the plaintiff to which he may
be entitled in equity.18 In addition, none of the statutes require
the defendant to assert these equitable defenses. He may elect
to plead the equitable right in the law action or bring an inde-
pendent bill on the equity side of the court to obtain relief.' 9
No delay in asserting such defenses ought to be permitted if the
issue involved is to be tried by the court, as it would be if the
matter were asserted in a suit in equity. There should be a
complete determination of the dispute in one proceeding if it can
be accomplished without any change in substantive rights of the
parties. But, if the defendant asserts his right in the law action,
16 HocG, PLEADING & FoRMus §§ 280, 282 (4th ed. 1934). These statutory
provisions were first inserted only in that part of the Code which relates to
ejectment. Although the treatise cited reaches the conclusion that these provi-
sions apply also to actions of unlawful entry and detainer, there is not cited
therein the section which was added by the revisers in 1931 to the article
dealing with unlawful entry and detainer and which expressly provides that
these equitable defenses shall be applicable. V. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 3, § 6
(Michie, 1949).
17 One section provides: "A vendor, or any person claiming under him,
shall not at law recover against a vendee, or those claiming under him, lands
sold by such vendor to such vendee, when there is a writing stating the
purchase, and the terms thereof, signed by the vendor or his agent." Id. at
c. 55, art. 4, § 11.
The other section adds: "The payment of the whole sum, or the perform-
ance of the whole duty, or the accomplishment of the whole purpose, which any
mortgage or trust deed may have been made to secure or effect, shall prevent
the grantee or his heirs from recovering at law, by virtue of such mortgage
or trust deed, property thereby conveyed, whenever the defendant would in
equity be entitled to a decree revesting the legal title in him without con-
dition." Id. at c. 55, art. 4, § 12.
Although the language of these sections does not indicate that the pro-
cedure is merely permissive, that will appear from the first statute cited
in note 19 infra.
is The statutes permitting the equitable defenses in ejectment and unlaw-
ful entry and detainer provide merely that the plaintiff shall not recover a
judgment if the facts there specified shall be shown by the defendant. These
sections are quoted in note 17 supra.
In an action on a contract the defendant may plead matters which would
entitle him to relief in equity against the obligation of the contract. See
statute quoted in part in note 14 supra. "No one would suggest that a common
law court could under the statute supervise an accounting, grant an injunction,
or order specific performance or cancellation." Moreland, supra note 15, at 55.
'9 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 4, § 13 and c. 56, art. 5, § 6 (Michie, 1949).
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the defense becomes a "legal" one for submission to the jury.20
The defendant must bring an independent suit in equity if he
prefers to avoid trial of the issue by a jury. The Federal Rules
would require these defenses to be asserted, but as equitable
matters they would be decided by the court. 2'
That the West Virginia rules are very restrictive may be
shown by comparison with the practice which existed in federal
courts for many years prior to the adoption of the new rules.
Section 274b of the Judicial Code provided:
"In all actions at law equitable defenses may be inter-
posed by answer, plea, or replication without the necessity
of filing a bill on the equity side of the court. The defendant
shall have the same rights in such case as if he had filed a
bill embodying the defense or seeking the relief prayed for
in such answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting the
subject matter of the suit may thus be obtained by answer or
plea. In case affirmative relief is prayed in such answer or
plea, the plaintiff shall file a replication. Review of the
judgment or decree entered in such case shall be regulated
by rule of court. Whether such review be sought by writ or
error of by appeal the appellate court shall have full power
to render such judgment upon the records as law and justice
shall require."22
Although this statute did not permit the plaintiff to join legal
and equitable causes of action, as do the new Federal Rules, it
applied to any action at law and permitted any equitable defense
to be interposed even though it involved a form of relief peculiar
to equity.23
Professor Moore has pointed out that under this statute some
courts even permitted the plaintiff to combine, in a devious way,
what would have been at common law legal and equitable causes
of action. This was permitted by the weight of authority where
20 Moreland, Equitable Defenses, 1 W. & L. L. REv. 154, 164 (1940). But
see CLEPHANE, EQUITY PRACTCE & PLEADING 409 (1926). See Davis v. Teays, 44
Va. (3 Gratt.) 270 (1846). Contrast the procedure in the federal courts prior
to the adoption of the new rules. Under the Equitable Defense Act of 1915,
when an equitable defense was pleaded in a federal court an equitable issue
was raised and was tried by the court. Moreland, supra at 177. See 2 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRACTcE 346-7.
21 "While today equitable defenses whcn availed of become law defenses
and are tried by the jury with the other issues, it is perfectly feasible to
have issues in a law action retain their character as equitable issues to be
tried by the court." Moreland, Counterclaim and Equitable Defense in Vir.
ginia, 3 W. & L. L. REv. 47, 60 (1941). See text which follows.
22 88 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U.S.C. § 898 (1934).
23 More tersely stated, it permitted "equitable defenses and equitable relief
in actions at law." 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrE 841.
6
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the defendant pleaded a legal defense and then the plaintiff
pleaded equitable grounds in avoidance by replication.21 How-.
ever, the Second Circuit, in Keatley v. United States Trust Co.,25
held that where the defendant pleaded a legal defense, the statute
did not permit a replication interposing an equitable defense.
The facts in the Keatley case 26 were strikingly similar to
to those in Janney v. Virginian Ry.,2 7 decided recently by the
West Virginia court. In the Janney case, the plaintiff sought to
recover damages under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for
injuries suffered by him while acting as a brakeman for the
defendant. The defendant pleaded a release of the claim, and
the plaintiff by replication alleged that the release had been
executed by him under a mistake of fact. The court sustained
the demurrer to the replication, saying ".... .we are impressed
that nothing short of the formality of a suit in equity should be
deemed sufficient to deal properly with the situation."2s No ques-
tion was raised in the case concerning the possibility of establishing
the mistake as the basis for equitable relief in the law action,
and certainly there is no basis for considering this proper under
the existing rules. 9  However, both of these cases emphasize the
uselessness of requiring two actions simply because a matter
equitable in nature, a matter proper for the court to decide, is
involved. If anything remains for a jury to decide after the court
has decided the equitable issue, that right can be protected without
the necessity of two actions.3 Transferring the case to the equity
side of the court, the procedure next to be discussed, was not
24 Id. at 342. The possibility of combining legal and equitable causes
of action by virtue of this statute also existed where the plaintiff sued at law
and the defendant had both a legal and an equitable claim arising out of the
transaction sued on. Id. at 343. As to these claims the defendant could not
have joined them if he had sued, but as defendant he might join them. Note
this possibility under W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 5, § 5 (Michie, 1949).
"s 249 Fed. 296 (2d Cir. 1918). Factually this case held that where the
defendant's answer did not pray for affirmative relief, but pleaded a release
which on its face was a complete legal defense to the action, the plaintiff
could not, by filing a replication, obtain cancellation of the release, and that
cancellation of the release could be obtained only by a bill in equity.
26 A summary of the facts in this case is set forth in note 25 supra.
27 119 W. Va. 249, 193 S.E. 187 (1937).
28 Id. at 253, 193 S.E. at 189. Italics supplied.
29 E-isting West Virginia statutes are more restrictive than was Section
274b of the Judicial Code, so that even the majority rule thereunder, discussed
above in the text, offers no possibility of a different conclusion in this state.
None of the statutes permit the plaintiff to establish equitable rights in a
law action even as defenses to claims asserted by the defendant.
30 The manner in which this can be accomplished is discussed in the
text at notes 121-129 infra.
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mentioned in either of these cases. The Virginia court followed
this procedure in a similar case.31 Since the action was "properly
brought on the law side of the court", it is questionable whether
the court should have permitted transfer of the case.3 2  In any
event, even if this were done, it would not avoid the possible need
for two actions since it would merely prevent the pending case
from being dismissed. A second action would be needed if the
release were held invalid.
3. Transfer of Case to Proper Forum
A more recent development to prevent the necessity of
starting two proceedings because of the distinction between legal
and equitable rights is the section inserted in the West Virginia
Code in 1931 to permit the transfer of cases brought on the wrong
side of the court.3 3 Prior to that time where a case had been
brought on the wrong side of the court, the action or suit was
dismissed, and the plaintiff was required to start another pro-
ceeding in the proper forum.3 4 Under the present statute, if the
only question concerns the proper forum, the court must transfer
the case to the proper forum and direct such changes in the
pleadings as may be necessary to conform them to the proper
practice.3 5 Thereafter the case proceeds and is determined on
the amended pleadings, the defendant being allowed a reasonable
time after such transfer in which to prepare the case for trial.30
To digress for a moment, the action of the revisers in adopting
this solution rather than abolishing the distinction between
pleadings in actions at law and suits in equity seems inconsistent
with other action taken in this state to eliminate similar prob-
1 In Edge Hill Stock Farm v. Morris, 155 Va. 103, 154 S.E. 473 (1930),
the plaintiff brought an action at law (notice of motion for judgment) to
recover damages for injury to its property caused by the negligence of the
defendants. The defendants filed a special plea of arbitration and award.
Plaintiff's special replication attacking the award on equitable grounds was
not allowed by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the plaintiff had proceeded in the wrong forum, but remanded the
case with leave to the plaintiff "to have the same transferred to the equity
side of the court and to amend its pleadings so as to conform them to the
proper practice." Id. at 111, 154 S.E. at 475.
32 See text which follows.
33 "No case shall be dismissed simply because it was brought on the wrong
side of the court, but whenever it shall appear that a plaintiff has proceeded
at law when he should have proceeded in equity, or in equity when lie should
have proceeded at law, the court shall direct a transfer to the proper forum,
and shall order such change in, or amendment of, the pleadings as may be
necessary to conform them to the proper practice .... W. VA. CODE c. 56, art.
4, § 11 (Michie, 1949).
34 BPu.s, PLEADING & PRACTICe 320.
35 Ibid. See also the statutory language quoted in note 33 supra.
36 This part of the statute was not quoted in note 33 supra.
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lems.3 7 When cases were dismissed and new actions necessitated
because the pleader had chosen the wrong form of action, for
example, trespass rather than trespass on the case, because of
technical distinctions between the two, the forms of action were
consolidated.:8 Thereafter, a demurrer to a declaration in the
form which had been abolished would probably be sustained, 9
and an amendment be necessary to allege properly a cause of
action in the combined form.40 Being a formal change, this
ought not to require even a continuance,41 but delay in the trial
of a case can be expected where it is transferred from the law
37 A point of interest in the adoption of this procedure, in addition to
that which follows in the text, appears from a comparison with the federal
procedure existing when this change was made in 1931. Basically the pro-
cedure adopted is the same as that which was provided by Section 274a of
the Judicial Code which had been enacted in 1915. This was recognized
by the revisers. (Section 1251a, U. S. Compiled Statutes 1916 cited in the
Reviser's note to this section is the same statute.) The only material dif-
ference was the omission of this provision: "All testimony taken before such
amendment, if preserved, shall stand as testimony in the cause with like effect
as if the pleadings had been originally in the amended form." However, even
prior to the Act of 1915, the Equity Rules of 1912 had provided for the trans-
fer of a suit in equity to the law side if the proceeding had been brought
on the wrong side. (Rule 22). Another of these Rules of 1912 provided that
if a matter normally decided at law arose in an equity suit, it would be deter-
mined in that suit "according to principles applicable, without sending the
case or question to the law side of the court." (Rule 23). This latter pro-
cedure was not inserted by the revisers, with the result that equity suits
must be suspended, where such matters arise, until they can be decided in an
action at law. Under the federal rule the law action was not needed, even
though the issues proper for trial by jury were so tried and with the same
effect as if a separate action had been brought. 2 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 2.05. Compare the method of assuring right to trial by jury under a com-
bined system for legal and equitable remedies. See text at notes 121-129 infra.
38 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, § 10 (Michie, 1949). Compare also the statute
abolishing the action of replevin (Id. at c. 55, art. 7, § 4) and the statutory
changes in the action of detinue to make available to the plaintiff some of
the advantages which he might have obtained in an action of replevin at
common law (Id. at c. 55, art. 6). On the latter, see Note, 32 W. VA. L. Q.
137 (1926).
30 Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 52
W. VA. L. Rav. 137, 171 n. 165 (1950).
40 This may be the one place where the change in the statute embodying
the general rules on amendments would have practical significance. The revisers
inserted the provision that the court might permit pleadings to be amended
"changing the form of action." W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, § 24 (Michie, 1949).
The common law rule which did not allow an amendment which changed the
form of action had never been used by the West Virginia court as the basis for
denying the right to amend even prior to this change in the statute. Lugar,
Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 53 W. VA. REV.
27, 31 (1950).
4' Id. at 42.
9
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side to the equity side, or vice versa. 42  The distinction between
an adequate and an inadequate remedy at law43 may be as fine-
drawn as the difference between a direct and indirect injury."
In any event, although transferring a case from one side of
the court to the other may avoid starting a new action to obtain
some relief, it does not avoid the possible need of another action
or actions to obtain the complete relief to which the plaintiff or
plaintiffs may be entitled. This is especially likely to be true
when the case is transferred to the law side.45 Equity may grant
complete relief once it has assumed jurisdiction,4 but the law
court does not possess such power, especially because of limitations
existing in the forms of action and the limited scope of the
common law judgment.4
42 Note that this same criticism can be made of the rule that an amend-
ment is not allowed if it changes the cause of action. Ibid. Where a case
is transferred to the other forum, the statute alticipates a delay before the
case is tried. It provides that the defendant shall be allowed a reasonable
time after the transfer to prepare the case for trial. W. VA. CODE c. 56, art.
4, § 11 (Michie, 1949). See also the suggested form for an order transferring a
case from law to equity. HOGG, PLEADING& FORMs 696. Note also the omission
in the West Virginia statute as to testimony taken on the wrong side of the
court. See note 37 supra.
43 The adequacy of the remedy at law, is the usual defense to a suit in
equity. "It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to state any general
rule which would determine, in all cases, what should be deemed a suit in
equity as distinguished from an action at law, for particular elements may
enter into consideration which would take the matter from one court to
the other. Per Mr. Justice Field, in Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146,
151 (1891).
44 This was a distinction to be drawn in determining whether trespass
or trespass on the case was the proper form of action at common law. Lugar,
supra note 39, at 170 n. 160.
45 For example, see Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside & Dan River
Cotton Mills, 147 Va. 522, 137 S.E. 614 (1927), in which, on transfer of the
case to the law side as an action for damages, six of the plaintiffs who had
been joined in the suit for specific performance were dropped to conform the
pleadings to the practice in the law court; a result made necessary in this
case by the more restrictive rules of joinder as to parties and causes of action
on the law side. These rules were criticized in the first part of this paper.
46 ". . . where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction over some
portion or feature of a controversy, it may, and will in general, proceed to
decide the whole issues, and to award complete relief, although the rights of
the parties are strictly legal, and the final remedy granted is of the kind
which might be conferred by a court of law. I POMEROY, EQUITY JUR15-
PRauENcE § 231 (5th ed., Symons, 1941). This doctrine has been often applied
by the West Virginia court. One example will suffice. Williams v. Victory
Coal Co., 119 W. Va. 200, 192 S.E. 329 (1937).
47 This deficiency as to common law judgments has been noted with respect
to the limitations thereby imposed on the assertion of equitable defenses at law.
See text at notes 14-15 supra. No attempt is here made to discuss the existing
limitations at law on joinder of parties and causes of action. They were dis-
cussed in the first part of this paper.
10
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Even where the transfer is from law to equity, the court may
decide that an amendment in the pleadings will not be allowed
if matters are included in the bill which were not and could not
have been properly included in the law-action declaration. It
might be deemed a change in the cause of action.48  A change
from law to equity based on the same general factual situation
ought to be protected by the statute allowing amendments where
the transfer is ordered. After the transfer the pleader ought to
have the same freedom in drafting his pleadings as if he were
originally starting a suit on that side of the court based on the
same general factual situation which was the basis of his original
pleading;4 9 but as long as the general statute on amendments
contains the limitation and the court retains the sometimes
restrictive, but sometimes liberal, view of what is a new cause of
action, no prediction can be safely made.
Moreover, it may be that a transfer will not be allowed in
many cases. The statute provides that a case shall not be dis-
missed "simply because it was brought on the wrong side of the
court." The Virginia court, in construing the statute from which
ours was copied, 9 has indicated that this language justifies dis-
48 The statute permitting the transfer would seem to prevent this view
or at least to make the amendment proper as long as the changes in the plead-
ings refer only to the relief sought and the legal theory of recovery. The
Virginia court in deciding whether such amendments were proper commented:
"... This was not a new action in this case. The order remanding the cause
and permitting its transfer to the law side of the court and amendment
necessarily implied that the action should sound in damages for breach of
the contract which this court found, because of the circumstances of the case,
could not be specifically enforced .... ." Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside
& Dan River Cotton Mills, 147 Va. 522, 533, 137 S.E. 614, 617 (1927). The
same reasoning should apply where the case is transferred from law to equity.
However, any change in the facts on which recovery is based will raise the
question of whether the amendment should be permitted. Are the changes
merely "necessary to conform them to the proper practice" or do the facts as
changed amount to a new cause of action? Id. at 534, 137 S.E. at 618. Will
the court apply the comparatively liberal view of equity as to what amounts
to a change in the cause of action or the restrictive approach on the law
side of the court? The limitations on the law side were discussed in the
second part of this paper.
49 So long as new parties are not involved, adequate protection against
the assertion of stale claims would seem to be embodied in a rule which would
permit the amended pleading to assert any claim which arose out of the
"conduct, transaction, or occurrence" set forth or attempted to be set forth in
the original pleading. This prevents recovery on stale claims but avoids a
restrictive construction of the term "cause of action". Compare Rule 15 (c),
Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
so See Reviser's note to this section.
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missing a bill in equity where the subject matter would require
more than one action at law.5'
Apart from the likelihood that in many cases the statute will
not make it unnecessary for the plaintiff to bring several actions
to obtain complete relief, it seems that the defendant may not
rely upon the statute to avoid another proceeding to obtain
equitable relief. It is clear that the defendant may not under the
statute obtain a transfer of an action purely legal to the chancery
side of the court in order to assert a purely equitable defense5 2
or so that the case may be heard with a cause pending on the
chancery side.5 3  If the plaintiff has stated a legal cause, the
defendant must proceed with an independent suit in equity unless
he has one of the equitable defenses which may be asserted at
law. 4  Even assuming that the plaintiff has not stated a legal
cause, and assuming further that the facts alleged indicate that
he may obtain relief in equity, it is not clear that the defendant
can obtain a transfer of the case by interposing a demurrer to
the action at law or moving to transfer the cause.55 If the court
51 Brame v. Guarantee Finance Co., 139 Va. 394, 124 S.E. 477 (1924); see
French v. Stange Mining Co., 133 Va. 602, 632, 114 S.E. 121, 130 (1922). In
the latter case the court said: ". . . since two separate actions must be brought
against these parties, a transfer of the cause to the law side of the court with
directions to reframe the pleadings would have little, if any, advantage over
dismissing the suit without prejudice, which, in effect, was what the court did.
In no just sense can it be said that the suit was dismissed 'simply because it
was brought on the wrong side of the court.'" Ibid. Compare, however,
Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, 147 Va. 522, 137
S.E. 614 (1927), wherein the action was transferred to the law side and one
party proceeded alone against the defendant, six plaintiffs who had been
associated in the bill of complaint being dropped in the law action to con-
form with that practice.
Presumably the plaintiffs would have one year from the dismissal within
which to start their actions at law, if the statute of limitations had not run
on the claims when the suit was started, even though the original periods
of limitations expire prior to that time. See Lugar, supra note 40, at 36 n.
40 (1950).
-12 Dexter-Portland Cement Co. v. Acme Supply Co., 147 Va. 758, 133 S.E.
788 (1926).
53 Conway v. American National Bank of Danville, 146 Va. 357, 131 S.E.
803 (1926).
54 See text at notes 13-18 supra.
55 Prior to the time that the court was authorized to transfer a case
brought on the wrong side of the court, the defendant might demur to the
bill of complaint or declaration for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter,
and apparently a demurrer may still be used to raise the point. BuRus,
PLEADING & PRACTICE 320. Perhaps a better method to raise the point would
be by motion to have the cause transferred. See Thomas Andrews & Co. v.
Robinson, 155 Va. 362, 366, 154 S.E. 514, 515 (1930). Certainly this was true
when a comparable procedure prevailed in the federal courts, since a demurrer
would be sustained only when the pleadings failed to state a cause on eithcr
side of the court. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 338.
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would dismiss the case "simply because it was brought on the
wrong side of the court," it is mandatory that the court transfer
the case on motion of the plaintiff;50 but the statute is primarily
for the benefit of the plaintiff,57 and if he stands on his pleading
and refuses to transfer the case, he is deemed to have waived the
benefit of the statute and cannot rely upon it on appeal.58 This
has been the position of the Virginia court. None of the cases
has, however, involved a situation in which a cause proper for
the other side of the court was alleged and the plaintiff did not
desire a transfer but the defendant requested one. 59  Similar
problems arose under the former comparable procedure in the
federal courts. 60
56 Nash v. Harman, 148 Va. 610, 139 S.E. 273 (1927) (defendant demurred;
demurrer sustained; plaintiff moved to transfer). This was the court's reason-
ing: ". . . It sufficiently appears that the real reason for the court's action
in dismissing the suit was because it was brought on the wrong side of the
court. Where this is the case, the statute is mandatory." Id. at 615, 139 S.E.
at 275. Note here that the plaintiff had moved for the transfer.
57 See Conway v. American National Bank of Danville, 146 Va. 357, 861,
131 S.E. 803, 804 (1926); French v. Stange Mining Co., 133 Va. 602, 631, 114
S.E. 121, 130 (1922).
58 The Virginia court, in taking the position that dismissal of a case
under these circumstances was not "simply because it was brought on the
wrong side of the court", stated: ". . . In this case the court did not dismiss
the proceeding simply for that reason, but because after complainants had
been offered and had rejected the privilege of amending their pleadings, they
signified 'their intention to stand by their bill... ' and made 'no motion to
remand this cause to the law side of the court...'" French v. Stange Mining
Co., 133 Va. 602, 632, 114 S.E. 121, 130 (1922). Note, however, that even
under these circumstances the dismissal should be without prejudice to the
right of the plaintiff to institute an action or suit on the proper side of the
court. George H. Rucker & Co. v. Glennan, 130 Va. 511, 107 S.E. 725 (1921).
Compare the dictum in J. S. Salyer Co. v. A. J. Doss Coal Co., 157 Va. 144, 150,
160 S.E. 54, 56 (1931), to the effect that the court should have transferred
the case even if the demurrer had been properly sustained on the basis that
the action was in the wrong forum, no mention being made of the necessity
for a motion by the plaintiff to transfer the case. See also the Virginia case
discussed in note 31 supra.
59 In Foreman v. Clement, 139 Va. 70, 123 S.E. 336 (1924), the defendant
made a motion that the case be transferred to the chancery side of the court,
but the court held that the motion was properly overruled since the matter
involved in the defendant's plea, the basis on which the motion to transfer
had been made, did not make a basis for equity jurisdiction. Note the dictum
in J. S. Salyer Co. v. A. J. Doss Coal Co., supra note 58, to the effect that a
demurrer alone may result in a transfer of the case.
Of interest is the decision in Thomas Andrews & Co. v. Robinson, 155 Va.
362, 154 S.E. 514 (1930). Basing the holding on this statute, the court held
that the defendant could not raise the point that the law court was without
jurisdiction since that issue had been waived by not moving that the case
be transferred to the chancery side.
60 2 MooRE, FEDARAL PRAMCE § 2.05, especially pages 334-335, 339. As
to the federal cases, it is important to note, however, that the Virginia court
has taken the position that the state statute does not place as great a burden
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In West Virginia the court has applied the statute in three
cases, only two of which have any bearing on the questions
discussed here, and neither of those is very enlightening since the
court merely directed transfers where the cases had been started
on the wrong side of the court without discussing the points
considered by the Virginia court. It may be that the West
Virginia court will place, as has the Virginia court, less emphasis
on the provision in the statute that the case shall be transferred
than on the introductory provision that no case shall be dismissed
simply because it was brought on the wrong side of the court.
In Wilson v. Mutual Protective Ass'n of W. Va.,,; the court made
this observation:
"For the reasons thus stated we are of opinion the circuit
court committed no error in sustaining the demurrer to the
bill, but following such ruling, the cause should have been
transferred to the law side of the court under Code, 56-4-11,
which provides that 'no case shall be dismissed simply because
it was brought on the wrong side of the court', but shall be
transferred to the proper side."0 2
However, as applied, the plaintiff may be entitled to the benefits
of the statute in West .Virginia even though he does not move
to transfer the case.-3 It may be that this right may be invoked
in the appellate court even though he was offered and rejected
the privilege by the trial court which dismissed the action for
this reason.6 4 It seems to be unnecessary for the plaintiff to take
upon trial courts as to reforming the pleadings as was imposed by the federal
statute. BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE 320 n. 56.
01 120 W. Va. 465, 199 S.E. 258 (1938).
62 Id. at 468, 199 S.E. at 259.
63 Note that in the Wilson case there was no motion by the plaintiff to
transfer the case, but the court took the position that, after sustaining a
demurrer to a bill in equity on the basis that the remedy at law was adequate,
the trial court should have transferred the cause to the law side of the court.
See quotation from this case in text above. Compare the decree enteret by
the trial court in Murray v. Price, 114 W. Va. 425, 427, 172 S.E. 541 (1933), in
which the demurrer being sustained since the plaintiff had shown no grounds
of equity jurisdiction, the bill was dismissed without prejudice to the right
of the plaintiff to have the case transferred. See, however, the cases cited
in note 87 infra.
64 In Vinson v. Home Ins. Co., 123 W. Va. 522, 16 S.E.2d 924 (1941), a
demurrer to the declaration was sustained and the case was dismissed with
prejudice, the plaintiff having declined "to amend". On writ of error brought
by the plaintiff the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in so far
as it sustained the demurrer and remanded the case "with directions to trans-
fer to the chancery docket". In neither the court's opinion nor in the order
entered by the trial court (Record p. 22) does it appear that the leave given
to amend was for the purpose of changing the action to a suit in equity, and
further the order of the trial court does not disclose the basis on which the
demurrer was sustained. In his brief at pages 5 and 6 counsel for the defendant
14
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this risk. If the court sustains a demurrer to a bill in chancery
and dismisses it even without prejudice to the plaintiff's right
to transfer the cause to the law side, the decree is appealable.6 5
The plaintiff is not compelled to have his rights determined in
a court of law before ascertaining whether the chancellor erred
in denying equity jurisdiction. The ruling of the trial court,
sustaining a demurrer on the basis that the action is in the
wrong forum, may also be certified to the Supreme Court of
Appeals;6 and if the ruling of the trial court is affirmed, the
cause may then be transferred to the proper side of the court.67
Also, where the trial court properly ruled that the plaintiff could
not proceed at law, the appellate court, on writ of error brought
by the plaintiff, may remand the case with directions that it be
transferred to the chancery docket for further proceedings." The
Virginia court has also taken this position.6 9 The earlier Virginia
case in which the plaintiff was not permitted to claim the benefit
of the statute on appeal, not having accepted the privilege of
transfer in the trial court, was not mentioned in the decision.7 0
states that argument on the demurrer was based on the proposition that the
proper remedy was in equity and that the court concurring in this view offered
the plaintiff an opportunity to change his action t6 a suit in equity. It is
interesting to note, however, that counsel raised these points to charge the
plaintiff with the costs of the appeal, while conceding that the judgment
should be modified to transfer the case to the equity side of the court.
In Virginia a different result might have been reached. See note 58 supra
and the text which it accompanies. See also the West Virginia oases cited in
note 87 infra.
5, Murray v. Price, 114 W. Va. 425, 172 S.E. 541 (1933), 40 W. VA. L. Q.
274 (1934). The court says that to require a determination of rights first at
law not only would work hardship on the plaintiff but would also "tend, in
many instances, to occasion and to prolong useless litigation." Id. at 429, 172
S.E. at 542. Compare the result where a writ of error is granted after the
demurrer is sustained to a declaration at law and the case is dismissed with
prejudice. See note 64 supra.
66 "Any . . . challenge of the sufficiency of a pleading . . . may, in the
discretion of the circuit court in which it arises, and shall, on the joint
application of the parties to the suit, in beneficial interest, be certified by it
to the supreme court of appeals for its decision, and further proceedings in
the case stayed until such question shall have been decided and the decision
thereof certified back . V..."W. VA. CODE c. 58, art. 5, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
67 Wilson v. Mutual Protective Ass'n of W. Va., 120 W. Va. 465, 199 S.E.
258 (1938).
6s Vinson v. Home Ins. Co., 123 V. Va. 522, 16 S.E.2d 924 (1941). This
case is discussed more in detail in note 64 supra.
69 Edge Hill Stock Farm v. Morris, 155 Va. 103, 154 S.E. 473 (1930).
The facts in this case have been summarized in note 31 supra. Note that the
plaintiff had not moved that the case be transferred.
70 See note 58 supra and the text which it accompanies.
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That holding seems to have been limited strictly to the facts
there involved by this later decision.T1
No complaint is voiced as to the West Virginia decisions
since it will often be difficult for the plaintiff to determine on
the facts of his case whether relief is obtainable at law or in equity,
and the statute should be liberally construed to permit recovery
without a new action.
It may be that under this statute the defense that the proper
remedy lies on the other side of the court will not be used as
often as it has been in the past. The defendant no longer can
expect to gain the delay incident to the starting of a new action
if he prevails in such defense. Nor is there a possibility that he
may succeed on a plea of the statute of limitations to the amended
pleading, where the statutory period expires after the original
action was started, so long as there is no change in the cause of
action.72
Another former rule in federal courts made even a transfer
unnecessary for decision of legal issues. However, there is no
statute or rule in West Virginia comparable to the former federal
rule which permitted a matter ordinarily tried at law to be deter-
mined in an equity suit according to the legal principles applica-
ble, without sending the case or question to the law side of the
court. 71 The rule seems sensible, but the formality of suspending
the equity suit until the matter can be determined at law prevails
in this jurisdiction,7 4 unless the question to be decided is one that
would be decided by the court, rather than by the jury, in the
71 It seems that on appeal or writ of error the plaintiff will be granted
the privilege of transferring the case even though he has made no motion for
such transfer in the trial court, so long as he has not declined to accept the
privilege if offered by the trial court. Some question may arise even as to this
limitation in West Virginia. See note 64 supra and the text which it accom-
panies.
72 Thomas Branch & Co. v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, 147
Va. 522, 137 S.E. 614 (1927). See discussion of this case in note 48 supra.
The leading case for this proposition is Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S.
207 (1918).
73 See note 37 supra.
74 The principal case to support this proposition is Freer v. Davis, 52
W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1902), wherein the court decided that the equity
court might grant relief to preserve the status quo pending the determination
of the matters at law, "if it appears from the bill that the complainant in-
tends immediately to put the question . . . into a course of judicial deter-
mination and prosecute it diligently." See Pardee v. Camden Lumber Co., 70
W. Va. 68, 73 S.E. 82 (1911), where the action at law had been started before
relief was sought in equity. For other West Virginia cases, see Note, 43 W. VA.
L. Q. 70 (1936).
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action at law.7 5  Although this federal rule has been superseded
by the new Federal Rules, the same result is accomplished there-
under, the right to trial by jury having been preserved. Since the
equity suit is suspended in West Virginia only where the matter
to be decided at law would be decided by the jury, there seems
to be no reason why the entire case should not be decided in one
proceeding if issues formerly proper for the jury continue to be so
decided and with the same effect, if either party demands a jury
trial as to those issues. This would be the result under the Federal
Rules.
The statute permitting transfers from law to equity, or vice
versa, was originally inserted in the Virginia Code of 1919. Judge
Burks, one of the revisers of that code, stated that it was one of the
two changes which together would give advocates of the code
pleading "full opportunity to develop the merits" of that system.70
Statements of this nature by eminent members of the bench and
bar may have led many to believe that our existing procedure is as
modern as any code pleading system and that little can be gained
by adoption of a new system.77 As herein indicated, the similarity
between this procedure and modern code pleading is negligible.
However, as applied by the Virginia court, the statute has shown
that there is no fundamental reason why there should be two sides
of the court. That court has held that it is not reversible error
for a court of equity to retain jurisdiction of a case which should
. . . The dispute, to defeat an injunction to restrain a trespass, must
he such as makes the intervention of a trial by jury necessary. If the facts
relating to the title are undisputed, the question is one of law only, and a
jury trial is not only unnecessary, but impossible except as to mere matter of
form, for the jury must take the law from the court ....... Suit v. Hochstetter
Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 323, 61 S.E. 307, 310 (1908) (applied to the construc-
tion of a clause in a deed). For similar expressions of the rule, see Ephraim
Creek Coal & Coke Co. v. Bragg, 75 AV. Va. 70, 72, 83 S.E. 190, 191 (1914);
Pocahontas Coal & Coke Co. v. Bower, Ill Wv. Va. 712, 718, 163 S.E. 421, 424
(1932) ; United Thacker Coal Co. v. Newsome, 129 V. Va. 86, 90, 38 S.E.2d 660,
662 (1946).
70 Burks, The Code of 1919, 5 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 97, 120 (1919). The
other change to which he referred was the enlargement of the notice by
motion proceeding to permit it in lieu of any action at law. After referring
to Judge Burks' statement, the West Virginia court had this to say: ". . . The
language of the statute itself mirrors the legislative intent to adhere to the
prevailing distinction between courts of equity and courts of law. Hence,
consideration of cases based on code practice is unnecessary." Murray v. Price,
114 W. Va. 425, 429, 172 S.E. 541, 542 (1933).
77 Note also this reference to the statute authorizing transfer of cases
from one forum to the other. "It is but a step from this statute to another
abolishing the distinction between a common law action and a bill in chancery."
1 HOGG, EqUrrY PROCEDURE § 855 (3d ed., Miller, 1943). A step, but what
a stepi
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have been transferred to the law side of the court,78 or to transfer
a case to the equity side which should have been retained on the
law side,"0 if the court gives the defendant every substantive right
to which he would be entitled on the proper side.80 The court
acting may be deemed to act as a substitute for the proper court.
The desirability of this result seems unquestionable, especially
where, as in West Virginia, the same judge presides in both courts.81
It is not likely that the West Virginia court will be impressed
by the Virginia court's view that an equtiy court may act as a substi-
tute for the law court. This court has taken the position that an
equity court has no jurisdiction, in the sense of power, to decide
a matter where the remedy is properly at law, and that the ap-
pellate court has a duty to correct any decree of a lower court which
exceeds its jurisdiction in this respect.82  This view not only per-
mits the defendant to raise the objection for the first time after a
78 Iron City Savings Bank v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 164 S.E. 520 (1932)
(acts as a substitute for a court of law rather than as a court of chancery);
Sacks v. Theodore, 136 Va. 466, 118 S.E. 105 (1923) (on the facts in the case
awarding an issue out of chancery to ascertain the damages protected the
rights of the parties to trial by jury).
79 Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., 171 Va. 403, 199 S.E. 489 (1938) (all
essential facts were admitted; sole questions presented were questions of law).
s The Virginia cases are cited in notes 78 and 79 supra. The leading
case for the general proposition here involved is Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon
National Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
R1 Where the equity court acts when the action should have been at
law, the question most likely to arise is whether the parties have been
deprived of a right to trial by jury. Note the soundness of this reasoning by
the Virginia court: "It must be admitted that a party has a right to a trial
by jury, when the facts are in conflict. In such a case, to deprive a person of
that right is a denial of a substantive right. Unquestionably, however, the right
may be waived, and it is equally true that if there is no issue of fact to be sub-
mitted to a jury, and there is nothing to be decided by a jury, a denial of a
jury trial is not a denial of a substantive right." Quick v. Southern Church-
man Co., 171 Va. 403, 415, 199 S.E. 489, 494 (1938). As to waiver of the
right, Professor Moore takes the position that not even a motion to dismiss
(demurrer in West Virginia) the equity suit shoult protect the right and
that unless the defendant moves to transfer the case he should be deemed to
waive his right to jury trial. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 335. See, however,
the conservative view taken by the West Virginia court both as to waiver of the
right and power of one court to act as a substitute for the other. See text
which follows.
82 Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1902). In this case the
plaintiffs brought a suit in equity to recover possession of land from the
defendants who were claiming under adverse titles. The court found that
there was such a conflict in the facts as to the title that the parties had a
right to trial by jury, that the equity court therefore had no jurisdiction to
pass upon the question of title even though the error in its doing so was induced
by the plaintiffs, that consent cannot confer jurisdiction, and that the court
has the duty, on its own motion, to correct this excess of jurisdiction.
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full hearing on the merits,8 3 but it also makes it possible for the
plaintiff to choose the equity court and then, after a final adjudica-
tion against him, permits him to compel the defendant to go
through an action at law on the same facts S4 Although the parties
in an action at law may waive the right to trial by jury, they are
not permitted to do so by submission of the matter to an equity
court for decision.8 5 The only penalty attached is that the plaintiff
who loses, appeals, and wins on this basis, must pay the costs of
the appeal for not having raised the question in the trial court.8 6
Under the present statute the appellate court might remand these
cases with direction that they be transferred to the law side of the
court for proper amendment and retrial.8 7  In any event, on a
retrial on the law side if both parties waive trial by jury, the court
would be required to hear the same evidence again, if still avail-
able, and presumably would reach the same conclusion.88 Cer-
tainly there seems to be no justification for this result when neither
party originally indicated any desire for trial by jury. If this ap-
83 Even the vigorous dissent in Freer v. Davis, note 82 supra, concedes
that if the decree had been against the defendants, they could have raised
the question of jurisdiction. For the majority view, see note 84 infra.
84 Although the court acted on its own motion in Freer v. Davis, note
82 supra, the court also expressed the opinion that the better view would
permit the plaintiff to raise the question of jurisdiction even though he had
sought relief in that court. Accord, Sprinkle v. Duty, 54 W. Va. 559, 46 S.E.
557 (1904). Note that the decree in this case which was set aside was an
order of dismissal. The dissent vigorously asserted that equity had jurisdiction
in the sense of power to act, that it was not a matter of conferring jurisdiction
by consent, and that the parties waived the right to trial by jury when they
submitted the case to an equity court. The view of the dissent is sound and
is the majority view today. "There is no longer any doubt that equity has
the power to try that issue [title in trespass cases] without a jury if the parties
waive jury trial. The plaintiff waives by bringing his action on the equity
side of the court, and the defendant waives by pleading without raising the
question of his right to jury trial." WALSH, EQUITY 165 (1930). For a detailed
discussion of the question, see CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EquITY 296-349
(1950). The majority in the case took the position that this would be a waiver
which was accomplished "irregularly and indirectly by the court and counsel
and probably without the plaintiffs' having been apprised of the waiver."
Note that this case was followed in Nolan v. Guardian Coal & Oil Co., 119
W. Va. 545, 194 S.E. 347 (1937) and Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S.E.
920 (1921). See Bishop's Ex'rs v. Bishop's Heirs, 119 W.Va. 415, 417, 193 S.E.
910, 911 (1937).
sr See note 84 supra.
56 Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1902); Sprinkle v. Duty, 54
W. Va. 559, 46 S.E. 557 (1904).
87 See notes 63 and 68 supra and the text which they accompany; but
this action was not taken in Nolan v. Guardian Coal & Oil Co., 119 W. Va.
545, 194 S.E. 347 (1937), or Thacker v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 129 W. Va.
520, 41 S.E.2d 111 (1946).
88 Compare Denison v. Keck, 13 F.2d 384 (8th Cir. 1926), and the criticism
thereof in 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 40..
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proach is to be followed, an interesting question arises as to what
result would follow if both parties waived the right to trial by
jury in an action at law and the appellate court then decides that
only an equity court has "jurisdiction". 89
It appears therefore that there are basic differences between
the combined procedure in federal courts and that which exists in
West Virginia courts. Aside from the difficulty of determining to
what extent the existing statutes were designed to alleviate the
delays which were necessary from a separation of courts to enforce
legal and equitable rights, it is clear that the time which could be
saved from a merger of the two systems cannot be attained under
the present law. Are there reasons why the delay now experienced
may be necessary in order to protect the rights of parties to litiga-
tion? This will now be considered.
C. Possible Objections to the Federal Rule
Designing any tool to replace two which were formerly used
offers certain problems. However, not many would prefer to con-
tinue the use of the two instruments if a new one can be used as
efficiently for any of the operations for which the separate tools
were formerly employed. The number should be even smaller if
the one tool can accomplish the complete assignment more effi-
ciently than the two formerly did. Litigants who pay the price of
obstructive technicalities are certainly interested in this objective. °
Some practitioners feel, however, that the combined procedure
should not replace the existing bifurcated system of law and equity.
Some of the objections, which merit consideration, are on constitu-
tional grounds, but more often the opposition is in terms of fear
that some other substantive right will be affected. The objections
most often raised will be discussed.
1. Constitutionality
There may be some who would raise an objection based on
the constitutional provision which gives the circuit courts juris-
diction of "all matters at law where the amount in controversy,
89 For cases in which the defendant proceeded to trial at law without
objecting that the proper remedy was in equity, when the transfer procedure
existed in federal courts, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTrcE 338.
90 "... . many members of the bench and bar . . .are inclined to forget
that both bench and bar are merely servants of the people, the better to enable
the administration of justice to be accomplished." BORCHARD, DEcLARATORI
JUDGMENTS Viii.
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cxclusive of interest, exceeds fifty dollars", and in a separate phrase
provides that they shall have jurisdiction of "all cases in equity".91
Does this mean that cases at law and in equity must be treated
separately, as they were when the constitution was adopted? A
similar provision in the Constitution of the United States provides
that the judicial power of the United States "shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity," arising under the constitution, laws of
the United States and treaties.92  There are many dicta that this
provision requires a separation of legal and equitable proceed-
ings.93 However, analysis of those cases indicates that what the
courts really had in mind was that legislation could not take away
power of the courts to give both legal and equitable remedies, not
that the procedure under which those remedies were made avail-
able could not be amalgamated. 4  Professor Moore has taken the
position that the main provision refers to all cases, and the phrase
in law and equity is in form explanatory of all, adding emphasis
to it, and that no intent is indicated to require one single means
of enforcing these rights.9 5 As previously noted, and to be devel-
oped more in detail, the new Federal Rules did not alter any of
the legal or equitable remedies or rights-only the method of en-
forcing those rights was changed. A similar combined procedure
would seem to satisfy the requirements of the comparable provi-
sion of the state constitution, for not only are the same considera-
tions present, but in addition the separate listing of cases at law
and in equity was needed because of the monetary limitation on
jurisdiction for actions at law.9 6
The other constitutional provision, which creates greater prob-
lems under a combined proceeding but does not prevent a union
of law and equity procedure, reads: "In suits at common law,
where the value in controversy exceeds twenty dollars exclusive
of interest and costs, the right of trail by jury, if required by either
91 W. VA. CONST. Art. VIII, § 12. Italics supplied.
92 U. S. CONsr. Art. III, § 2. Italics supplied.
93 Bennett v. Butterworth, 11 How. 669, 674 (1850); McFaul v. Ramsey,
20 How. 523, 525 (1857); Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U.S. 536, 550 (1900). These
statements and others to the same effect are discussed in Pound, Law and
Equity in the Federal Courts-Abolishing the Distinction and Other Reforms,
73 CENT. L.J. 204 (1911).
94 Pound, supra note 93, ut 207.
or 2 MoowE, FEDERAL PRA~cra 313.
90 For a general discussion of the problem here involved, see Clark and
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE LJ. 387,
394-401 (1935), noting also the other articles therein cited.
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party, shall be preserved....,, This provision is strikingly
like the one in the Constitution of the United States which
preserves the right to trial by jury,"" and neither it nor simi-
lar provisions in other state constitutions prevent the adop-
tion of a unified procedure.9 9  It is now well settled that
the restriction applies only to the trial and is operative only
at the trial stage of a contested case with respect to the issues as they
have been formulated. The early view that it forced various dif-
ferentiations in the forms and details of pleading has lost favor.100
The right to trial by jury should be treated as a problem at the
trial stage, if, but only if, the case reaches that stage and a jury is
requested by either party. The pleadings need not be affected by
the right.'0 1
Apart from the constitutional right to trial by jury, this right
has also been given by statute for the determination of certain
issues of fact. 02 These statutory rights may be altered by legisla-
tion, but they need not be affected by a union of law and equity.
These rights may be protected as easily as the constitutional right,
and by the same approach to the problem. This method will now
be described.
The constitution preserves the right to trail by jury as it
existed at common law prior to the time the constitution was
adopted.0 1 Where the issue is one to be decided in a suit in
equity, the chancellor may submit issues of fact to a jury as a
matter of discretion,'0 4 but the constitution preserves no right to a
jury trial on such issues.0 5 Where remedies have been created
since the adoption of the constitution, no right to a trial by jury
97 W. VA. CONsT. Art. III, § 13. Italics supplied.
08 "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. "U.S. CONt.
AMEND. VII.
09 The earliest case deciding this point is Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N.Y.
270 (1858). A comprehensive discussion of the problem appears in Scott,
Trial by Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1918).
100 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrscE 312.
101 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 93-94. The views expressed here will be dle-
veloped further in the text.
12 For example, W. VA. CODE c. 41, art. 5, § 11 and c. 56, art. 4, § 55
(Michie, 1949). See generally 7 M.J., Equity § 133 (1949).
1o Simms v. Dillon, 119 W. Va. 284, 193 S.E. 331 (1937); Lawhead v.
Grand Lodge, 115 W. Va. 475, 176 S.E. 860 (1934); Cecil v. Clark, 44 W. Va.
659, 30 S.E. 216 (1898); James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of
Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022 (1936).
104 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, § 4 (Michie, 1949). For details on this
procedure, see 7 M.J., Equity §§ 131-156 (1949).
05 Statutes may give the right to jury trial on such issues. See note 102
supra.
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is preserved.1°0  The test is purely historical. 0 7  Legal claims may
have been settled in equity, or equitable doctrines may have been
applied in actions at law, at the time of the adoption of the consti-
tution.10s These questions may arise independently of any prob-
lems in a union of law and equity. They will determine constitu-
tional rights of jury trial under any combined system. If the con-
stitution does not preserve and assure a right to trial by jury, then
statutes would be applied to determine whether trial of the issue
formulated should be by jury.0 9 Where the right to trial by jury
exists, the same examination would be made to determine the effect
to be given to the verdict.1 0 The rule preserving the right to trial
by jury under a combined procedure may be worded in different
ways,"' but it need require only a determination as to whether the
disputed question of fact is one as to which a party would be
entitled to a trial by jury under the present law and what binding
effect the verdict has.1 2 That this is all that is involved has already
100 Lawhead v. Grand Lodge, 115 W. Va. 475, 176 S.E. 860 (1934).
107 James, supra note 103, at 1023.
10s ". . . Due largely to the rule that equity, once having obtained
jurisdiction, would go on to give complete relief, many legal claims were
actually disposed of in equity. On the other hand, certain equitable doctrines
had worked over into the law, such as equitable estoppel as a defense to
ejectment .... CLARK, CODE PLEADING 92.
109 It may be a matter formerly triable in equity but by a jury rather
than by the court by virtue of a statute existing when law and equity pro-
cedure were combined. Conversely, it might be a matter formerly triable at
law when the merger was effected by virtue of a statute triable by the court
and not by a jury. The latter type statute would meet the constitutional
test if the remedy were created after the adoption of the constitution (see
text above) or the matter were cognizable only in equity prior to the adoption
of the constitution. Fisher v. Sommerville, 83 W. Va. 160, 98 S.E. 67 (1919).
110 For example, assume that the issue being tried involves an equit-
able right but is one which by virtue of a statute an equity court would
have submitted to a jury, it is the type in which the verdict would be merely
advisory or would it be binding?
Ill There are two general ways in which this has been done. Some states
have provided expressly that the historical test of issues formerly triable to
a jury shall determine the right to jury trial. Others have attempted to
enumerate the kinds of action which shall be tried by a jury under the merged
system. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 95-102. The first method seems preferable
for the question when raised may be decided thereunder by "a comparatively
limited historical investigation." Note how simply a rule of this type may
be stated: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be pre-
served to the parties inviolate." Rule 38 (a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.
(1950). Rules of the second type are difficult to phrase and if literally ap-
plied often indicate that jury trial is required where it clearly was not prior
to the merger.
112 As limited to the constitutional right, Judge Clark succinctly states
the problem in this way: ". . . And in practice this means that if the issue
would have been tried to the jury in the law court just prior to the adoption
of the codes, either party may now claim such trial as of right." CLARK, CODE
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been recognized by the Supreme Court of Appeals in the rule es-
tablishing a unified proceeding for declaratory judgments in West
Virginia.'" Thus, if the relief sought is clearly legal and no so-
called equitable defense 114 is asserted or if the relief is to be clearly
equitable, no problem as to jury trial arises.
Even where legal and equitable claims and defenses are as-
serted in the same action, the problem ought not become compli-
cated if it is kept in mind that actions under a unified procedure
are neither legal nor equitable; it is an action in which rights form-
erly legal or equitable, or both, are being enforced. An attempt to
classify the action as legal or equitable may result in the require-
ment of a jury trial where one would not have been needed in en-
forcing the same remedy under the former procedure. The terms
of the rule effecting a unified procedure ought to be interpreted in
the light of the history surrounding the remedy. To use an ex-
ample given by Judge Clark, an action to reform a contract and
to recover on it as reformed is not a combined legal and equitable
action, but is an action to enforce an equitable remedy and is
triable to the court.1 5
The use of an historical approach in the construction of the
rule is especially important when so-called equitable defenses are
set up. The form of the pleading ought not be controlling, that is,
whether the claim is set up as a defense or a counterclaim, but
rather the nature of the claim should determine the right to jury
trial. If the issue raised by the "defense" would formerly have
been triable only in equity, such issue should be tried to the
court." 6 The real problem in West Virginia would be in contract
actions where the defense may be now asserted at law by virtue
of the statute with a right to trial by jury or it may be made the
PLEADING 92. See also WALSH, EQUITY 116 (1930). The same test may be applied
broadly to the right under existing statutes if the merger is made without any
attempt to specify particular actions or issues which shall be tried by a jury.
See note Ill supra. For a discussion of some problems which may arise where
a statute attempts to enumerate actions which shall be tried by a jury after
the merger, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 103-106. Statutes of this nature are
needed only if the right to trial by jury is to be granted where it did not
exist prior to the merger.
13 See text at note 11 supra.
114 The term as used here refers to matters relied on by the defendant
for his defense which prior to the merger would have been cognizable only in
equity as the basis for affirmative action. This does not include matters
which may now be set up as defenses at law or may be used as the basis for
relief in equity. See text at notes 117-120 infra.
115 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 99. Other examples of this approach with cita-
tion of authorities are there given.
- 116 Id. at 103-106.
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basis of an independent suit in equity.117 The same problem could
arise in the "equitable defenses" now available in unlawful entry
and detainer and ejectment."8 To the extent that these defenses
were not available at common law at the time the constitution
was adopted, the right to trial by jury could be clarified by legis-
lation."', In the absence of legislation, a general rule preserving
the right to trial by jury as it existed immediately before the
merger should be interpreted to give the defendant, but not the
plaintiff, the right to demand a determination of the issue by a
jury. Substantive rights are not to be changed by the combining
of procedure, and the defendant now has the right to determine
whether the issue shall be tried by a jury under existing law by
electing whether to set up the defense at law or by a separate
suit in equity. 20 Under the merger he would be required to
assert his defense in the same action but that is not to affect his
remedial rights.
Where both legal and equitable issues are formulated in the
same action, the order in which the issues shall be tried may
present a problem. Where the equitable remedy asserted would
prevail over the legal right presented, 12 and there is no waiver
of trial by jury, the court may try the equitable issues first and
then the legal issues may be heard by the jury if determination
of the equitable issues has not settled the case.12 2 This will usually
be the preferable procedure since the establishment of the equit-
117 See text at notes 13-20 supra.
1's Ibid.
119 See note 103 supra.
120 No complication is involved if the defense be one which the defendant
is required to assert at law if an action has been instituted against him even
though in the first instance he might have used the matter as the basis for
relief in equity. E.g., Prewett v. Citizens National Bank of Parkersburg, 66
W. Va. 184, 66 S.E. 231 (1909). Here the defendant would have had a right
to trial by jury prior to the merger.
12, It seems unnecessary here to revive the academic argument as to whether
there is a conflict between law and equity; practically it is necessary to con-
cede that rules of equity may prevent the enforcement of legal rights, and
tinder a merged system the rules of equity would prevail if there were a variance
between them and the rules of law applicable to the facts involved.
122 This problem existed under the former rule in federal courts which
permitted equitable defenses and equitable relief in actions at law. See text
at note 22 supra. In referring to this period Professor Moore states: ". . . a
number of courts stated dogmatically that the equitable issues were to be
determined first. But this is a matter which should be left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, for there is no inherent reason requiring settle-
mnent of the equitable issues first in all cases. This discretion is given the
court by Rule 42 (b)." 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 347. See WALSH, EQUITY §
23 (1930).
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able remedy would nullify the legal right. However, in some
cases it may be more convenient for the court to hear the equitable
issues at the same time that the jury is hearing the legal issues,
to the extent that the same evidence is material. 12' This might
be the better procedure if it appear that the defendant is not
likely to prevail on the equitable issues.1 24  Where issues of both
types are heard, findings of fact as to each will permit the appellate
court to decide the case without sending it back for a new trial
because it was decided on the wrong issues.125 If the equitable
issues are such that a party has a statutory right to trial by jury 2
or the court in its discretion decides to obtain an advisory
verdict, 12 7 the court may send the entire case, including the legal
issues, to the jury and give the same effect to its findings on the
issues submitted as are now given to a jury's verdict on those
issues.12s
Often the problems here suggested will not arise since the
case may never come to trial; where it does, the issues may be
entirely questions of law or, if there be issues of fact, the parties
may have waived the right to trial by jury.1 29 This raises a
related question concerning the existing West Virginia practice.
The constitution preserves the right to trial by jury if required
by either party". 130 However, the statute goes further and pro-
vides in effect that if the defendant has appeared, then both parties
or their counsel must waive the right to a jury by consent entered
of record before the case may be heard and determined by the
court."' Earlier statutes containing almost identical language"1 2
were construed to mean that waiver of the jury by both parties
123 Additional evidence applicable to the equitable issues but not to the
legal issues may be heard by the court in the absence of the jury, either
before or after the trial of the legal issues.
124 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 39.04.
125 For an excellent illustration of the advantages from this procedure,
see the case discussed in 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE § 2.05 [4].
126 See note 102 supra and text to which it refers.
127 See note 104 supra and text therewith.
128 For a more detailed discussion of the methods which may be used to
establish the form of the trial where both legal and equitable issues are
present, see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 106-110. Compare, however, Union Pacific
R.R. v. Syas, 246 Fed. 561 (8th Cir. 1917).
129 Referring to the waiver of jury trial, Judge Clark states that the
parties will be indifferent as to the form of trial in a surprisingly large number
of cases if no procedural advantage such as delay is to be obtained. He givesjudicial statistics to support this conclusion. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 93.
120 W. VA. CONsT. Art. III, § 13.
131 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 6, § 11 (Michie, 1949).
132 The present section of the code is a composite of two sections which
appeared in different chapters of the earlier code. See Reviser's note.
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might be by either words or conduct but the record must
affirmatively show the waiver."1 3 Waiver of the right may not be
inferred merely from the fact that the court tried the case without
objection.'3 4  Furthermore, if the defendant has "appeared to the
action,"'135 although neither he nor his counsel is present when
the case is called for trial three years later, the court may not
hear the case without a jury even though the record shows that
the plaintiff did not desire a jury.13" That the constitution does
not require this procedure seems clear.137  Our court, in con-
struing the statute providing for a jury trial on an appeal from
a decision by a justice of the peace if either party requires a
jury,138 held that a positive act was necessary to secure a jury
trial .1 3  The court took the position that a statute requiring a
demand was not a denial of the constitutional right but was
mere a reasonable regulation, adding this observation: ...... The
object of the statute doubtless is to secure trials of such actions
without the expense of a jury unless either of the parties requires
it." 14 0 The decision is especially persuasive since it is by appeal
133 Salzer v. Schwartz, 88 W. Va. 569, 107 S.E. 298 (1921); Yellow Pine Lumber
Co. v. Mays, 81 V. Va. 46, 94 S.E. 42 (1917); Lipscomb's Adm'r v. Condon,
56 W. Va. 416, 49 S.E. 392 (1904). Trial by jury is not waived even though
both parties move for a directed verdict. Canterberry v. Canterberry, 120
W. Va. 310, 197 S.E. 809 (1938).
134 Lipscomb's Adm'r v. Condon, 56 W. Va. 416, 49 S.E. 392 (1904). Com-
pare Phelp & Pound v. Smith 9& Co., 16 W. Va. 522 (1880) as distinguished in
Yellow Pine Lumber Co. v. Mays, 81 W. Va. 46, 94 S.E. 42 (1917).
13r The filing of a plea of the general issue is sufficient for this purpose.
See the cases cited in note 136 infra.
138 Salzer v. Schwartz, 88 WV. Va. 569, 107 S.E, 298 (1921); accord, Shamblen
v. Hall, 100 W. Va. 375, 130 S.E. 496 (1925); Matheny v. Greider, 115 W. Va.
763, 177 S.E. 769 (1934). In the last case, holding that a judgment obtained
in such proceeding is void and subject to collateral attack, the court stated
that it reached this conclusion since it was "bound by precedent to an ex-
tremely rigid rule respecting the matters urged." Id. at 764, 177 S.E. at 769.
137 The language of the present statute, namely, that trial by jury be
waived "by consent entered of record", was inserted in the Virginia Code of
1849 (c. 162, § 9). At that time the constitutional guaranty of jury trial was
contained in the Virginia Bill of Rights and was in a form different from
that which now exists in the West Virginia constitution. The West Virginia
court has recognized this historical background and has implied that the
legislature may now "dispense with the statutory requirement as to the manner
in which such waiver shall be evidenced." Lipscomb's Adm'r v. Condon, 56
WV. Va. 416, 445, 49 S.E. 392, 404 (1904). See also text which follows. See,
however, the questions raised in the notes by Professor Carlin in 33 W. VA. L.Q.
183 (1927) ; 41 W. VA. L.Q. 249 (1935).
'38 W. VA. CODa c. 50, art. 15, § 9 (Michie, 1949). Compare the statutory
provision for trial by jury of an issue arising in a motion proceeding. Id,
at c. 56, art. 2, § 7.
130 Lambert v. Inter-Urban Motor Co., 99 W. Va. 135, 128 S.E. 81 (1925).
140 Id. at 139, 128 S.E. at 82.
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to the circuit court that a party obtains his constitutional right
to a jury trial.' 41
Federal Rule 38 (d) provides that the failure of any party
to demand a trial by jury in the manner required by the rule
constitutes a waiver by him of trial by jury.142  Whether this
provision would preserve the right to trial by jury was once
questioned; 43 but the courts have not raised any question as to
the validity of the practice under the Constitution of the United
States,143a and this procedure seems to be sanctioned in West Vir-
ginia by the decision already mentioned. The rule seems fair if a
litigant really desires a jury trial, but it does not permit him to
remain silent with the hope that lack of a jury may later be used
to secure a delay or reversal in the case. 144 Our court has expressed
dissatisfaction with the existing rule.1 45  The objective of saving
expense, recognized by the court in the quotation above,'140 seems
to be an additional reason for changing the rule.
If the procedure in law and equity is united, it is especially
important that the court know in advance of trial whether there
will be a demand for trial by jury. Although no great problem
will be involved in most cases in determining whether a party
is entitled to a jury trial if he demands one, as noted above, there
may be cases in which some time will be required to determine
this question. In addition, if no demand for jury trial is made,
the merged system will offer no jury problem, regardless of what
the issues may be. The federal rule provides that the demand may
be made at any time after the commencement of the action but not
later than ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to
the issue triable of right by a jury.14  Recognition of the need
for a rule of waiver by nondemand and of pre-trial notification
141 Vetock v. Hufford, 74 W. Va. 785, 82 S.E. 1099 (1914); Lovings v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 47 V. Va. 582, 35 S.E. 962 (1900).
142 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). When trial by jury has
been demanded in the manner provided, waiver thereof may be accomplished
by means comparable to those used in West Virginia. Rule 39 (a) provides:
" . .The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the
parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court
or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record,
consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury ......
143 Ohlinger, Questions Raised by the Report of the Advisory Committee
etc., 11 U. or CIN. L. REv. 445, 463 (1937); but see Ohlinger, Problems of
Jurisdiction and Venue etc., 26 CORNELL L.Q. 240, 255 (1941).
143a E.g., United States v. Moore, 71 Sup. Ct. 524 (1951).
144 See cases cited in note 136 supra.
145 See quotation in note 136 supra.
146 See quotation in the text at note 140 supra.
147 Rule 38 (b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
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where law and equity are merged is shown by the present trend
to adopt such rules in states having code pleading.1 48
2. Relief Obtainable
Having considerd briefly, but for the purpose of this paper
sufficiently, the objections which may be made on constitutional
grounds to an amalgamated system of pleading, the question most
likely to arise in the mind of a common-law pleader should be
noted, namely, how can one determine from the pleadings what
relief the opposing party will be permitted to obtain under this
combined procedure? The answer is that one cannot, unless
there be a judgment by default.
Federal Rule 54 (c) reads:
"A judgment by default shall not be different in kind
from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for
judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment
is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings."' 149
The opposing party may expect fair notice of the facts which the
other party makes the basis for his recovery, but whether he is
entitled to legal or equitable relief, and the nature thereof, will
depend upon the proof if there is not a default judgment.150
148 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 115.
149 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). Rule 55 provides when a
judgment by default may be entered. Professor Moore suggests that a broader
scope might be given to Rule 54 (c) if it had read: A judgment by default for
uwant of appearance shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount
that prayed for in the demand for judgment; and that in all other cases the
judgment should grant the parties the relief to which they are entitled on
the merits. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE 1670. For a discussion of the con-
fusion which may arise and make "a jest of the fusion of law and equity"
where the code provision states that the judgment shall not be more favor-
able than that in the demand for relief "where there is no answer", see CLARK,
CODE PLEADING 266-269. For example, under such provisions it may be held
that relief other than that claimed is not justified where the defendant has
only demurred, permitting the complaint to be held insufficient even though
it shows a basis for relief other than that asked.
150 Note that this approach may be used as to problems arising either
from the fusion of law and equity or from the abolition of the common law
forms of action, for even as to the latter the relief obtainable depends upon
the form chosen. The relief to which a party is entitled ought to be regarded
as a matter of substantive right and ought to be granted upon proof of the
facts which support that right if fair notice of the facts claimed is given to
the opposing party. Any limitations placed upon the right by the mere
form in which the demand is made seem difficult to justify. See CLARK, CODE
PLEADING § 18. Of course, where the defendant has failed to appear, he
should be able to rely upon the demand made as limiting the relief to be
granted since this restriction is needed to satisfy the idea of fair notice.
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The facts in the case as proved will determine whether he obtains
a decree for specific performance, an injunction, or a judgment
for money damages,' 5' or whether he obtains damages for breach
of a contract or damages for injuries sustained from a tort.15 2
No longer will cases be dismissed merely because the declaration
"sounds in contract" when the proof discloses a right to recover
damages for a tort which was basically the same occurrence alleged
in the declaration.,5 - The opposing party may be entitled to
additional notice of the facts on which the claim is based, involving
an amendment and possibly a continuance, but the demand for
particularly relief is no part of the cause of action. 5 4 Stated more
directly:
"'A [complaint] may be dismissed on motion if dearly
without any merit; and this want of merit may consist in
an absence of law to support a claim of the sort made, or
of facts sufficient to make a good claim, or in the disclosure
of some fact which will necessarily defeat the claim.' But a
complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it
appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support
of the claim. Pleadings are to be liberally construed. Mere
vagueness or lack of detail is not ground for a motion to
dismiss, but should be attacked by a motion for a more
definite statement."'15
151 This problem will usually arise where the prayer seeks equitable relief
but the facts indicate a basis for only money damages or vice versa. Withinlimits the equity court now will award damages even though injunctive relief
is not granted. Webber v. Offhaus, 62 S.E.2d 690 (W. Va. 1950). Aside from
the constitutional right to trial by jury the only limits on this power flow
from the historical separation of the courts of law and equity. As shown
later in the text, the right to jury trial can be protected without limiting
the power of a court by the technicality of the side of the court on which the
proceeding was started and without the need of transferring the case to the
other side. Like considerations apply to the complete denial of the power
of a law court to grant any equitable relief.152 This result would follow: "Common-law forms of action have quite
generally lost their significance except as mental pegs upon which to hang
discussions as to whether or not a plaintiff has a right of action at law."
2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 355.
153 Being basically the same occurrence, fair notice of the facts on which
recovery is based would have been given (see note 150 supra); and the form
of action used by the plaintiff will have lost any significance (see note 152
supra). In West Virginia right to recover in the same action would be denied.
Being a change in the cause of action, an amendment would not be permitted
to meet the variance in proof. See Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified
Versus the Federal Rules, 53 W. VA. L. Rlv. 27 (1950).154 The facts constitute the cause of action-the legal conclusion to be
drawn therefrom is for the court. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 271-273, 332. See
also cases cited in 2 MOORE, FDEaAL PRAcTicE 1670 n. 6.
155 2 MooRE, Fn.RAL PRACTICE 2245. Italics by Professor Moore. See
also CLARK, CODE PLEADING 273.
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To this counsel for the defense may be opposed, but it makes sense.
Thus, if the facts alleged show that the pleader is entitled to
any relief, legal or equitable, the complaint would not be dismissed
merely because the pleader has asked for the wrong relief on the
facts pleaded; the demand for relief not being a part of the cause
of action, and law and equity having been combined as to
pleadings. For example, if the facts alleged show that the pleader
is entitled to damages for breach of a contract, he may obtain
that relief although he has asked for, .but was not entitled to,
specific performance of the contract.
Changes in the theory of the pleadings of the nature men-
tioned here will be discussed more fully presently. That this
treatment of the pleadings does not involve a denial of the right
to trial by jury will also be shown.
3. Other Stated Objections
Aside from the inability to determine from the pleadings,
unless there be a judgment by default, what relief will be granted,
which some may term an objection to the suggested procedure,
other nonconstitutional objections to the combined procedure
have been advanced from time to time. These might be specified
in detail and be answered in the same manner, but a general
summary of these objections with a general approach to the
answers thereto seems more appropriate in view of the length
which this paper has already acquired. This is especially true
when it can be summarily stated that all of the objections which
have been raised can be met in the same general manner as the
complaint concerning the right to trial by jury, and that method
has already been developed herein at length.
A concise classification and summary of these objections has
been stated by Judge Clarks as follows:
"1. Inherent differences in manner of trial and of ap-
pellate review, referring to the constitutional right of trial
by jury in 'law cases' and to the different methods of appellate
review in 'law' and 'equity' cases.
"2. Inherent differences in manner or amount of relief
to be granted, referring to the specific relief of equity as
distinguished from the money damages ordinarily given at
law; or to a possible variance in the amount of money damages
recoverable, depending on the form of action chosen; or to
particular remedies granted only in certain forms of actions,
such as execution on the defendant's body.
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"3. Inherent differences as to jurisdiction and venue, re-
ferring to the fact that certain actions must be brought in
certain courts or at certain places.
"4. Inherent differences as to the application of certain
statutes, such as statutes of limitations which were drawn
along the lines of the old procedural divisions.
"5. The necessity of forming clear and exact issues, both
for the trial and also to support the judgment and thus make
the plea of res judicata thereafter available to the parties."'8 0
This list of objections seems adequately to cover the more
meritorious complaints which may be voiced to the combined pro-
cedure; yet, if the pleadings contain sufficient information to
apprise fairly the court and parties concerning the 'cause to be
tried, neither separate sides of the court nor technical forms on
either side are needed to safeguard the substantive rights involved.
The remedy or other substantive rights in issue may be substan-
tially different depending upon the cause which is asserted, but
this seems to stress the need for a procedure which assures that
those rights will be protected regardless of technicalities as to the
manner in which the cause is asserted rather than being dependent
upon such formal requirements. Why should the relief to be
granted, or the form of trial, or any other substantive right be
dependent upon distinctions in the form of pleadings if the oppos-
ing party has fair notice of the cause of action?
All of these substantive rights can be protected in the same
manner as the right to trial by jury. If on the facts alleged or
the facts proved a particular substantive right may be involved
and that right is claimed by the party entitled thereto, that issue
may be settled on the pleadings, if there raised, or on the facts
as proved. There may be differences of opinion as to the degree
of detail which should be required in the pleading to give fair
notice of the cause to the opposing party, but no formal distinction
between forms of action at law and between suits in equity
and actions at law is needed to protect the rights which the voiced
objections indicate that some fear may otherwise be denied.167
D. Principal Beneficial Change Effected
No attempt will be made to suggest that the changed procedure
may not produce great differences in the results which may be
158 Id. at 88.
157 A detailed discussion of the matters here generally discussed may be
found in CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§ 18, 35-55 and 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAGnC
§§ 2.06, 2.08, 2.10.
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achieved for litigants. That is the desired objective. Many of
the devices which are now used to delay, limit, or defeat recovery
or defense will be eliminated. Naturally a litigant may continue
to be deprived of his rights through the errors of his counsel,
but the probability of substantive rights being defeated is lessened
by rules which make it clear that the more restrictive procedural
principles have been eliminated in order to permit substantive
rights to prevail. The principal beneficial change which would
be made by the adoption in West Virginia of these suggested rules
will here be examined.
Perhaps the most restrictive of existing procedural doctrines
is the one commonly called the "theory of the pleadings." It
means that a pleader must have and maintain in his pleadings a
definite legal theory on which his client may recover. Although
the facts as proved may show that a basis for recovery exists, the
client loses unless that was the theory on which counsel pro-
ceeded.1'- This doctrine is applied in West Virginia in a limited
form,'5 9 even though a recent decision contained this liberal
language: ". . . We would attach no particular importance to
the fact that the declaration proceeds upon a theory of recovery
not recognized in this jurisdiction, should the plaintiff establish
a right to recover on the facts pleaded."'160 The case involved
an action based on injuries sustained by a child five years
of age and caused by an unguarded fire. Presumably the action
was in the form of trespass on the case. It was prosecuted
on the theory that the bonfire in question was an attractive
158 The principle has often been summarized by this statement of the
Indiana court, which has consistently enforced it: "It is an established rule
of pleading that a complaint must proceed upon some definite theory, and
on that theory the plaintiff must succeed, or not succeed at all. A complaint
cannot be made elastic so as to take form with the varying views of counsel."
Mescall v. Tully, 91 Ind. 96, 99 (1883); see Ott v. Perrin, 116 Ind. App. 315, 63
N.E.2d 163 (1945). Courts have differed as to whether this principle also ap-
plies to the defendant's pleading. Whittier, The Theory of a Pleading, 8
COL. L. REv. 523, 534 (1908).
159 As an example of the extreme to which this doctrine can be carried,
see Scott v. McIntosh, 167 S.C. 372, 166 S.E. 345 (1932), wherein two causes
of action were set up in the complaint, the first based on a written contract
and the second on quantum meruit. Under each cause of action $500 was
alleged to be due and the complaint sought recovery of $500. This was
obviously a case in which two counts were used to meet a possible variance
in the proof. However, the court held that the causes of action were incon-
sistent and that the plaintiff should have been required to elect upon which
of the causes he would go to trial for the reason that "the evidence necessary
to establish the one differs from that necessary to establish the other." Id.
at 375, 166 S.E. at 345.
160 Tiller v. Baisden, 128 W. Va. 126, 128, 35 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1945).
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nuisance.161 That doctrine has been repeatedly rejected in West
Virginia.162 On the trial of the action, the lower court sustained
a motion at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case to strike out his
evidence. The jury was directed to return a verdict for the
defendant, and the judgment was rendered in his favor. The
appellate court reaffirmed the rejection of the attractive nuisance
doctrine. However, since no particular importance was attached
to the plaintiffs having proceeded on that theory, the court
examined at length the possibility of justifying recovery on another
basis on the facts proved. No detailed discussion seems necessary
to point out the fairness of this result to the person injured or the
advantages gained in development of the substantive law rather
than deciding the case on a mere technicality in the pleading. "3
There is nothing in the case to indicate that the plaintiff would
have been accorded this liberal treatment if he had chosen the
wrong form of action. The other basis of recovery considered
by the court would also have supported an action of trespass on
the case. To evaluate this case and find the limitations on the
doctrine in West Virginia the concept needs to be further
developed.
That the theory of the pleading may not be changed is not
confined to limitations on the right to amend. The problem
there is whether the changed theory will result in a change in
the cause of action, and consideration has been given to that
issue elsewhere in this paper.161  Whether a pleader can change
his theory of recovery by an amendment is one question, and that
lie can under the Federal Rules has been shown, but the broader
problem is whether a party may obtain a judgment by proving
a right to recover on a theory different from that on which the
pleading was prepared even without amending to indicate the
new theory.165 This problem assumes that there are sufficient
161 Ibid.
162 The cases are collected and cited in the principal case.
163 In this case the court, after stating that the action was prosecuted
on the theory that the bonfire in question was an attractive nuisance, added
this comment: "The declaration refers to it as such." 128 W. Va. at 128, 35
S.E.2d at 729.
164 See citation in note 153 supra.
165 It is sometimes suggested that the pleader be required to follow one
theory until he amends to state Another. CLARK, CODE PLaAnNG 260 n. 150.
The question may also arise in the appellate court where an amendment has
not been made in the lower court. Ibid. See also the West Virginia cases
cited in note 160 supra and the accompanying discussion in the text. See
text at notes 205-212 infra.
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
facts alleged in the pleading to sustain the proof needed for the
new theory. Sometimes they may have been alleged merely in
aid of the original theory of recovery. This may appear from
either the form of action used or from the facts stressed. On the
other hand, the facts needed to support the new theory may be
provable under the general allegations which supported the
original theory.
At common law the problem can only arise when the original
theory and the new theory both support the same form of action,
which is another way of saying that the rule preventing recovery
on proof of facts sufficient to support a form of action not
originally used is an illustration of the requirement that a pleader
can not change his theory of the case. 16 6 Even though recovery
would be within the same form of action, or assume that the
forms are abolished, the question may arise since the manner in
which the facts are alleged will show the theory on which recovery
is sought.1 7
In many cases the pleader may find that the evidence at the
trial develops differently than expected or that the court takes
a different view of the law than anticipated. To a limited extent
the pleader may meet this problem in West Virginia by including
in his declaration separate statements of the "same cause of action"
in different counts, or in effect different theories of recovery,
representing the same general state of facts in different ways. 6 '
There is no limit to the number of different versions of the facts
16-1 See Whittier, supra note 158, at 524. Was it the intent of the re-
visers to permit the theory of the action to be changed by providing that
amendments changing the form of action might be made? Was this idea
negatived by the limitation that the amendment was not to change the
cause of action? See citation in note 153 supra.
167 This is illustrated by the fact that certain courts in code pleading
jurisdictions have adopted the principle. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 43. After
referring to the limitations imposed by the forms of action at common law,
Judge Clark states as to this doctrine: "The development of the idea in code
pleading seems to have been due largely to judges trained in the common law,
who were seeking a logical justification for enforcing the strict rules made
necessary by that system." Id. at 264. See note 210 infra.
168 This is frequently done where damages are sought on the basis of
negligence to assert different ways in which the defendant may have been neg-
ligent and where damages for breach of an express contract are sought to
assert a quasi-contractual basis of recovery if proof of contract fails. One
of the best cases to illustrate the advantage of this procedure is Cochran v.
Craig, 88 W. Va. 281, 106 S.E. 633 (1921). In this case in which the common
counts had been used with a special count on the contract, the court ap-
proached the problem in this way: ". . . If the contract wts made as claimed,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover [on] it, nevertheless. There was no
abandonment of this claim. Assertion of the alternative claim is not incon-
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that the pleader may insert to cover fairly possible doubt as to
the legal theory which may be held applicable or as to the facts
which may be proved,10 9 so long as he does not join "inconsistent
causes of action". This seems to mean merely misjoinder as to
parties or forms of action.170 But, apart from the detailed pleading
sistent with adherence to it, if that would be material. The law does not
compel a plaintiff to elect at his peril between alternative claims. He may
assert both, leaving it to the jury or court to say which he is entitled to ...."
Id. at 296, 106 S.E. at 639. See also points 5 and 7 of the syllabus. See also
Campbell v. Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co., 122 W. Va. 231, 9 S.E.2d
135 (1940). Good illustrations of the need for alternative counts are shown in
Lawson v. West Virginia Newspaper Pub. Co., 126 W. Va. 470, 29 S.E.2d 3
(1944) (contract action), and Jenkins v. Spitler, 120 W. Va. 514, 199 S.E. 368
(1938) (tort action).
169 SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 81 (3d ed., Ballentine, 1923). "
thus, in practice, a great variety of counts often occurs in respect of the same
cause of action, the law not having set any limits to the discretion of the
pleader, in this respect, if fairly and rationally exercised." Id. at 204. See
many illustrations in 1 TIDD, PRACTICE *616-617 (3d Am. ed. 1840), including
two declarations held proper which contained 480 and 286 counts respectively.
170 In an earlier part of this paper the writer discussed at length the
limitations imposed by the rules as to what forms of action are joinable and
the liberalization permitted by the West Virginia statutes concerning the forms
of actions which may be maintained. Restrictions on joinder of parties was
also discussed. Lugar, Common Law Pleading Modified Versus the Federal
Rules, 52 W. VA. REV. 137. Whether there is any other limitation on the counts
which may be joined in West Virginia is not clear. In Collins v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933), the court held that
a count alleging two theories of recovery, one for negligence and the other
for intentional injury, was merely duplicitous and not subject to demurrer
for that reason. The court said that the remedy is for the objecting party
to require an election as to the theory on which the pleader will rely, and
further that even in the absence of election the matters alleged might be so
inconsistent as to destroy each other. On the facts the court found that the
matters alleged were not so inconsistent but implied that an election woult
have been required had one been sought by the defendant. Would the court
reach the same conclusion if separate counts in joinable forms of action had
been used to allege the two theories? Clearly an election should not then
be required. See Professor Carlin's note in 40 W. VA. L.Q. 241 (1934); but
see Campbell v. Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co., 122 W. Va. 231, 239, 9
S.E.2d 135, 139 (1940). See also Humphrey v. Virginian Ry., 54 S.E.2d 204, 215
(W. Va. 1948). Might the court yet take the position that the matters alleged in
the separate counts were so inconsistent as to destroy each other? Compare
the statement by the court quoted in note 168 supra. If the court takes the
position that some test of inconsistency between counts exists other than the
rules as to what forms of actions are joinable, where the parties are the same,
there will be an even greater need for modification of existing rules to permit
different theories of recovery to be asserted. See note 159 supra as to the
results which may flow from the application of other rules as to inconsistency
between "causes of action". The very purpose of inserting the various counts
may be defeated. See notes 351-352 infra. The court may have in mind the
idea, as earlier expressed, that misjoinder of parties or forms of action pro-
duces "inconsistent causes of action" and that the plaintiff here must amend
to drop one group of the misjoined counts or elect to proceed on matters
joinable if all are in one count. Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va.
719, 723, 84 S.E. 750, 751 (1915). As to inconsistent pleas, see notes 373-381
infra.
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required by this method, 71 the limitations on joinder of forms
of action, as well as separation of power in the courts, will prevent
or delay recovery by the most careful and prolific pleader if the
facts proved or the law held to apply shows a right to recover in
equity rather than at law, or vice versa,1 2 or in a form of action
which he did not and could not have joined with the form on
which his action was based. 73 This is true even though there
be no variance between the allegations in the pleading and the
proof, which could easily happen where the allegations are not
too specific or the proof needed on the new theory was supported
by allegations in aid of the original theory or theories. The
theory of recovery would be different from that or those on
which counsel had proceeded. It will be noted incidentally that
the pleader's right to amend to meet such variances in theory,
rather than joinder in his initial pleading, is even more restricted
under WATest Virginia procedure. 1'7 4
In addition to these limitations, the West Virginia court by
a recent dictum would prevent a pleader from joining and relying
on even consistent causes of action or theories if he combines
them in one count. 7 5 This defect in pleading appears to be
merely so-called duplicity, a formal defect which can be reached
only by a special demurrer. Demurrers for formal defects have
been abolished in this state. 7 6  Nevertheless, the court took the
position that if the plaintiff committed this error, he could be
forced to elect the ground upon which he would rely at the trial
if timely advantage were taken of the double averment.'7 7 The
result is the same as if the plaintiff had misjoined forms of action
in different counts and after a demurrer was required to amend
to drop one group of misjoined counts to cure the defect, except
that the dictum would presumably require the plaintiff to stand
171 A practice called "cumbersome and confusing". CLARK, CODE PLEADING
257. See also SHIPMAN, COMIMON-LAw PLEADING 204 n. 25. See note 169 supra.
172 No attempt is here made to discuss the possibility of transferring the
case to the proper forum. On this subject, see text at notes 33-72 supra,
Even where permitted, delay will be involved.
173 The possibility of joining the improper count or counts and then
amending if a demurrer to the declaration is sustained, as well as the defect
being cured by verdict, has been discussed earlier in this paper. Lugar, supra
note 39, at 168.
174 Lugar, supra note 153, at 33.
175 Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
This case is discussed more in detail in note 170 supra. Professor Carlin's
note there cited criticizes this case at length.
176 W. VA. CoDE c. 56, art. 4, § 37 (Michie, 1949).
177 114 W. Va. at 233-234, 171 S.E. at 758-759.
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on one ground if many are grouped in one count whereas the
misjoinder might be cured without limiting the plaintiff to one
ground of recovery.17
Despite the merited criticism which this recent case received,7 0
the court did not disapprove this procedure in a recent case which
also serves to show how restrictive the doctrine of the theory of
the pleadings can be. This is the case of Wellman v. Drake,8 0
in which the plaintiff sued for damages sustained when a dentist
began to fill her tooth, refused to fill it after the nerve was exposed,
and with force removed her from the dental chair. The declaration
contained only one count, but the plaintiff contended that it
set up two causes of action: one for malpractice and the other
for assault and battery. After the plaintiff had introduced her
evidence, the defendant asked that she be required to elect upon
which cause she relied, and she elected to rely upon the allegation
of assault and battery. After the defendant introduced his evi-
dence, the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was trying
the case on the theory of assault and battery. The appellate
court construed the declaration to embody only the theory of
malpractice, the language relied upon to sustain the theory of
assault and battery being merely a charge of conduct in aggrava.
tion of the malpractice. The verdict of $500 for the plaintiff
was set aside because the plaintiff had tried the case on the theory
of assault and battery when the declaration did not sustain that
theory.'8 1
One hope as to the theory of his pleading that the pleader
has is that the court may deal liberally with him in construing
17S The plaintiff's right to amend by dropping the misjoined counts has
been discussed earlier in this paper. Lugar, supra note 153, at 34. If a number
of counts in each form had been originally joined, correction of the defect
could be accomplished by eliminating either group of the misjoined counts
but leaving various theories of recovery on the counts which remain. The
only limitation on the remaining theories would be that imposed by the rules
as to joinder of forms of action if the pleader had inserted originally all
desired theories in the joinable forms and thus avoided the possibility of
restrictive rules as to the assertion of a new theory by amendment in a join-
able form. Compare Humphrey v. Virginian Ry., 54 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1948),
a case in which separate counts were used to set forth different theories.
179 See note 170 supra.
180 130 W. Va. 229, 43 S.E.2d 57 (1947).
is' Although the court was of the opinion that the plaintiff was entitled
to a new trial on the theory of the malpractice alleged in the declaration,
there is no indication that the court thought an amendment would be proper
to assert the theory of assault and battery. This may be another instance in
which it is safer to rely upon lengthy pleadings, even though an election
may be required, than to wait for trial to determine whether an amendment
may be desired.
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the allegations of the pleading despite the general rule that his
pleading will be construed strictly against him. 82 Occasionally
the court has done this. Perhaps the best example of this treat-
ment is found in Bell v. Kanawha Traction & Electric Co.,'8 3
in which the plaintiff sued to recover the value of the consideration
given by him for free transportation, promised by the defendant but
no longer legally permissible, to the extent that such transporta-
tion had not already been furnished. The declaration was styled
as an action of trespass on the case and the language which was
used was that ordinarily used in declarations in that action.
However, the court took the position that the substantial question
was whether a cause of action was presented and held that the
declaration was good since it did state a cause in implied assumpsit.
This theory of recovery was deemed to be clear from the facts
stated. Said the court:
". .. Language is used which ordinarily is used in a
declaration filed in an action of trespass on the case, but this
matter may be treated as surplusage; it is nonessential. The
defendant is fully informed of the cause of action against
him, and because the pleader improperly styles it an action
of trespass on the case we will not hold it bad. Though
inartistically drawn it is sufficient in form to fully advise the
defendant of the ground upon which recovery is sought..."184
This treatment may help the plaintiff, but it may also work to his
detriment if recovery can be allowed only on a theory different
from that which the court construes to have been his real theory.18 5
182 A pleading subject to two intendments will be construed most strongly
against the pleader. Blooming Rose Coal Co. v. White, 128 W. Va. 502, 37
S.E.2d 455 (1946), and the cases cited therein. Contrast Federal Rule 8 (f)
which provides that all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial
justice. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.. 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). For discussion of import-
ance of this rule, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.02.
183 83 W. Va. 640, 98 S.E. 885 (1919).
184 Id. at 646, 98 S.E. at 888. Compare also this approach: ... a
more careful survey and analysis of the count, although it uses the words
'agreed', 'undertook', 'promised' and 'consideration', the usual characteristics
of an assumpsit, seem to disclose an intention on the part of the pleader to
declare in tort .... ." Chambers v. Spruce Lighting Co., 81 W. Va. 714, 716,
95 S.E. 192, 193 (1918). See Fleming v. Nay, 120 W. Va. 625, 200 S.E. 577
(1938) and cases cited in Lugar, supra note 39, at 175 n. 193. See note 210 infra.
185 For example, in Stewart v. Raleigh County Bank, 121 W. Va. 181, 2
S.E.2d 274 (1939), the court was of the opinion that there might be a duty
on the landlord to maintain certain equipment even though he might not
have had any duty to install it. Nevertheless, the plaintiff could not recover
on this theory under his declaration. Here was the reasoning: ". . . But the
responsibility of the landlord, if any, under these circumstances, is some-
thing entirely different from any duty set up in the declarations in this case.
Here the duty is alleged to be to 'equip and maintain'. The maintenance is
merely an adjunct to the duty to equip... .This is not a technical dictinc-
tion. A defendant is entitled to know what he will be called upon to meet ...."
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Under the Federal Rules and the more advanced code
states, the plaintiff is permitted to obtain such relief as the facts
pleaded and proved justify, irrespective of the theory on which
the pleading was framed'8 6 This seems proper since the prayer
for relief constitutes no part of the cause of action at the trial
stage, 87 and the pleader having stated the facts which constitute
the cause of action, the court is to determine therefrom whether
the plaintiff has stated any basis for judicial relief. 8 This does
not mean that the pleader should not have a theory or theories
on which his client is entitled to recover or that he is not to
indicate in his pleading the basis on which the facts pleaded
justify relief.8s If he does not do so, he may have his action
dismissed unless he amends to cure the defect. 90 But, if the facts
proved show a right to the relief asked on the theory advanced
by the pleader, the problem here discussed does not arise. How-
ever, where the facts alleged and proved show a right to relief
different from that demanded or relief of the same nature but on
a different theory from that indicated in the pleading, the rejection
of the doctrine permits the relief to be granted. This does not
seem unjust to the opposing party so long as he has fair notice
of the facts on which the claim is asserted, since he will know
prior to the trial that the plaintiff is not limited by his theory
of the pleading nor by the relief demanded.'' If the change in
either is so great that the opposing party could not have been
reasonably expected to anticipate the shift in position, which
should rarely occur in view of his advance knowledge of the
facts likely to be proved, a new trial may become necessary. This
treatment is necessary where he is actually surprised that the
Id. at 189, 2 S.E.2d at 278. Might not the court under other circumstances
have held the "and" to include "or"? Would not this be only duplicity?
See the dissenting opinion. Compare also BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTICE § 99.
Note the inconsistency within the section cited as to whether the words "agreed"
or "undertook" indicate a contract or tort count. See note 184 supra.
180 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 263; 2 MooRi, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.14; Alberts-
worth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 202
(1922).
187 See note 154 supra.
188 Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1945).
See Rule 54(c), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). See also note
154 supra.
189 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 260, 265; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1657. Judge
Clark recognizes that unless the pleading does have a theory it will be a
"meaningless jumble".
190 See the cases cited in 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.14 nn. 9, 10, 11.
See also the quotation in the text at note 155 supra.
191 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 119.
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facts developed show the plaintiff entitled to legal relief rather
than equitable relief, for otherwise he would be deprived of his
right to trial by jury. If the shift could have been expected,
the right to jury trial should be deemed waived unless the request
was made in advance of trial, for otherwise the right could
be asserted as a mere technicality to subject the other party to
a new trial.192 The other advantages of requiring a demand for
a jury in advance of trial have been discussed previously herein. 93
The theory of the pleading may become important in West
Virginia at the pleading stage, that is, the plaintiff may have
sufficient facts stated for a cause of action but may have used the
wrong form of action or in equity may have asked for the wrong
relief. This would be tested by a demurrer. No additional
consideration need be given to this phase of the doctrine, for it
has already been shown that under the Federal Rules the demurrer
would not be sustained merely because the pleader asked for the
wrong relief on the facts alleged. 9 4
It may be appropriate to give an illustration of how the
abandonment of the doctrine of the theory of the pleading would
in practice avoid the deciding of cases on what a layman would
certainly think of as a technicality. The client who loses his
case on a technical point is likely to be critical of the law, as
well as his lawyer, and the objective of eliminating what are
viewed by laymen as technicalities should therefore be worthwhile
to even the most sagacious pleader.195
One of the cases most often cited to show that the Federal
Rules have eliminated the doctrine is Nester v. Western Union
Telegraph Co.' 96  It is particularly enlightening to the West
Virginia practitioner since it involved a change in the theory of
192 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 117-120, including an excellent criticism therein
of Jackson v. Strong, 222 N. Y. 149, 118 N.E. 512 (1917), a case in which the
principle here urged was not applied. See also NVALSH, EQUITY 109-111 (1930);
James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE J.L.
1022, 1028 (1936).
193 See text at notes 142-148 supra.
194 See text at notes 154-155 supra.
195 "'Loose pleading' is the cry of an alarmist who unconsciously would
punish the client because of the latter's unfortunate choice of a lawyer who
chanced to be a poor pleader." 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1606. Or, who
is a good pleader, but is not permitted by the system under which he is
pleading to insert enough safety valves. From an historical viewpoint, com-
pare: ". . . when it was proposed finally to allow amendment of pleadings,
Baron Parke exclaimed in opposition, 'think of the state of the recordl' .
Albertsworth, supra note 185, at 202.
296 25 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
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the case which cannot be covered in this state even by inserting
separate counts in the declaration. 197  The plaintiff sued for
damages caused by the defendant's negligent failure to transmit
a money order. Although the duty which was violated arose
from a contract, the plaintiff treated the negligence of the
defendant as the basis of an action in tort and so framed his
complaint. However, the proof failed as to the damages which
he had alleged. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was permitted to
recover, under the facts alleged and proved, a sum stipulated
as liquidated damages in the contract, and this without amending
the pleadings to conform to the evidence. The basis of the
decision was this:
".... Under the liberal rules of the reformed procedure,
a plaintiff is entitled to recover, not on the basis of his
allegations of damages, but on the basis of the facts as to
damage shown in the record. This liberality is carried over
into the new rules. In fact, it is broadened. Differences in
the forms of claims being abolished, the plaintiff should be
denied relief only when, under the facts proved, he is
entitled to none. ... 198
In a sense there is really nothing new about this procedure
to West Virginia practitioners. It has long been provided that
in proceedings before a justice of the peace: "The forms of action
now existing shall not apply. . . . and there shall hereafter be
but one form of such action in such courts, which shall be
demoninated a civil action."' 199 The material language is the same
as that in the federal rule under which the Nester case was
decided,200 and it has been construed by the West Virginia court
to have the same effect in trials before a justice or in the circuit
court on an appeal from the judgment entered by a justice. In
197 In West Virginia causes ex contractu cannot be joined with thoqc
ex delicto. The cases are collected in Lugar, supra note 39, at 175 n. 193.
198 25 F. Supp. at 481. When this case reached the Supreme Court, it
was held that the sum specified in the contract did not fix a definite liability
but only a maximum limit on recovery if damage were proved. The case was
reversed on this basis. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Nester, 309 U.S. 582(1940).
199 W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 4, § 1 (Michie, 1949).
200 The court relied upon Rule 2 which reads: "There shall be one form
of action to be known as 'civil action' ". Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.
(1950). Compare also Rule 8(a) (2) which contains the general rule of plead-
ing under that system, namely, the pleading shall contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," with
W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 4, § 4 (Michie, 1949), which provides that in a
justice's court the complaint "shall state in a plain and direct manner the
facts constituting the cause of action."
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Lovings v. Norfolk & Western Ry.,20 1 the plaintiff brought his
action before a justice "for the recovery of money due for a
wrong. ' 20 2  Judgment was entered for the plaintiff and the
defendant appealed the case to the circuit court. At the trial in
that court the defendant requested instructions which would
have denied the plaintiff relief unless the jury found that the
defendant had committed a tort. It was held that the instructions
had been properly rejected, the court explaining that ". . . the
plaintiff could recover in said action whatever he showed himself
entitled to recover in the action either ex contractu or ex delicto."2o3
Ironically the plaintiff with a small claim may thus expect
to obtain relief in a justice's court or on appeal therefrom when
the facts proved show that he is entitled thereto, irrespective of
the theory of his case, although the litigant entitled to a larger
sum or more important relief may have to suffer delay, incon-
venience, and additional expense before obtaining his relief
because it develops at the trial that his lawyer chose the wrong
theory to justify recovery. As every practitioner knows, this
error may occur in a well prepared case when the proof does not
develop as the pleader had every reason to believe that it would
or the court does not agree with the pleader's determination of
the law applicable to the facts proved. To the extent that the
pleader cannot protect his client from these contingencies, it
seems clear that the rules of pleading should be changed if it can
be done without any unfairness to the opposing party. This the
Federal Rules have done by abolishing the doctrine of the theory
of the pleadings.
To hold that the theory of recovery cannot be changed in
the appellate court may also result in a denial of justice. When
a case has been tried on one theory, may an appellate court affirm
the judgment on a different theory? This is not a suggestion
that the court should, if the facts on which the decision would
rest are disputable and the issue was not actually tried. But
suppose that the facts on which the decision would rest are not
201 47 W. Va. 582, 35 S.E. 962 (1900).
202 See the statutory form of summons in justice's courts. W. VA. CODE
c. 50, art. 3, § 4 (Michie, 1949).
203 Point 3 of the syllabus by the court. See also O'Connor v. Dils, 43
W. Va. 54, 26 S.E. 354 (1896). The result here can also be supported by the
statute which provides that a variance between the proof and the allegations
of a pleading shall be disregarded as immaterial unless the adverse party has
been misled to his prejudice thereby. W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 4, § 10 (Michie,
1949).
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in dispute or that the parties had a fair opportunity to introduce
all relevant evidence on the issue at the trial since it was a
controlling issue on the original theory, shall the judgment be
reversed merely because it was decided on the wrong principles
of law? Our court has stated that
"... Litigation is not, and ought not be regarded as a
contest presided over by the court and determinable by the
skill of the actors, as in the case of a game. A correct ruling
based upon a wrong or untenable reason should always be
upheld ... ."204
On the premises suggested above the same principle should be
applied, since the plaintiff in error can show no prejudice from
an affirmance. Only a technicality would require a retrial.
The fairness of this result appears in a case decided under
the Federal Rules.2 0 5  The decision was supported in part by a
federal rule which permits a case to be decided on the issues tried
by the parties 'although not raised by the pleadings, 206 but the
same treatment should be given a fortiori to issues raised by the
pleadings and tried by the parties. The plaintiff asserted liability
on the theory that the truck which caused the damage was being
driven by a servant of the defendant at the time of the accident.
The defendant contended that the evidence was insufficient to
establish the master-servant relationship. The appellate court
agreed, but affirmed the judgment on the theory that the de-
fendant was liable even as an employer of an independent con-
tractor on other facts in the case as to which there was no dispute.
Perhaps this was the approach being followed by the West
Virginia court when it searched for a theory on which the facts
proved might justify recovery even though it rejected the attractive
nuisance doctrine, the theory on which the case had been tried
in the lower court.2 0 7
In another West Virginia case 20 8 the court expressed a rather
liberal view concerning the theory of the case. In that case the
plaintiff had sued husband and wife for wrongful death caused
by the negligent operation of the husband's automobile by the
204 Cochran v. Craig, 88 W. Va. 281, 302, 106 S.E. 633, 641 (1921). Even
though the opinion of a circuit court is made a part of the record by court
order, a correct decision is not affected by the reasons prompting it. Robertson
v. Vandergrift, 119 W. Va. 219, 193 S.E. 62 (1937).
205 Venuto v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1941).
206 Rule 15 (b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.CA. (1950), discussed in
an earlier part of this paper dealing with amendments.
207 See note 160 supra and the text which accompanies and follows it.
208 Creasy v. Thomas, 106 W. Va. 24, 144 S.E. 563 (1928).
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wife, apparently asserting liability against the husband on the
family car doctrine. The plaintiff was permitted to amend his
declaration to allege that the automobile was owned by a third
person since it involved no change in the cause of action, the
decision being based upon the fact that ". . . The plaintiff would
have been entitled to recover under the original declaration, on
the ground that the husband was responsible for the wife's tort,
whether he or another was the owner of the automobile..."209
Although the husband's liability for his wife's torts has been
modified by statute, this reasoning would indicate that the new
theory might have been the basis of recovery without any amend-
inent of the declaration.
However, the writer believes that both of these West Virginia
cases may illustrate nothing more than a liberal application of the
principle that surplusage in a pleading may be disregarded and
the true theory of the pleading be determined from the other
allegations therein. 210  This approach has been discussed herein,
and it offers no relief from the doctrine unless the court strains
the principle in order to justify recovery. 211 The only safe remedy
available to the pleader at the present involves the insertion of
separate counts to cover all possible theories of recovery. Even
with the prolixity of pleading and possible confusion involved in
this method, the limitations on its effectiveness have been shown.
2 12
The adoption of rules comparable to those herein discussed would
eliminate any danger that the theory of the pleading doctrine
could continue to operate to delay or deny the relief to which the
facts pleaded and proved show the claimant is entitled.
E. Summary
The adoption of one form of action may be accomplished
without denial of any substantive rights of the parties. The
manner in which the change may be effected has been described
herein. The points discussed in detail may be summarized by
Professor Moore's approach to the combined procedure. He
states that the real problems now are:
209 Id. at 26, 144 S.E. at 564.
210 ". . . At common law the form of action is not settled by the name
given to it by the pleader, but by asking what form is indicated by the count
as a whole, the substantial allegations being given chief consideration. A similar
rule prevails in determining the theory of a pleading.... A name given to a
pleading does not determine its theory .. " Whittier, supra note 158, at 536.
211 See text at notes 182-185 supra, especially notes 184-185 supra.
212 See text at notes 164-181 supra.
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"(1) What interests will the law protect?
"(2) What type of protection should, as a matter of
substance be given-e.g., damages or specific performance;
damages or injunctive relief? In answering this, factors of
merit, not procedural forms, should be and are weighed.
"(3) Are the parties entitled to a jury trial, and have
they waived that right? Rule 38 preserves the right to jury
trial of legal issues when a litigant actually wants such trial
and demands it; but the litigant is not encouraged, as he has
been in New York, to sit by until the case has been decided
on the merits and then for the first time advance the claim
that he was entitled to a jury trial."213
Such other problems relating to substantive rights as may arise
from the union of law and equity may be approached in the same
manner as the right to trial by jury. If substantive rights can
be protected without the retention of two systems of courts, the
existing distinctions amount to little more than saying that a
judge has "power to decide the dispute when he crosses his left
leg over his right, and no power at all when his right leg is on
top."214
V. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADING
In this part of the paper rules of pleading which : control
the manner in which a claim must be alleged will be discussed.
The precision required by some of these rules may delay a hearing
of the claim on its merits even though there is no uncertainty as
to the nature of the claim from the allegations used by the pleader.
The writer has no intention of discussing all the rules which
regulate the manner in which pleadings shall be drafted. A few
of them will be criticized as illustrative of rules which are un-
necessary for an understanding of the issues to be tried. As rules
of pleading they were designed to prevent uncertainty generally;
but when applied without considering the facts in the particular
case, they, often do not serve this purpose and become merely
technicalities which may be used to delay the trial. Some of these
rules of pleading may even require another action to obtain relief.
For the sake of brevity, the discussion will be limited largely to
rules for pleading causes of action, excluding most rules as to
pleading defenses.
213 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 357.
214 CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY 339 (1950).
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A. Different Approaches
Two common law rules, if properly stressed and liberally
applied, might have made many others unnecessary, namely, a
pleading is not ambiguous if it be clear according to a reasonable
construction,215 and all pleadings ought to be tr!ue.216 In effect,
the substance of the federal rules on pleading a claim is composed
of these two rules, many others having been eliminated. In West
Virginia steps have been taken to eliminate technicalities, but
many remain. The principal difference seems to be that the
Federal Rules use a positive approach to the problem, whereas
the West Virginia approach has been negative in nature.
For example, Federal Rule 8 provides that a pleading which
sets forth a claim for relief shall contain "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief",
and that a party shall state "in short and plain terms his defenses
to each claim asserted." 21   The rule also contains the following
specific directives:
"(e) Pleading To Be Concise and Direct; Consistency.
"(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, con-
cise, and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions
are required.
"(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of
a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in
one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. When
two or more statements are made in the alternative and one
of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading
is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more
of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency
and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on
both. All statements shall be made subject to the obligations
set forth in Rule 11.
215 "A pleading . . . is not objectionable, as ambiguous or obscure....
if it be clear enough according to reasonable intendment or construction,
though not worded with absolute precision ........ " STEPHEN, PLEADING
§ 231 (2d ed., Andrews, 1901). See SHIPMAN, COMIMON-LAW PLEADING § 320
(3d ed., Ballentine, 1923).
216 "At common law, while it is a principle that pleadings ought to be
true, yet there are no means of enforcing the rule. Thus the common-law
pleadings fail to uncover the real issues in dispute ...... SHIPMAN, COtoN-
LAW PLEADING § 326. See STEPHEN, PLEADING § 258. Consider this principle
as to the pleader's doubt concerning the facts provable or the law applicable.
This is developed in the text which follows.
217 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
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" (f) Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be
so construed as to do substantial justice."218
In contrast an example of the West Virginia approach is
contained in this statute:
"On a demurrer (unless it be to a plea in abatement), the
court shall not regard any defect or imperfection in the
declaration or other pleading, whether it has heretofore been
deemed mispleading or insufficient pleading or not, unless
there be omitted something so essential to the action or
defense that judgment, according to law and the very right
of the cause, cannot be given. ... 219
As construed by the court, this statute, which has been in effect
since the formation of the state, simply abolished special demurrers,
which went to matters of form, and any demurrer for a matter
of substances continues to be sustained.2 20 Thus, where precedents
exist, the court uses them to determine whether the defect in the
pleading is one of substance. 22'
The approach in West Virginia results in cases being decided
on rules of antiquity rather than rules of reason. As a specific
illustration consider the rule that pleadings must not be by way
of recital, but must be positive in their form. 2 2  Our court is
firmly bound to hold that a declaration in tort is fatally bad on
demurrer if the facts necessary to constitute the cause of action
are stated under a quod cum or after a whereas,223 even though
218 Ibid. Rule 11 reads: "... The signature of an attorney constitutes
a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served.
For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action....." The other parts of Rule 8 form the basis of the
text which follows.
219 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 37 (Michie, 1949). An equally good
illustration is the statute which provides that no action shall abate for want
of form where the declaration sets forth sufficient matter of substance for the
court to proceed upon the merits of the case. Id. at c. 56, art. 4, § 12.
220 This section and the other cited in note 219 supra are usually read
together in reaching this conclusion. E.g., Spiker v. Bohrer, 37 W. Va. 258,
16 S.E. 575 (1892); Hays v. Heatherly, 36 W. Va. 613, 15 S.E. 223 (1892). Rely-
ing upon this section alone, see Coyle v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 11 W. Va.
94 (1877).
221 E.g., Reynolds v. Hurst, 18 W. Va. 648 (1881). The court recognized
the need for precedents to determine such questions for "it is not always easy
to determine, what is matter of form, and what is matter of substance."' Id.
at 651.
222 STEPHEN, PLEADING § 237; SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 294.
223 Gould v. Coal & Coke Ry., 74 W. Va. 8, 81 S.E. 529 (1914); Spiker v.
Bohrer, 37 W. Va. 258, 16 S.E. 575 (1892).
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the claim made is perfectly clear to the court and opposing
counsel.224  Perhaps the same is true of contract counts-except
the common counts in assumpsit.2 25 This result was reached
because the early Virginia cases held that the defect was one of
substance and could be reached by general demurrer, although
Chitty took the position that it could be attacked only by a special
demurrer.2 26 The court has been able to find some cases in which
the ancient rule did not apply and has been pleased to recognize
the exceptions, 227 stating that the rule is centuries old, technical,
a stigma upon the common law,22s and an odious blot on the law
of pleading.2 29
2"24 Note, for example, the allegations in the one-count declaration in
Spiker v. Bohrer, 37 W. Va. 258, 259, 16 S.E. 575, 576 (1892).
225 The common counts in an action of assumpsit are good on demurrer
even though both the consideration and promise are stated after a whereas.
Sheppard v. Peabody Insurance Co., 21 IV. Va. 368 (1883); Burton & Co. v.
Hansford, 10 IV. Va. 470 (1877). This conclusion was reached because the
English judges had prescribed this manner of allegation in the common counts
and because the Virginia court had never held such counts defective on
demurrer. The court realized that the allegations which followed the whereas
in these counts constituted the very gist of the action. However, no West
Virginia case has been found in which this manner of pleading was held
good in other contract counts, and the court in the latter case recognized
that the Virginia law, which was being followed, might be otherwise as to
contract counts other than the common counts although some attempt was
made to indicate that most of the Virginia cases involved actions in tort.
Chitty took the position that this manner of pleading in contract counts might
be good on general demurrer and perhaps even on special demurrer. 1 CHrTTY,
PLEADING 0309 (16th Am. ed. 1879). However, the West Virginia court has followed
the Virginia court in preference to Chitty. See text which follows.
20 ". . . The injury in trespass should be stated directly and positively,
and not by way of recital; and therefore a declaration charging 'for that
whereas', or 'wherefore,' the defendant committed the trespass, is bad on
special demurrer . . . . 1 CHITTY, PLEADING *1402. Note that this applied
only to a declaration in trespass, according to Chitty. To the same effect, see
STEPHEN, PLEADING § 237; SHII' AN, COMMoN-LAw PLEADING § 294. This is
of special interest in West Virginia since the action of trespass has been
abolished. However, the West Virginia court pointed out specifically that
the Virginia court applied the rule to both actions of trespass and trespass
on the case. Burton & Co. v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470, 476 (1877). See
note 225 supra as to this manner of pleading in contract counts, noting especially
Chitty's view.
227 In addition to the cases cited in note 225 supra, which permit this
manner of pleading in the common counts in assumpsit, see Rogers v. Coal River
Boom & Driving Co., 41 W. Va. 593, 23 S.E. 919 (1896) (held that the "whereas"
was used only as to inducement); Battrell v. Ohio River Ry., 34 W. Va. 232,
12 S.E. 699 (1890) (the participial form of a verb used in stating the facts-
decision weakened by the court's finding that these facts might be regarded
as surplusage). Note also Jenkins v. Montgomery, 69 W. Va. 795, 72 S.E. 1087
(1911) (recital as to amount of damages claimed-not a fact essential to the
cause of action).
228 Battrell v. Ohio River Ry., 34 V. Va. 232, 233, 12 S.E. 699, 700 (1890).
229 Rogers v. Coal River Boom & Driving Co., 41 W. Va. 593, 598, 23 S.E.
919, 920 (1896).
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Although the difference in result may not be entirely attribut-
able to the language variation in the rules, the declared purpose
of such statutes to eliminate only some technical rules leaves the
court bound by other ancient rules and precedents based there-
on.2 10  Instead of a new approach to determine whether the court,
jury and opposing party have fair notice of the particular claim
asserted, definite formulae must be satisfied. A few of these
will be examined more in detail to illustrate more clearly what
is meant.
B. The Pleader's Dilemma
The pleader in West Virginia is confronted with this dilemma
in drafting his pleadings: he must plead ultimate facts but not
conclusions of law.2 31  If he can find precedents to follow, he is
reasonably safe;2 .3 but if he reasons by analogy from precedents
or simply drafts the pleading in such manner that no doubt exists
concerning the basis of his claim, he may find that his pleadings
are demurrable..2 33  One court frankly admitted that there is no
guide except precedents, in these words:
"... It may not be possible to formulate a definition that
will always describe what is a mere conclusion of law, so as
to distinguish it from a pleadable, ultimate fact, or that will
define how great an infusion of conclusions of law will be
allowed to enter into the composition of a pleadable fact.
Precedent and analogy are our only guides. And it is un-
2-(o For example, in Battrell v. Ohio River Ry., 34 W. Va. 232, 12 S.E.
699 (1890), Judge Brannon felt constrained to follow the precedents which
were available, but he says that the language in the statute quoted in the
text above if properly construed would cure the defect of recital pleading. 1d.
at 234, 12 S.E. at 700.
231 SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING §§ 295, 296. A mere reading of these
two sections will demonstrate that the rules mean nothing except that pre-
cedents based upon the rules must be used to determine what degree of
particularity is required in alleging particular matters. What allegations are
deemed to make the issue clear vary, not on the basis of the declared objective
of clarity but based on considerations of policy and convenience.
232 One rule of pleading is thus stated in SHIPMAN, COMMON-LAW PLEADING
§ 327: "Pleadings should observe the known and ancient expressions as con-
tained in approved precedents." But, he hastens to add: "The rule stated
is of rather uncertain application, for it must be often doubtful whether a
given form of expression has been so fixed by the course of precedent as to
admit of no variation." Note what has happened in the West Virginia cases
where precedents were the basis on which the pleader acted. See text which
follows.
2.33 In addition to the text which follows, compare the preceding text
as to recital pleading. Judge Green said of this matter: ". . . it may be dif-
ficult to assign any good reason for a difference, yet a distinction has been
taken between declarations in tort and those based on contracts." Burton &
Co. v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470, 476 (1877).
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doubtedly true that there will be found a want of entire
judicial harmony in the adjudicated cases as to what are
statements of fact, and what are mere conclusions of law.
And in holding one class of inferences as facts to be pleaded,
and another as conclusions of law to be avoided, courts may
have been often governed more by precedent than by a sub-
stantial difference in principle .... 234
Can a pleader rely on precedents by analogy? Normally that
is all that can be done, but it offers little assurance of a concession
that a claim has been well pleaded. To illustrate this point the
writer has chosen a factual situation as to which the average
practitioner believes the existing precedents are clear. It can
probably be said that the West Virginia law is better settled here
than in most pleading problems which involve the dilemma of
ultimate facts versus conclusions of law. In other jurisdictions
there is a conflict of authority as to "whether it is proper to plead
generally that the defendant 'negligently' collided with the plain-
tiff, or whether the special circumstances from which the negligence
might be inferred should be set out concretely and in detail."2 "5
It is said to be a well settled rule in *West Virginia that in a
declaration alleging negligence it is not necessary to state the
particular acts which constitute the negligence. 2:16  The court
adopted this approach soon after the formation of the state. 217
Yet cases continue to come before the court for a determination
of whether the plaintiff has alleged simply that the act on which
he bases his cause was done "negligently". In a case decided
a year ago the court cites over twenty cases which have in-
volved this issue and others might have been added.2 38  Although
the court refers to declarations which are held to satisfy the rule
as fully informing the defendant of the negligent act with which
he is charged, this means merely the "primary act of negligence",
and it is clear that the defendant may obtain no information from
234 Clark v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 28 Minn. 69, 71, 9 N.W. 75 (1881).
Italics supplied.
235 SHIPMAN, Cozmu ioN-LAw PLEADING 496.
236 HoGG, PLEADING & FORMS § 178 (4th ed. 1934).
37 Blaine v. Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 9 IV. Va. 252 (1876), wherein the
court relied upon Chitty's form and the West Virginia statute abolishing
special demurrers. In reaching the same conclusion in Baylor v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 9 IV. Va. 270 (1876), the court relied merely upon the statute.
In Hawker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 15 W. Va. 628 (1879), the court seems
to have regarded the rule as settled in this jurisdiction and merely relied
upon the two cases above as precedents.
238 Gasber v. Coast Construction Corp., 60 S.E.2d 193 (VV. Va. 1950).
Some of the other cases which might have been added are being used in the
text which follows.
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the pleading concerning the facts which the evidence will show
amounted to negligence .2 The information which he receives
concerning the claim may be no greater than that which a de-
fendant receives from a complaint couched in the language of the
official form used in federal courts. 40  There is no reason that
he should, but that form may be used with greater assurance
that the hearing of the claim on its merits and recovery of judg-
ment will not be delayed by a contention that a violation of the
well settled rule as to how negligence shall be alleged has occurred.
A brief review of a few of. the cases may indicate why counsel
continue to have some difficulty in knowing whether sufficient
facts have been pleaded to show a cause based on negligence.
In Robbins v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,241 the West Virginia
court held a distinct allegation that the defendant by its servants
and agents in its behalf "carelessly and negligently" ran its loco-
motive and cars upon and against the horse of the plaintiff and
thereby killed the horse was an allegation of an act of negligence
and not simply a conclusion of the pleader. The declaration was
held sufficient since it showed how the horse was killed by the de-
fendant, was in conformity with a form set forth by a well-known
writer on West Virginia procedure, gave the defendant notice of
the claim for damages, and was good under the statute which
239 E.g., ". . . Here the defendant is fully informed from the allegations
that it is charged with the negligent construction of the steps. True, the
declaration does not say just what step was negligently or defectively con-
structed, or what nail was improperly placed, or what board or material used
was defective, or how much any step sloped, or what step was constructed
of thin boards ...... Gasber v. Coast Construction Co., 60 S.E.2d 193, 197
(W. Va. 1950). This declaration was held sufficient. Many other West Virginia
cases might be cited in which declarations were held adequate although the de-
claration merely alleged as to the negligence that the defendant did a certain
act "negligently, carelessly and wrongfully". These words or the equivalent
were held sufficient in the earliest cases. See cases cited in note 237 supra.
In Louis v. Smith-McCormick- Construction Co., 80 W. Va. 159, 165, 92 S.E.
249, 251 (1917), the court said it suffices to set forth the primary act causing
the injury and say it was done negligently. See Bralley v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
66 W. Va. 462, 464, 66 S.E. 653, 654 (1909) (to show what instrumentality in-
flicted the injury and say it was negligently done).
240 Federal Form 9 contains only this allegation as to the negligence:
"On June 1, 1936, in a public highway called Boylston Street in Boston,
Massachusetts, defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against plaintiff
who was then crossing said highway." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.
(1950). Compare the allegations held sufficient in the West Virginia cases
mentioned in note 239 supra. But, contrast the detailed allegations as to
negligence in the declarations usually found in West Virginia cases; detailed
allegations to comply with common law forms but containing no greater in-
formation than in the federal form.
241 62 W. Va. 535, 59 S.E. 512 (1907).
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abolished special demurrers. The earlier West Virginia precedents
had held comparable allegations of negligence sufficient. 242
However, in Wilson v. Guyandotte Timber Co., 243 a later case,
the plaintiff alleged that
"... the said defendant . . . so carelessly, negligently, im-
properly, and unlawfully constructed, managed, and operated
the boom . . ., by its servants and agents; that by and through
the negligence and improper conduct of the defendants by its
said servants and agents in that behalf, the said boom entirely
stopped up ... the river, . . . whereby an immense number of
logs accumulated behind said boom ... to such an enormous
extent that the said boom broke, carrying along with it . . .a
great volume and mass of water, so that in its course . .. it
• . . swept away all of the timber and logs, etc., that were
owned by said plaintiff ....
The court held that there was no averment of facts which consti-
tuted a use of the river in disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.
Here was the reasoning:
".... The charge that the boom broke by the defendant
stopping up the river entirely and catching a great accumula-
tion of logs is not enough. Such breaking may have been
without blame on defendant's part. Nor will it do merely
to say that these acts were negligently and unlawfully done
without showing wherein the negligence and unlawfulness lay;
for it is not always a negligent or unlawful act for a boom
company to stop up a river and catch a great number of logs.
The act must be shown to be negligence; not merely stated
to be . . ."245
The same might be said of the operation of a locomotive which
strikes the plaintiff's horse, as in the Robbins case. The plaintiff
in the Wilson case had relied upon the Robbins case, but the court
summarily disposed of it by saying:
".... The case is different from that of running a loco-
motive onto a horse. Robbins v. Railroad Co., 62 W. Va. 535.
That case, relied on by plaintiff, is not in point here. Facts
must be averred to take the act out of its ordinary harmless
phase .. ,"246
One would have thought that plaintiff's counsel had used greater
care in drafting his pleading in the Wilson case, having alleged
242 See note 237 supra; note the basis for this conclusion in the earlier
cases.
243 70 W. Va. 602, 74 S.E. 870 (1912).
244 This is quoted from the second count of the declaration as found in
the record. Italics supplied.
245 70 W. Va. at 604, 74 S.E. at 871.
246 Ibid.
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more "facts" than the Robbins case seemed to require. The de-
fendant certainly had fairer notice of the claim asserted than in
the Robbins case.
The reasoning in the Wilson case stands in contrast with later
cases permitting more general allegations of negligence. Com-
pare this:
"... Neither the running of an engine nor the killing of
a person in so doing is necessarily negligence . . .24T
. . . The averment is that the defendant negligently ran
its train over and upon him. Under any conceivable state of
circumstances, this would be a wrong, if it happened . . .,,24s
Or this:
"... An allegation that an act which may have been done
either with or without negligence, according to the circum-
stances to be revealed by the evidence, was done negligently,
is an allegation of fact ....- 249
Although the Wilson case has been discredited by these two later
cases, though not menioned therein, it does show how the rule may
unnecessarily delay a hearing on the merits. Further, it may be
assumed that the court has not heard the last of the Wilson case.
In the most recent case involving the sufficiency of an allegation
as to negligence, the defendant relied upon that case. The court
did not disapprove of the manner in which the rule had been
applied in the case; it was merely stated to be "a case where 'that
which is averred therein as negligence is not negligence' and not
a case where an allegation of primary negligence was held in-
sufficient." 250
In this recent case the court applied the "well settled rule",
the application of which appears not always certain,251 and con-
cluded that the primary act of negligence had been ascertained by
the pleader and that the declaration was sufficient since that act
was alleged to have been negligently done. 25 ?2  After reviewing
the earlier cases and pointing out that declarations in some of
247 Bralley v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 66 W. Va. 462, 464, 66 S.E. 653, 654 (1909).
248 Id. at 466, 66 S.E. at 655.
249 Louis v. Smith-McCormick Construction Co., 80 W. Va. 159, 165, 92
S.E. 249, 251 (1917).
250 Gasber v. Coast Construction Co., 60 S.E.2d 193, 198 (W. Va. 1950). The
quotation within the quotation is taken from the Wilson case.
25, Even in this latest case the court said that this was one of the more
difficult questions in the case. Note that the court examined more than
twenty cases in reaching its decision.
252 The declaration alleged that the defendant "negligently, carelessly and
unlawfully" constructed certain wooden steps. Id. at 195.
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them were sustained even though "there was no specific act of
negligence alleged", the court says:
..... We do not intend to be understood as saying that
a general allegation of negligence will be sufficient in any
case. A defendant must be informed from the allegations of
the pleadings 'that he negligently did a specific act doing
harm. In other words, you may say that the defendant neg-
ligently did or did not do so and so, without detail as to the
mere negligence, but you must state the acts that are the basis
of liability. If the negligence cannot be otherwise charged,
detail must be given.' "253
As stated in the syllabus by the court, an allegation that the pri-
mary or basic act was done negligently will be sufficient unless an
allegation of the particular or specific act constituting negligence
is necessary to inform the defendant of the charge.
Whether the decision in this case has clarified the law may be
doubted. The holding appears consistent with the great majority
of the earlier cases in finding the allegations here sufficient, but
may the court have indicated that greater detail may be required in
the future where it is felt that the defendant should be better
informed? The form of allegation held sufficient in this case and
most of the West Virginia cases is no different basically from that
used in the official form prescribed for use in federal courts.254
There is no danger that that form will be held insufficient and
little likelihood that an objection will be made as to its sufficiency
as a delaying tactic. 2 5 The possibility that there may arise a case
in which the defendant should be given additional information
concerning the claim, although he concededly gets little from
most of the declarations which have been sustained in the past, 256
can be met by other means to be discussed herein and without
holding out hope to the defendant that he may use this argument
as to sufficiency of the pleadings to delay a hearing on the merits.
251 Id. at 198.
214 See notes 239, 240, and 252 supra and the text at notes 241-249 supra.
25r See note 261 infra.
2.3 See note 239 supra. See also Bralley v. Norfolk 9: W. Ry., 66 W. Va.
462, 465, 66 S.E. 653, 654 (1909), and Carlin, The Common Law Declaration
in West Virginia, 35 IV. VA. L.Q. 1, 6 (1928), for a discussion of the ad-
vantages in not requiring detailed pleadings. In Gorsuch v. F.W. Woolworth
& Co., 104 W. Va. 98, 139 S.F. 472 (1927) and 107 W. Va. 552, 149 S.E. 610
(1929) are two declarations in the same case, both with detailed allegations,
neither of which gives the defendant any more information as to the claim
than the other. Yet the first was held inadequate but the second sufficient.
Had the plaintiff waited long enough for justice?
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The problem here as to precedents in determining what is an
ultimate fact or a legal conclusion has been limited to a field in
which the law is said to be well settled in this jurisdiction. Num-
erous other words and phrases used in pleading might be discussed
in relation to this problem, but as to many of these the law is less
well settled and the dangers inherent in choosing the proper
phraseology are greater.2 5 7 Much space would be required to de-
velop adequately as to these other words the same factors as
stressed herein and the point urged would not be made any clearer
thereby. Let this one question suffice: has the use of precedents
either established a safer basis on which a pleader may proceed
in alleging his cause or defense or resulted in giving the opposing
party any fairer notice of the claim or defense asserted than might
be secured under a rule which provides that earlier precedents
shall be ignored and that the pleading shall be held adequate
"unless there be omitted something so essential to the action or
defense that judgment, according to law and the very right of the
cause, cannot be given"?258  Since this quoted part of the statute
has not been construed to eliminate precedents based on matters
of "substance", the common law rules of pleading which were re-
garded as more than "formal" many years ago continue to consume
much time of the court and lawyers-and law students-and this
not for the purpose of ascertaining either the law applicable or the
facts on which the cause of action will be based, but merely to com-
ply with rules for the sake of rules. This time-consuming game
of mental gymnastics may be interesting, but how long will the
public, which does not understand how fascinating the game can
be, continue to pay the expenses of the participants?
Rather than accept as controlling the technical rules of com-
mon law pleading, along with the confusing precedents, many of
which continue to be applied in states having code pleading,2°5
the Federal Rules stress the requirement that the pleader set forth
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that he is en-
257 Many of these words and the variety of approaches as to their suffi-
ciency or insufficiency in pleading are discussed in Wheaton, Manner of
Stating Cause of Action, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 185 (1935).
258 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 37 (Michie, 1949). A greater portion
of this statute is quoted in the text at note 219 supra. "Great liberality in
a pleading should prevail under this statute." Per Judge Given, dissenting in
State ex rel. Kootz v. Smith, 62 S.E.2d 548, 554 (W. Va. 1950).
259 In some respects code pleading became even more technical since some
courts emphasized that this was to be fact-pleading and required extensive
detail in cases where the common law permitted general allegations. See
CLARK, CODE PLEADING §§ 39, 45 et seq.
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titled to relief, 260 and as an extra precaution prescribe certain
forms which not only illustrate the simplicity goal but are ade-
quate to cover the great majority of litigated cases. 26 1 The federal
courts are no longer "hampered by the morass of decisions as to
whether a particular allegation is one of fact, evidence, or law.
262
The West Virginia court has "indicated that it would welcome an
opportunity to be free of some of the fetters imposed by such
common law precedents and to decide cases without sacrificing
substantial rights to mere technicality and form. 26 3 In the follow-
ing sections the resulting simplicity of pleading under the Federal
Rules is shown, noting also that pleading according to the legal
effect, another common law requirement, is not needed. In effect,
pleading under the Federal Rules is equivalent to notice pleading
in West Virginia.
264
C. Pleading Legal Effect
The official forms in the appendix to the Federal Rules indi-
cate that the rule requiring one to plead according to the legal
effect has been abolished and that those rules require no verbalism
to state a claim. Although other forms may better illustrate the
permissible brevity of pleading under these rules,2 65 the form of
the common counts best reflects the absence of pleading by legal
effect .2 6' For example, Form 5, the complaint for goods sold and
delivered, reads (omitting the allegation to show jurisdiction):
2,3,, Rule 8, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). Note that there
is no requirement that the pleading set forth "facts", "ultimate facts", "facts
stating a cause of action", or "facts according to their legal effect", nor is
there any prohibition against pleading "legal conclusions" or "evidence", except
as the latter may be discouraged by the emphasis on a short pleading.
2611 "The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under
the rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement
which the rules contemplate." Rule 84, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.
(1950). The amendment of this rule in 1946 made it clear that the Official
Forms are sufficient to withstand attack. See comment on this rule in MooRE,
FEDERAL RULES AND OFFICIAL FORAIS (1949).
262 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1647.
26; See notes 228 and 299 supra and the accompanying text. See also
this complaint: "The use of exhibits to pleadings in common law actions is
barred under the strict and stereotyped rules of the common law." Mountain
State Water Co. v. Kingwood, 121 W. Va. 66, 69, 1 S.E.2d 395, 397 (1939).
234 ". . . The courts have recognized that the function of pleadings under
the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable
the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial, to allow for the application
of the doctrine of res judicata, and to show the type of case brought, so that
it may be assigned to the proper form of trial ....... ".2 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 1649.
265 E.g., Forms 3, 9, 11 and 12, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
266 Forms 5, 6, 7, and 8. Ibid.
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"I. .• •
"2. Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for
goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between
June 1, 1936 and December 1, 1936.
"Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defend-
ant for the sum of ten thousand dollars, interest, and costs."
Where is the promise to pay?
In Waid v. Dixon,267 the West Virginia court meticulously
examined a declaration, set forth in full and covering four pages
of the opinion, to find that it would have been a good pleading
except that the plaintiff had not averred a promise on the defend-
ant's part, even though it was immaterial whether the defendant
ever made a promise or whether the plaintiff had to prove it. The
court held that the statute eliminating special demurrers had not
rendered the "promise" allegation unnecessary, and apologized
for reversing the judgment in haec verba:
"... This seems a technical matter on which to reverse
the case, but according to long established principles of law
calculated to promote justice, and a fair trial between litigants
and precedents firmly established, the Court cannot do other-
wise." 2 8
When dealing with the implied promise in the common
counts, the court is permitting the pleading of what is as much a
legal conclusion as other allegations which are held not sufficient
for this reason. 269 Yet not only is it permitted, it is required, in
either general or special assumpsit,2 0 and in the latter action
even though it may serve no greater purpose than it does in the
former. Here is an illustration: The plaintiff sues for rent relying
upon the written contract of lease and charges in a special count
indebtedness of $500.00 "for money due for rent of a certain store
room " * * rented by the plaintiff to the said defendant, o *
amount due and unpaid prior to the beginning of this suit, at the
rate of $75.00 per month, payable monthly in advance." 27' This
the court says would be bad on demurrer for there is no
267 55 W. Va. 191, 46 S.E. 918 (1904).
268 Id. at 197, 46 S.E. at 920.
269 " ..Therefore, the court first says, 'State not law,' then it orders,
'State it.' What admirable consistencyl . . ." Wheaton, supra note 257, at 207.
270 The express promise should be alleged in the declaration whether the
promise relied upon is express or implied in law. Wheeling Mold and Foundry
Co. v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 62 W. Va. 288, 57 S.E. 826 (1907); Waid
v. Dixon, 55 W. Va. 191, 46 S.E. 918 (1904). Some word or words equivalent
to "promised" may suffice. Paull v. Pittsburgh, W. & K. R.R., 72 W. Va. 263,
78 S.E. 100 (1913); Union Stopper Co. v. McGara, 66 W. Va. 403, 66 S.E. 698
(1909); Bannister v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., 63 W. Va. 502, 61 S.E. 338 (1908).
271 Koen v. Fairmont Brewing Co., 69 W. Va. 94, 97, 70 S.E. 1098 (1911).
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express allegation of the promise to pay the rent, and if there was
a promise it was not well pleaded, although the court concedes that
"... This apprised the defendant of the nature of the
demand, and also of reliance upon an express contract of
rental, carrying an implication of a promise or agreement to
pay the rent sued for .... The subject matter of a cause of
action is here plainly indicated. Enough is stated to show
what the plaintiff seeks and upon what theory or claim he sues
for it. Nothing is omitted which could have misled or injured
the defendant. Only a technical allegation is lacking. What
should have been stated in express terms has been pdt in by
way of implication or intendment ... "272
Contrast the requirement that a promise must be alleged in
all actions in assumpsit with the rule that an allegation of any duty
on the defendant's part in an action for negligence may be consid-
ered as surplusage. An allegation of duty is only a conclusion of
law and is unnecessary where the facts alleged show the duty and
are stated with sufficient clarity to prevent surprise.2 7 3  The legal
liability results from the facts whether the action is trespass on the
case for negligence or general assumpsit on an implied promise.
Clearly the difference in pleading is required only by the techni-
cality which was used many centuries ago to develop the common
counts. 274  The allegation of a fictitious promise was created to
promote justice; requiring the allegation today where the claim is
clearly stated only delays justice.
In a very recent case 275 an excellent example of justice de-
layed resulted from what may be termed a requirement that the
pleader allege legal effect. Some may believe that it is a better
illustration of the ultimate fact versus legal conclusion problem.
In either event, existing rules of pleading as there applied delayed
a hearing on the merits without any known benefit to either party
unless delay alone is beneficial. This may often be true as to
defendants, but seldom as to plaintiffs. 276
272 Id. at 97, 70 S.E. at 1099. It was held that the defect was cured
after verdict by a statute.
273 The duty implied by law from the facts alleged need not be averred.
Curry v. New Castle Auto Express, 112 W. Va. 268, 164 S.E. 147 (1932); Gorsuch
v. F.W. Woolworth & Co., 104 W. Va. 98, 139 S.E. 472 (1927). Many earlier
West Virginia cases in support are cited in the latter case.
274 For a history of this development, see Aatns, LE CT'RES ON LEGAL
HISTORY 145-152 (1913).
275 State ex rel. Koontz v. Smith, 62 S.E.2d 548 (W. Va. 1950).
276 Compare the statement by the West Virginia court quoted in the text
at note 341 infra.
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The state tax commissioner instituted an action to recover
money illegally expended and received by a commissioner of a
county court. The majority of the court were of the opinion that
only one statute gave the tax commissioner that right. The statute
provided that the defendant would be personally liable if he "wil-
fully" participated in the expenditure involved.2 7 7  The declara-
tion alleged that the defendant "failed and neglected to pay and
receive to himself only such monthly salary as was provided by
law", that the amount paid by him to himself as an individual
over arid above his salary was $1,100, that the same was paid and
received by forty-three separate orders, each order being specifically
described and numbered in the declaration, and that such pay-
ments were "illegal, unlawful and improper".2 78  A demurrer to
the declaration was sustained in the trial court but not for the
reason given by the appellate court. Although the court said that
the ground so assigned by the trial court, reasons which went to the
merits of the case, were improper, discussion of those grounds was
postponed until the fatal defect in the declaration, first noticed by
the appellate court, was corrected. Apparently relying upon the
very general ground of demurrer assigned by counsel, namely, "no
cause of action is stated",279 the majority of the court held that no
cause of action was alleged because the word "wilfully" was omitted
before the word "received". The court deemed this to be a "grave
question", and says that it is not sufficient for the wilfulness of the
conduct to appear in the declaration by inference or by implica-
tion. Reliance was placed upon this statement from a digest:
"Whatever facts are necessary to constitute the cause of action
should be directly and distinctly stated in the declaration, and such
facts should not be left to be inferred from other facts distinctly
277 "A person who in his official capacity wilfully participates in an
illegal expenditure may be proceeded against for the recovery of the amount
illegally expended .... W. VA. CODE c. 11, art. 8, § 30 (Michie, 1949). Italics
supplied.
278 From the dissenting opinion. 62 S.E.2d at 553-554. To the same effect,
see the majority opinion at 551.
279 ".. . All demurrers in civil cases shall be in writing and shall state
specifically the grounds of demurrer relied on, and no grounds shall be con-
sidered other than those so stated, except by the court of its own accord ......
W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 36 (Michie, 1949). Will this general assignment
serve as the basis for challenging the sufficiency of a pleading on any matter
of substance; may a demurrer special in form be thus converted to one gen-
eral in form; or was the court considering this ground of its own accord?
See Carlin, Functions of a Demurrer under the Revised Code, 41 W. VA. L.Q.
313 (1935).
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alleged in the declaration, and arguments, inferences and matters
of law should be excluded. 2 0
Would the allegation of "wilfully" be a statement of fact? or
law? or legal effect? The dissenting judge believed that the dec-
laration alleged "facts which clearly established that the sums sued
for were received wilfully by the defendant." 281 He says further:
... Assuming the allegations to be true, as we must on demurrer,
the actions of defendant could not have been otherwise than wil-
ful."2 2 Be it fact, law, or legal effect, who would be misled by the
omission of the word? WTould the facts alleged or the statements
made in the declaration lead the jury to believe that the defend-
ant was charged with doing the acts there alleged in any manner
other than wilfully? Was the defendant in doubt as to the charge?
Apparently not; this basis was not even assigned as a ground of
the demurrer.
This case offers a sharp contrast with what would be required
under notice pleading. If all parties concerned have fair notice of
the claim which is being made, what more should be required or
expected of pleading? Requiring more seems difficult to justify.
D. Notice Pleading
Unjustifiable delays are equally apparent where code plead-
ing requires a pleader to state "facts", the distinction between
facts, evidence, and law being as nebulose as that between ultimate
facts, evidentiary matters, and conclusions of law. The same pre-
cedents are usable.283  What was needed was a new approach, at
least a different approach or objective. If there were fair notice
of the claim asserted, that would suffice. This is the objective
under the Federal Rules, 284 and the West Virginia practitioner
280 62 S.E.2d at 552. 8 lIcHim, DIGEST OF VIRGINIA & WEST VIRGINIA REPORTS,
Pleading, § 52. Italics supplied. The only West Virginia case cited in sup-
port of this proposition is Burton v. Hansford, 10 W. Va. 470 (1877). This
is the case which held that recital pleading was proper in the common counts
in assumpsit (see note 225 supra), the exception as to this type of pleading
in West Virginia. This statement quoted from that case was used there as
introductory matter. The only other West Virginia case cited to support the
holding in the instant case involved a declaration in which sufficient facts
were not alleged to show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff-
the quotation taken from that case was there adopted from the Burton case.
28, 62 S.E.2d at 553.
282 Id. at 554.
283 See note 259 supra.
284 See note 264 supra.
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has long been familiar with it, 2 s  even though only in a limited
field. 28
"It is the purpose of a notice, on which to base a motion
for judgment, to acquaint the defendant with the grounds on
which he is to be proceeded against; and if it be so plain that
the defendant cannot mistake its object, it is sufficient, how-
ever wanting it may be in form and technical accuracy ...
Such notice will be treated with great indulgence by the
court . . ."287
That is the West Virginia court dealing with the sufficiency of a
notice of motion for judgment,288 but it might as easily have been
a federal court applying the new rules. For example:
..... to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be had, it is necessary only to allege sufficient
facts to apprize the opposing party of the nature of the claim
which will be proved. Technicalities in pleading are no
longer observed .... 289
The only difference to be noticed is that the West Virginia court
went further to state that the pleading would be treated with great
indulgence, which is also the way in which pleadings are to be
construed under the Federal Rules. 290
A comparison of the official forms in the appendix to the
Federal Rules with notices held sufficient by the West Virginia
court also illustrates the same liberal treatment of pleadings. One
notice held sufficient recited simply that the plaintiff would move
the circuit court "to render judgment against you, and in our
favor, for the sum of $389.40, with interest thereon from the due
date of said account. Said money is due and owing to us by you,
as per itemized statements rendered to you for sand heretofore sold
2 5 Notice of motion for judgment proceedings have been used from the
time the state was formed. VA. CODE c. 167, § 5 (1849).
286 The limitations are discussed in the text which follows.
287 Hall v. Harrisville Southern R.R., 103 W. Va. 287, 289, 137 S.E. 226
(1927). From an historical viewpoint it is of interest that originally it seems
that the notice though not in writing was adequate and that where in writing
it was often drawn, not by a lawyer, but' by the party plaintiff himself. 4
MiNoR's Institutes, 1318 (3d ed. 1893). It is also of interest that recent state-
ments by the court as to the manner in which the sufficiency of a notice is
determined, such as that quoted in the text above, are almost verbatim with
those made by Professor Minor in the reference, omitting only the two obser-
vations made in this note. As to the possibility of litigants' drafting their
own pleadings under the Federal Rules and the dangers inherent in such
action, see Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944).
288 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 2, § 6 (Michie, 1949).
289 Van Dyke v. Broadhurst, 28 F. Supp. 737, 740 (M.D. Pa. 1939).
290 "All pleadings shall- be so construed as to do substantial justice."
Rule 8(f), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
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and delivered to you from time to time.."2 9 , In another case 29 2
the motion held sufficient stated that the plaintiff would move for
a judgment for $1,000.00, being the amount owing to the plaintiff
for a carload of lumber which was sold to the defendants on a
specified date. The court held that it was unnecessary to state
that the defendants had contracted with the plaintiff and had
promised to pay him for the car of lumber because the law
implies that from an allegation of sale,293 and further that the
details as to quantity and price per thousand need not be alleged.
As an example of similar treatment of pleadings under the
Federal Rules, one of the official forms, omitting the allegation
as to jurisdiction, reads:
"I. . . .
"2. Defendant owes plaintiff ten thousand dollars for
goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to defendant between
June 1, 1936, and December 1, 1936.
"Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against defend-
ant for the sum of ten thousand dollars, interst, and costs." 294
Although the West Virginia court states the rule to be that
the pleader must allege in the notice the facts necessary to show
a right to recover from the defendant,29 5 the distinctions drawn at
common law and under code pleading betwen facts, evidence, and
law, have not been used to hold notices insufficient as long as the
defendant is given reasonable notice of the claim asserted.29 6
Those who think an extension of these principles to plead-
ings in common law actions is objectionable may attempt to justify
the liberality here on the basis that notices of motion for judgment
201 Elkhorn Sand & Supply Co. v. Algonquin Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 110, 111,
136 S.E. 783 (1927). This quotation is from the unofficial report. In the
official report the words "as per itemized statements rendered to you" are
omitted. The record in the case confirms the correctness of the unofficial
report.202 Tuggle v. Belcher, 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927).
203 See the text above as to the essentiality of the allegation of a promise
in the action of assumpsit, whether general or special assumpsit. Why the
difference when it may be the same cause of action being used as the basis of a
notice of motion for judgment? And why is implication sufficient 'here but
not in a common law action? The questions are further discussed in the
text which follows.
294 Form 5 in appendix to the rules. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A.
(1950). See as to sufficiency of such forms, note 261 supra.
29 E.g., Citizens National Bank v. Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 27, 117 S.E. 685,
687 (1923); Hastings v. Grump, 89 W. Va. 111, 112, 108 S.E. 600 (1921).290 E.g., Tuggle v. Belcher, 104 W. Va. 178, 139 S.E. 653 (1927); Marshall
County Bank v. Citizens Mutual Trust Co., 114 W. Va. 791, 174 S.E. 556 (1934).(Judge Hatcher's concurring opinion). Liberal rules are also applied as to de-
fenses. E.g., Collins v. White Oak Fuel Co., 69 W. Va. 292, 71 S.E. 277 (1911);
Note by Professor Carlin in 40 W. VA. L.Q. 159 (1934).
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are now limited to actions in which the amount to be recovered
is "liquidated".
The statute provides that this procedure may be used "to
recover money by action on any contract."297 Even though the
court has restricted the application of the statute,29 the procedure
may be used where the issue even as to "damages" is not free of
doubt.
In White v. Conley,299 the court held that the quoted statutory
phrase does not permit this simplified procedure where the plaintiff
merely seeks damages for the breach of a contract. The plaintiff
had sued upon the official bond of a justice for his alleged failure
to issue an execution. The decision contained this reasoning:
".. . Upon a bond with a collateral condition, or an
official bond, there may properly be a proceeding by motion
for judgment for a claim which is definite, certain and fixed
in amount, .... ; but if the claim sought to be collected under
the bond is not definite and certain but depends upon proof
as to the amount which the claimant may be entitled to re-
cover, then a proceeding upon notice of motion for judgment
is not proper. ... "300
An earlier case 301 in which the plaintiff had proceeded by motion
for judgment on an oral contract for a sum uncertain, though
capable of being made certain, was not mentional by the court.
Later cases recognized that a notice of motion for judgment would
be entertained for the recovery of money on contract, including
contracts implied in law and fact,3°2 and they did not seem to
require that the sum demanded be either certain or liquidated as
297 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 2, § 6 (Michie, 1949).
298 ". . . This language, ambiguously, is sufficiently broad to cover all
claims that might be litigated in a common-law contract action, but it has not
been so construed .. " Carlin, supra note 296, at 162.
299 108 W. Va. 658, 152 S.E. 527 (1930).
•oo Id. at 662, 152 S.E. at 529.
30, Davis v. Fisher, 90 W. Va. 417, 111 S.E. 155 (1922).
302 Mountain State Water Co. v. Kingwood, 121 W. Va. 66, 1 S.E.2d 895
(1939) (contract implied in fact); Grinrod Process Corp. v. Rothwell, 117
W. Va. 709, 189 S.E. 100 (1936) (judgment of sister state) ; Lawhead v. Garlow,
114 W. Va. 175, 171 S.E. 250 (1933) (liability imposed by statute on stock-
holders of banks); State ex. rel. Bush v. Carden, 111 W. Va. 631, 163 S.E. 54(1932) (contract implied in law where action for damages on injunction bond
required by statute); Lambert v. Morton, 111 W. Va. 25, 160 S.E. 223 (1931)
(quasi-contractual obligation; money received for another). See also the cases
in note 303 infra which are not cited here.
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long as there was a promise to pay money.303 One of these cases,
State ex rel. Bush v. Carden,304 since discredited as will be noted,
permitted the proceeding on an injunction bond to recover dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the granting of the
injunction. The issues for trial in cases of this nature were often
complex,30 5 but these cases indicate that, as long as the claim
asserted is made reasonably clear by the pleading, the technicalities
which would have been required in common law actions can be
eliminated without prejudice to the substantive rights of the
parties.
One might have thought that the apparent extension of the
field in which notices of motion for judgment might be used was
303 In Houston v. Lawhead, 116 W. Va. 652, 182 S.E. 780 (1935) (notice
of motion for judgment to recover the purchase price of a note under a
warranty imposed by law), the court used reasoning which would even permit
this procedure in an action for damages for breach of contract, namely:
The test of this provision is the right to recover money by an action on a
contract. In other words, if a person is entitled to recover money on a con-
tract in an existing law action, he is, by this provision, also entitled to recover
on motion. The statute simply provides an alternative remedy. Therefore,
the designation of assumpsit as a proper remedy necessarily makes its statu-
tory alternative also a proper one." Id. at 655, 182 S.E. at 782. Italics by the
court.
Concededly this went further than the court had previously gone. [The
soundness of this approach was questioned in Moundsville v. Brown, 125 W. Va.
779, 25 S.E.2d 900 (1943).] However, it had been thought that the White
case merely confined the remedy to promises to pay money, express or implied,
and if such a promise existed, then the sum due need not be so certain or
liquidated that evidence in the nature of an inquiry of damages would be
unnecessary. Carlin, supra note 296, at 162. The case which best illustrated
this view was State ex rel. Bush v. Garden, 111 W. Va. 631, 163 S.E. 54 (1932),
wherein the motion procedure was held proper to recover damages on an
injunction bond by this reasoning:
. . . The injunction bond given by defendants was required by statute
... . thereby establishing an obligation to pay for any damages ensuing
as a result of the injunction order. . . . Recovery is thus predicated on
money due under the contract implied in law and a proper remedy there-
for is under the statute providing for motions for judgments in actions
on contract."
Id. at 633, 163 S.E. at 55. Italics supplied. This approach permitted the court
to reach a conclusion different from that in the White case although both
cases were based on Stuart v. Carter, 79 W. Va. 92, 90 S.E. 537 (1916). The White
case was not mentioned in the Garden case. The cases cited in note 302 supra
also demonstrate this approach. In addition to these cases, see Skidmore v.
Star Insurance Co., 126 W. Va. 307, 27 S.E.2d 845 (1943) and Morgan v.
American Central Insurance Co., 80 W. Va. 1, 92 S.E. 84 (1917), both of which
permit the motion procedure to be used for recovery on fire insurance policies.
In the latter case, the court said: ". . . A policy of fire insurance is a con-
tract on which the insured is entitled to recover money, after a loss by fire
has occurred .... Id. at 2, 92 S.E. at 85.
304 111 W. Va. 631, 163 S.E. 54 (1932).
305 Note the variety of fact situations in which the procedure has been
used. See cases in notes 302 and 303 supra.
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some evidence of the court's reluctance to allow tcehnical rules to
delay a hearing on the merits. However, in State, for Use of Stout,
v. Rogers 0 6 a very recent case, the court has indicated that the use
of the notice procedure with its concomitant liberal rules of plead-
ing may be further restricted. For all practical purposes the Garden
case was overruled, and perhaps an extended application of the
principles relied upon in the Conley case is to be expected."0
It was held in the Rogers case that a notice of motion for
judgment will not lie on an injunction bond for damages which
are "unliquidated". The court seems to have reached this con-
clusion by emphasis on this being an action for unliquidated dam-
ages for breach of contract and that the proceeding is not proper
for unliquidated amounts, whereas the court in the Garden case
seems to have relied upon the idea that the contract sued upon
created an obligation to pay damages or money and thus whether
liquidated or unliquidated the recovery was predicated on "money
due under the contract".30 8
Aside from the holding, further doubt is cast upon earlier
precedents. In clarifying the meaning of previous statements by
the court that damages for breach of contract may be recovered
in a notice proceeding, the court concludes:
".. .What we think the courts have meant to hold is that
the notices of motion procedure may not be used to recover
what is termed unliquidated damages, that is damages which
can only be determined in the trial of a case where evidence in
some form other than the terms of the contract is required
to ascertain the amount of the damages sustained. Notices of
motion were designed to recover liquidated demands, or de-
mands which could be definitely ascertained from the contract
sued on, on the theory that that is certain which can be made
certain . 3.."309
It is hoped that the court had in mind only actions on express
contracts, where the rule here expressed has been used to deter-
mine whether damages for a breach thereof are liquidated,' 0 and
that these statements will not be applied to prevent the use of
notice procedure where the action is based on an implied con-
306 52 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1949).
307 See the quotation from the White case in the text above.
308 See also note 303 supra.
300 52 S.E.2d at 684.
310 Hooper-Makin Fuel Co. v. Shrewsbury Coal Co., 94 W. Va. 442, 119 S.E.
176 (1923); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Martin-Nelly Grocery Co., 90
W. Va. 730, 111 S.E. 759 (1922); Cook Pottery Co. v. Parker, 86 W. Va. 580, 104
S.E. 51 (1920). Although not so stated, the court may have had in mind the
analogy of claims deemed liquidated for the purpose of set-off. For that pur-
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tract.311 Even if this is what the court meant, this will in effect
amount to a discrediting of other earlier cases in which the pro-
ceeding had been based on express contracts. 312
In any event, from the viewpoint of the proper function of
pleadings, why should the defendant receive less notice of the
claim, or the plaintiff be permitted to use less specific language in
describing his claim, because the amount claimed is liquidated?
Perhaps this feature may indicate that it would normally require
less to notify the defendant concerning the amount of the claim,
but how could this justify a lesser degree of particularity in alleging
the basis of the claim? Furthermore, application of more liberal
rules to notice pleading is not justified on the basis of the amount
involved in the action. Even though liberal rules of pleading
apply to notice procedure, the pleader has always been required
to allege sufficient therein to state a cause of action. 313  If it be
conceded that this requirement can be enforced under liberal rules
as to notice pleading, and there is no contention that it has not
been, why cannot those same rules be applied to any cause of action
whether stated in a pleading called a notice, a declaration at law,
a bill in equity, or a complaint in a unified procedure? The rea-
son is merely historical. 31 4
E. Pleading Technique
The question may arise whether the pleader would be re-
quired to develop a new technique in drafting his pleadings if
pose, where the claim is based on an express contract, the terms of the con-
tract must furnish the basis for making the claim certain; but, where
the promise is implied' the amount due may be made sufficiently certain
from the evidence to be allowed as a set-off. See Lugar, Common 'Law
Pleading Modified Versus the Federal Rules, 53 W. VA. L. Rav. 142, 145
n. 20 (1951). Even if this is the distinction which the court had in mind,
it is difficult to see why the line should be so drawn; even where made
certain from the contract, a writ of inquiry may be needed and as much
evidence may be needed to determine the amount of recovery as in many
cases where the evidence alone would determine the amount due. Is this
another attempt to establish a general rule to prevent the issues for trial
from becoming complex without considering the facts in the particular case?
.311 See note 310 supra.
312 Note, for example, the proceedings which had been based on fire in-
surance policies. See note 303 supra.
313 E.g., Citizens National Bank v. Dixon, 94 W. Va. 21, 117 S.E. 685 (1923);
Hastings v. Grump, 89 W. Va. 111, 108 S.E. 600 (1921).
314 As an example, if the reason is other than historical, why should the
court not apply this test: if the cause of action asserted in an action at law
is one which might be asserted by notice of motion for judgment, the liberal
rules of pleading applied in the latter will be applied in the former. Absurdl
Perhaps, but not on the basis of policy considerations; only on the basis of
what we expect from precedents.
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simplified pleading were extended to all actions. The answer is
that he need not, but he probably will. What now is sufficient
under existing rules of pleading will continue to be sufficient,313
but failure to observe existing technical rules will no longer be
bad pleading. Under the Federal Rules the function of the plead-
ings is to give fair notice of the claim asserted so that the oppos-
ing party may answer and prepare for trial, so that the doctrine
of res adjudicata may be applied, and so that the proper form of
trial may be assigned.318  As long as fair notice of the cause of
action is given, it is immaterial whether legal conclusions, ultimate
facts or evidentiary facts are alleged.3 1 .7 If the pleading does not
show that the litigant is entitled to relief on the facts that might
be proved under its allegations, although it need not be the same
relief as demanded, 3 1  the pleading will be insufficient without
amendment whether the deficiency is the result of too few or too
many allegations.3 19
F. Determining the Issues
Under the simplified pleading in notices of motion for judg-
ment in West Virginia no difficulty seems to have arisen in deter-
mining the issues for trial or in the defendant's being aware of
the evidence which would be needed. However, if the scope of
this type of pleading is broadened to cover the assertion of any
claim, these problems may need some consideration. This is
especially true if a freer joinder of parties and claims, including
legal and equitable claims, is permitted. The West Virginia court
seems to have recognized that these problems may arise even in
the limited field in which notice pleading may now be used if the
claim is very tersely stated, but the court shows no great concern
315 Or, as stated by Professor Moore: "What constituted good craftsman-
ship before the Rules continues to constitute good craftsmanship ....... 2
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1654. Judge Clark, in speaking of what should
be considered proper pleading in code jurisdictions, states this: ". . . It would
seem, therefore, that the common-law rules as to particularity of allegation,
since they have become familiar to pleaders, should be considered at least
in point under code pleading and, subject to the more flexible nature of code
pleading which puts less of a premium on formalism, should furnish satisfactory
precedents. Beyond this it might well be held that any form of pleading which
through long usage under the common law or elsewhere has been held to give
sufficient notice should be considered to be sufficient under code-pleading
rules. ... CLARK, CODE PLEADING 249.
321 See note 264 supra.
317 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.13.
318 See text which accompanies notes 149-155 supra.
319 2 MooRE, FEDERAL. PRACTICE 1653, 1657-1658. See also quotation from
this treatise in the text at note 155 supra.
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for the defendant unless he has made a demand for a bill of par-
ticulars.320  This suggests that there are ways to meet these prob-
lems without unduly cluttering the pleadings.
Although it may not be within the scope of this paper to dis-
cuss the methods aside from the pleadings which may be used for
the purpose of formulating issues and advising the opposing party
of the facts involved, such methods can be and have been devised.
Professor Moore writes:
". ... Under the old practice the pleadings not only
served the function of giving notice of the claim asserted, but
they also carried the burden of formulating the issues and to
a large extent of advising the adverse party of the facts in-
volved. Now the pre-trial conference under Rule 16 and the
deposition and discovery procedure under Rules 26-37 afford
a much more efficient method of getting at the facts than plead-
ings ever offered, and they also bear much of the burden of
making up the issues.... 21
Federal Rule 12 (e) is also designed to assist an opposing party at
the pleading stage if the pleading to which he is permitted to re-
spond is so vague or ambiguous that he cannot reasonably be re-
quired to frame a responsive pleading. This rule permits him to
move for a more definite statement before interposing his respon-
sive pleading.322 The amendment to this rule in 1946 eliminated
any reference to this motion as one for "a bill of particulars" or
320 ".. . Here the defendant could not be mistaken as to the nature of
plaintiff's claim, or the object of the motion. It had only to defend a suit
for the value of sand sold to and delivered to it by plaintiff. It made' no
demand for a bill of particulars or statement of account." Elkhorn Sand &
Supply Co. v. Algonquin Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 110, 112, 136 S.E. 783 (1927).
321 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1652. Most West Virginia practitioners
are familiar with the principles of pre-trial conferences. Procedural rule in
volume 127 West Virginia Reports. The pre-trial deposition-discovery mech-
anism under Federal Rules 26 to 37 was an innovation in federal procedure.
Space does not permit an adequate treatment of this procedure here. Basic-
ally these rules recognize that the common law method of using pleadings to
determine what facts are really in dispute only resulted in making the
pleadings highly technical without disclosing the real issues. The mechanism
and its benefits, as well as possible abuse thereof, are discussed in detail in
4 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcriCE §§ 26.01-37.04 (the subject matter of almost
the entire volume).
322 This rule further provides: "... The motion shall point out the
defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted and the
order of the court is not obeyed. . .. the court may strike the pleading to
which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just." Rule
12 (e), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
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that such motions could be used "to prepare for trial".323  Many
federal courts had entertained a motion under this section where
the pleading satified the requirement of Rule 8, that is, it con-
tained a short and plain statement of the claim, where the oppos-
ing party sought detailed information concerning the cause of
action or defense or desired to limit the issues to be tried. The
elimination of this practice was designed to force a use of the
more expeditious methods provided by the pre-trial conference
and the deposition and discovery procedure. Rule 12 (e) can no
longer be used as a discovery method or as a means to narrow the
issues, nor as a device to delay trial of the case.3 24
More rules of this nature might be needed or be helpful in
expediting litigation if simplified pleadings were adopted more
generally in West Virginia, but existing devices would be sufficient
to permit greater liberality in pleading without any fear that un-
certainty would result. Since June 1, 1945, trial courts have had
the option of using pre-trial conferences. The rule establishing
this procedure is the same in substance as the federal rule, the only
change therein being the substitution of terminology to indicate
that the procedure applies whether the proceeding is "at law" or
"in equity".32 5 This procedure can be used to simplify and clarify
the issues and reduce or eliminate surprise at the trial, and as indi-
cated, these objectives can be accomplished much more effectively
by this method than by any pleading device. In addition, the
other matters which may be considered at the pre-trial conference
may greatly lessen the time to be consumed in the trial of the
case or perhaps avoid the necessity of a trial.320  For these reasons,
,23 The rule formerly read in part as follows: ". . . a party may movefor a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which
is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him pro-
perly to prepare his responsive pleading or to prepare for trial .... A bill ofparticulars becomes part of the pleading which it supplements." 2 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE 2215. Italics supplied.
324 An excellent discussion of the reasons for abolishing the bill ofparticulars, containing an elaboration of the points above in the text, appears
in 2 MOORE, FED.RAL PRACTICE § 12.17.
.253 The rule appears in volume 127 West Virginia Reports. Compare Rule16, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). The rules are identical except
that (1) the words "action" and "suit" are used in lieu of "action" which
could be used alone in the federal rule since there is only one form of action
in that system, and (2) in the first line of the rule the word "civil" has beeninserted before the word "action".
320 Note the number and variety of matters which the rule stipulates may
be considered in the pre-trial conference. Much that might be accomplished
in such conferences may not have been realized in West Virginia to datebecause of lack of interest in the procedure. Those who have had little ex-
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it might be hoped that simplified pleadings would make it neces-
sary or expedient for this procedure to be used more frequently
by trial courts. The rule provides that pre-trial conferences may
be used in all cases or in such cases as the trial court deems it
necessary or expedient.
In addition to the pre-trial conference, bills of particulars as
to the claim or defense are now available to obtain a more partic-
ular statement of the nature of the claim or defense or the facts
expected to be proved by the pleader at the trial.3 27 The state-
ment does not become part of the pleading which it supple-
ments, 32s being simply an evidentiary device which limits what
may be proved at the trial. That a bill of particulars is not as
effective as pre-trial conference or the federal deposition and dis-
covery procedure in narrowing the issues or preventing surprise
may be judged from the test to be applied in determining its
sufficiency. The statute provides: ".... But no statement which,
in the particulars required ... to be stated or referred to therein,
is sufficient to notify the adverse party, in effect, shall be adjudged
the claim or defense to be set up against him, shall be adjudged
insufficient.."32 This test would be applied under the Federal Rules
in determining whether the pleading is sufficient.3 0 It is intended
that the motion for a bill of particulars be used in West Virginia
where the statement of the claim or defense is adequate as a pleading
but is so indefinite that the basis of the claim or defense cannot be
ascertained therefrom.3 31  The typical cases in which it is neces-
perience with pre-trial conference will find the following of interest: Nims,
PRE-TRIAL (1950); Shafroth, Pre-Trial Techniques of Federal Judges, 28 J.
Ahr. JuD. Soc'v 39 (1944); Sunderland, Procedure for Pretrial Conferences in the
Federal Courts, id. at 46. See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1101-1139.
Mr. Nims includes in his book not only all of the decisions of courts of last
resort on pre-trial matters but also a lengthy appendix containing pre-trial
rules of various courts and administrative bodies, transcripts of minutes of
pre-trial hearings and specimens of forms and orders. In a review of this
book, Judge Jayne quoted this pertinent statement. ' . . . Experience has
shown that, while pre-trial procedure generally proves popular with attorneys
after they have once become familiar with it, it needs a strong push from thejudge to get over the initial hump caused by our acquired habits of thinking
of the law as a sort of a game in which each party holds his cards under the
table..' " 34 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 157 (1951).
327 W. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, §§ 19, 20 (Michie, 1949). See also id. at §§
18, 21-23.
328 E.g., Baker v. Letzkus, 113 W. Va. 533, 168 S.E. 806 (1933). Compare
the former rule in federal courts. See note 323 supra.
329 W. VA. CODE C. 56, art. 4, § 23 (Michie, 1949).
330 Rule 8, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.CA. (1950). See note 264 supra.
331 "If the pleadings of either party already sufficiently set forth the
grounds of action or defense, no bill of particulars is necessary." Burks, Plead-
ing 9- Practice 573.
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sary are those in which the plaintiff has used the common counts
in assumpsit or the defendant has used one of the general issues
under which a great number of different defenses may be shown A 2
It may be used in other cases where the pleadings leave the nature
of the claim or defense uncertain, for example, where the pleading
is duplicitous. 333 If a short and plain statement of the claim or
defense were required, one which gave the opposing party fair
notice thereof, not even a bill of particulars would be required&.3 4
It is dear that it is not an efficient method of obtaining accurate
pre-trial information, for in supplying the bill a pleader may pre-
pare a lengthy statement which really gives little or no knowledge
as to the real claim or defense and the issues for trial will remain
uncertain. 3
35
Therefore, since the deposition and discovery procedure es-
tablished for federal courts does not exist in West Virginia, the
trial court under existing procedure would need to rely largely
on pre-trial conferences to limit the issues and prevent surprise at
the trial, but to no greater extent than may be necessary now under
proper pleadings and bills of particulars if the true issues are to be
learned in advance of trail. In many cases simplified pleading
would give the court and opposing counsel as much, if not more,
notice of the claim or defense from the pleadings as do the present
pleadings even aided by bills of particulars. Here it is reempha-
sized that Federal Rule 8 requires as to both a claim and a defense
that the statement thereof be short and plain and composed of
332 E.g., a plea of nil debet gives the plaintiff no notice of what the
actual defense is for numerous matters may be introduced thereunder. Id. at 158.
333 Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W.Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915).
334 See note 331 supra.
335 It is not necessary to support a verdict that all of the matters set forth
in the statement be proved; only so much thereof as is necessary to sustain
the essential averments of the pleading need be proved. Deitz v. Providence
Washington Insurance Co., 33 W. Va. 526, 11 S.E. 50 (1890). Since the state-
ment is not a part of the pleading, it seems that evidence as well as ultimate
facts may be averred. In speaking of a statement of the grounds of defense
to accompany a plea of nil debet: " . . . the defendant may allege in such
statement as many different grounds of defense as his imagination may sug-
gest, and, if he includes among such grounds his actual defense, he is safe.
So, even with the aid of § 6091 the plaintiff may still be left to conjecture in
determining what the real defense is." BURKS, PLEADING & PRACTIcE 159. See
also id. at 572 n. 24. Only this limit is imposed by the statutes: the state-
ment must be under the oath of the party plaintiff or defendant, or some
other credible person, to the effect that the affiant believes the same will be
supported by evidence at the trial. See note 327 supra. Not being a part
of the pleading, the statement is not subject to demurrer even though the
grounds stated are an inadequate basis for a claim or defense. See note 328
supra and the accompanying text.
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simple, concise and direct averments, and further that general
denials are permitted only where the pleader intends in good faith
to controvert all of the averments of the preceding pleading, with
the added condition that matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense must be pleaded specially.3 36 If compliance
with these requirements does not give as much notice of the issues
for trial from the pleadings as existing pleadings and bills of par-
ticulars, the court may resort to pre-trial conferences on its own
motion or on motion of one of the parties."' The real issues for trial
might also be developed under the deposition and discovery pro-
cedure set forth in Federal Rules 26-37, and this without the court's
participation; 38 but even without the adoption of similar rules,
simplified pleadings may be used without losing any of the benefits
which are historically assigned as reasons for the technical re-
quirements observed in common law pleading.
G. Alternative Pleading
Before concluding these comments on the rules which govern
how a claim must or must not be pleaded or stated, one other
limitation will be examined. This restriction in West Virginia
results from other basic differences between the procedure in this
state and that under the Federal Rules. Differences which have
already been discussed in this paper. Being of more fundamental
importance, it was thought advisable to treat this matter after
discussing the differences as to the degree of particularity required
in stating a claim. Alternative pleading here to be discussed may
be permitted regardless of the certainty required as to the state-
ment of any one theory of recovery or defense.
The adoption of simplified pleading may avoid delays in
hearing cases on the merits, but an even more important consid-
eration is involved in the provisions of Federal Rule 8 (e) (2) which
permit alternative pleading.338 Permitting a pleader to set forth
two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively and
regardless of their consistency may prevent the necessity of two
actions and the possibility of a party's being defeated in his recov-
ery by the necessity of presenting "his case" piecemeal. Likewise,
recovery may be permitted unjustifiably unless the defendant is
338 These requirements are expressly set forth in the rule. Rule 8, Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
337 See notes 325-326 supra.
338 See note 321 supra.
338 This part of the rule is quoted in text at note 218 supra.
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permitted to set forth any defenses which he has regardless of their
consistency. That these principles should apply whether the claim
or defense be legal or equitable has already been developed herein.
The real danger is that alternative or inconsistent pleadings may
be inserted merely for the purpose of delay and without any
grounds to support them. This possibility was considered when
the Federal Rules were drafted, and the requirement that all
statements in the pleadings shall be made subject to the obligations
set forth in Rule 11 was designed to prevent any abuse of the lib-
eral rule.3 40
Merely to be permitted to set forth alternative statements of a
claim might not suffice to prevent the hardships suggested if the
plaintiff were limited, regardless of his proof, to recovery on only
one claim and one type of relief and against only one person.
Other provisions of the rules permit the plaintiff to meet these
alternatives. Rule 18 (a) permits him to join, either as alternative
or independent claims, as many claims as he may have against the
opposing party, Rule 8 (a) permits him to demand relief in the
alternative or of several different types, and Rule 20 (a) provides
that defendants may be joined in the alternative if there is asserted
against them any right to relief in respect of the same transaction
and if any question of law or fact common to them will arise in
the action. Some of the broader applications of these rules have
already been discussed herein. They are noted here as to the situa-
tion in which the plaintiff may in good faith not know which per-
son is responsible, the basis on which he is responsible, or the relief
which should be granted. Shall he be required to bring a series
of actions to determine these matters "without any corresponding
advantage to the defendant[s], other than the disadvantage thrown
in the way of the plaintiff"? 41 To a limited extent the West Vir-
ginia court has recognized that these matters can be decided in
one action.
340 Rule 11 is quoted in note 218 supra. Only if the pleader is honestly
in doubt as to the theory of recovery or the facts provable should he use a
variety of statements of the claim or defense. Compare the situation under
common law pleading. See notes 169 and 216 supra. For a dicussion of
application of Rule 11 in the federal courts, see 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTrICE
§ 11.02.
341 Per Judge Poffenbarger, in Bralley v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 66 W. Va.
462, 465, 66 S.E. 653, 654 (1909). This was stated as to other matters, but
it is equally appropriate here.
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The West Virginia court has taken the position that a plead-
ing must not be inconsistent with itself, or repugnant;342 but aided
by the statute abolishing special demurrers, 34 3 the rule has been
liberally applied so long as the declaration does not involve what
the court terms a "misjoinder of inconsistent causes of action",3 44
which seems to mean a joinder not permitted by existing rules as
to parties or forms of action.345  Where such misjoinder is not
involved, the rule preventing inconsistent pleading does not forbid
pleading merely because it is in the alternative, whether in one
count or separate counts. 40  The pleader may allege many acts of
negligence, 3 47 or different theories of negligence, 34 or that the acts
complained of have been done "wrongfully, negligently, unlaw-
fully, injuriously, wilfully, maliciously, and violently",34 9 or that
they were done negligently or wilfully.3 0 Dicta in the case in
which the last proposition was decided, which would permit the
defendant to force an election as to the theory on which the
plaintiff will proceed at the trial, has been criticized herein. 351
The undesirability of that result becomes even more obvious in
considering the present problem. No contention is made that a
pleading should be held sufficient if the allegations thereof are
wholly repugnant, inconsistent, and destructive of one another.3 5 2
'142 Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933);
STEPHEN, PLEADING § 229.
.43 In text at note 219 supra.
'4 4 Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 V. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915).
See note 170 supra. For examples of "consistent causes of action", see cases
cited in notes 347-350 infra.
t45 This is discussed in detail in note 170 supra.
.46 Where the alternatives are alleged in one count, the pleading may be
duplicitous but this will not render the declaration demurrable unless in
combining the alternatives the pleader has committed some other fatal error,
such as misjoining causes of action or jumbling the allegations so that no
cause of action is clearly stated. See Carlin, supra note 170.
347 Gartin v. Draper Coal & Coke Co., 72 W. Va. 405, 78 S.E. 673 (1913).
348 Meyn v. Dulaney-Miller Auto Co., 118 W. Va. 545, 191 S.E. 558 (1937).
.349 Turk v. Norfolk & IV. Ry., 75 W. Va. 623, 84 S.E. 569 (1915).
-o Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933).
351 See text which accompanies notes 175-179 supra. On the same point,
see discussion of the Wellman case in the text at note 180 supra. Note that
Federal Rule 8 (e) (2), quoted in the text at note 218 supra, expressly permits
two or more statements of a claim or defense to be alleged alternatively either
in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses. Further, the courts
have held that the party will not be required to elect upon which theory
he will proceed, "since this would defeat the whole purpose of allowing in-
consistent pleading." 2 MOORE, FrDERAL PRACTICE 1708.
3152 As stated by the West Virginia court: ". . . our inquiry here is . . .
whether the matters alleged in the declaration are so fundamentally incon-
sistent as to destroy each other and thus constitute a fatal repugnancy."
Collins v. Dravo Contracting Co., 114 W. Va. 229, 233, 171 S.E. 757, 758 (1933).
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To avoid this possibility separate counts may often be advisable.315
But, the pleader should be permitted to observe the other ancient
rule of pleading, namely, all pleadings ought to be true,35 4 by using
allegations in the alternative when he is not certain as to the basis
of his recovery. 5 Properly applied this principle stated by the
'West Virginia court might be used as a guide: "To vitiate a
pleading, on the ground of repugnancy, the conflict or inconsist-
ency must be irreconcilable. If the intent is clear, nice exceptions
are ignored."358 1
Further, if the theory advanced in one of the alternatives is
deemed insufficient, the pleading ought not to be regarded as in-
adequate, as some courts hold, merely because one or more of the
alternatives is bad.35 7  The federal rule expressly so provides, 8s
and the West Virginia cases seem to support this result. The court
holds that if a declaration states a good cause of action, its suffici-
ency cannot be tested by a demurrer.35 9 Also, the reasoning in
The same is true under the Federal Rules. Pleadings thereunder have been
condemned where alternative allegations have been so intermingled that the
pleader's position was not clear. 2 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8.35. Judge
Clark suggests that the tests of a pleader's truthfully stating his position and
of fair notice under-all the circumstances be applied to alternative pleadings
to determine whether they are proper. C.ARK, CODE PLEADING 258. As to the
requirement in some code states that to be joinable causes of action must be
consistent, he believes that this should be applied only to the facts alleged
and not to legal claims-it then would be a requirement of truth in the
pleadings and the specific requirement of consistency would become un-
necessary under the general requirement that all pleadings must be true. This
approach might be used: "where it appears that proof of all the facts alleged
means perjury by somebody, the pleadings are objectionable." Id. at 449.
353 Because of the West Virginia dicta, discussed above, that an election
may be required where the theories are combined in one count, another reason
for using separate counts appears. ". . . Where a resort is had to multiple
counts, of course an election between the counts is not required. Such a
requirement would wholly defeat the object of the right to resort to multiple
counts ...... Carlin, supra note 170, at 244. See note 351 supra.
354 STEPHEN, PLEADING § 258.
355 "... This is somewhat shocking to the common-law pleader [per.
mitting alternative pleading]. As a matter of fact an alternative. . . posi-
tion is often the true one, but the rule of common-law pleadings compelled
the pleader to pretend the contrary." Sunderland, The New Federal Rules,
45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 12 (1958).
356 Town of Cameron v. Hicks, 65 V. Va. 484, 64 S.E. 852 (1909), point
2 of the syllabus by the court.
357 CLARK, CODE PLEADING 256 n. 142; 2 MooR, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1706.
358 Rule 8 (e) (2), quoted in the text at note 218 supra.
3Z9 The statement usually quoted by the West Virginia court to support
this proposition appears in point 1 of the syllabus to Grass v. Big Creek Develop-
ment Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S.E. 750 (1915): "A declaration, though indefinite
and uncertain, is not demurrable, if with reasonable certainty it states one
or more good and not inconsistent causes of action .... Quoted, for example,
in State ex rel. Stout v. Rogers, 52 S.E.2d 678 (W. Va. 1949); Jones v. Berry,
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Union Stopper Co. v. McGara360 seems to support this conclusion.
In each count of the declaration the plaintiff sought to recover on
the theory that the defendant owed him a debt. The court held
that there was no justification for this theory but overruled the
demurrer since sufficient had been alleged to show that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for breach of the de-
fendant's agreement. Said the court:
"... The averments of an indebtedness and all matter
thereto related, must be excluded as insufficient and as con-
stituting mere surplusage. With the surplusage excluded, a
cause of action is shown. . . If a count alleges sufficient
matter of fact to warrant a recovery, all immaterial allega-
tions may be disregarded as surplusage. Injury from imma-
terial matters in a declaration may be prevented by objection
to evidence and by application for proper instructions ..... 3 361
The real problem arises in West Virginia from the limitation
that pleading in the alternative is not permissible if it will result
in the "misjoinder of inconsistent causes of action". Although the
court has not so stated the rule, the effect thereof is that the pleader
is again confronted by the rules regulating the joinder of parties
and forms of action.362  The often unnecessary multiplicity of
actions flowing therefrom has been discussed herein in its broader
aspects; here the rules prevent a doubtful case from being fairly
stated.363 As will be shown, the rule against inconsistency produces
inconsistencies.
The cases above in which pleading in the alternative was al-
lowed were those in which the allegations might have been stated
in several counts and joined in the same form of action. 36 1 An-
other example, involving joinder of counts in assumpsit, may be
used to illustrate the inconsistence resulting from this limitation.
In Cochran v. Craig,3 5 the plaintiff may have been uncertain
130 W. Va. 189, 45 S.E.2d 1 (1947). As to inconsistent causes of action, see
note 170 supra.
360 66 W. Va. 403, 66 S.E. 698 (1909); accord, Union Stopper Co. v.
Wood, 66 W. Va. 461, 66 S.E. 720 (1909).
361 66 W. Va. at 409, 66 S.E. at 701.
362 See note 170 supra.
363 "Now the difficulty is [may be] that the pleader cannot know, and
cannot reasonably be expected to know, which of two or more alternatives is
the correct one. . . . To enforce the rule as harshly as at common law is
unfairly to trap the pleader beyond any requirement of fair notice to the de-
fendant .... " CLARK, CODE PLEADING 255.
364 The limitations on joinder imposed by the forms of action and the
liberalization thereof in West Virginia were discussed in detail in an earlier
part of this paper. Lugar, supra note 39, at 167.
365 88 W. Va. 281, 106 S.E. 633 (1921).
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whether the facts would indicate that the person with whom he
bargained had actual or apparent authority to act for the defend-
ant; and if not, whether the evidence would show that the de-
fendant ratified the alleged contract; and if neither of these theories
could be supported by the evidence, perhaps he could show that
he was entitled to recover additional money expended in comply-
ing with what he considered an alteration in the contract. The
same problems may arise from uncertainty concerning the law
which will be applied to the facts proved. The court held that
recovery could be sustained on the pleadings on any of these
theories since the plaintiff had combined the common counts with
his special count (covering the first two alternatives). The ap-
proach in this case received favorable comment.3 16 However, if the
plaintiff has relied upon the representation of the defendant that
he had authority to sell property for another and has paid part of
the purchase price to the defendant, in seeking relief he cannot
properly combine the common counts with counts for fraud and
deceit.3 67 He may doubt whether the facts or the law will support
an action for fraud and deceit, the remedy he prefers, and be cer-
tain or uncertain that he is entitled to a return of the money
paid.365 Two actions may be needed, if the defendant objects to
the joinder by demurrer, 36 when one should have been sufficient
and would have been sufficient if the same form of action could
'6 This was called "the more liberal and the more just rule, assuming
that the court's purpose is to settle the dispute between the parties rather
than to award a prize for good pleading." Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical
Pleadings, 33 YALE L.J. 365, 375 (1924). See also 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC'rmv
1705 n. 11. The theory being approved was that the law does not require a
pleader to select at his peril between alternative claims-he may assert and
prosecute both claims in the same action, "leaving it to the court and jury
to determine to which claim, if either, he is entitled, and proof of one con-
stitutes no abandonment of the other." See quotation from the case in note
168 supra.
367 Shafer v. Security Trust Co., 82 W. Va. 618, 97 S.E. 290 (1918). Said
the court: "Clearly this summarization indicates an inconsistency between the
general and special counts of the declaration. The first is proper only in
actions of debt or assumpsit, never in an action on the case, of the nature of
which the two special counts clearly partake .... " Id. at 620, 97 S.E. at 291.
Another good illustration appears in Wells v. Kanawha & M. Ry., 78 IV. Va.
762, 90 S.E. 337 (1916). See also Lugar, supra note 39, at 175 n. 193.
36s See statement in note 363 supra.
369 Misjoinder of causes of action is cured by the statute of jeofails after
verdict. Malsby v. Lanark Co., 55 W. Va. 484, 47 S.E. 358 (1904); Knotts
v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S.E. 899 (1900). As to joinder of contract
and tort counts, see Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Wysor, 82 Va. 250 (1886).
78
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 3 [1951], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol53/iss3/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
have been used for both counts.3 " The forms of action being
different, requiring different pleas and judgments, historical rea-
sons, but only historical, can be assigned for requiring separate
actions and refusing the privilege of using these counts in the
alternative.37' The right to amend and drop some of the counts
to cure the defect is no solution to the problem.3 72
Another inconsistency is produced by adherence to the forms
of action as limitations on alternative pleading. No limitation of
this nature has ever been applied in West Virginia to the defend-
ant.37 3  The statute provides that "The defendant in any action
or suit may plead as many several matters, whether of law or fact,
as he shall think necessary, except that if he plead the plea of non
est factum he shall not, without leave of the court, be permitted
3711 Cases involving alternative allegations of more "inconsistent" causes
of action which have been permitted under the Federal Rules, and without
encountering any insurmountable difficulties, are cited in the notes to 2 MooRE,
Fr:IRuLA PRACTICE § 8.32. Note therein cases joining tort and contract counts.
The West Virginia cases usually give no reason other than precedents for
not permitting joinder of contract and tort counts. A few cases refer to the
difference in the measure of damages in assumpsit and tort. E.g., Shepherd
v. Pocahontas Transportation Co., 100 V. Va. 703, 131 S.E. 548 (1926); O'Neal
v. Pocahontas Transportation Co., 99 W. Va. 456, 129 S.E. 478 (1925). It
may be that an election should be required where the plaintiff has alleged
and proved two theories under which relief may be obtained for the same
"cause of action" and either the relief or the amount of recovery differs depend-
ing upon the theory chosen. But this assumes that the alternative allegations
of the cause have been permitted as theories of recovery during the trial of
the case. And when can it be assumed that both theories have been proved?
Only after the court or jury has made this determination. Why should an
election be forced prior to this time? The element of saving time is im-
portant but would more time be saved by requiring possibly two actions
where a bona fide doubt exists as to the theory or the facts which will justify
recovery? If no doubt exists, the pleader probably would not resort to altern-
ative allegations; and where he is in doubt and uses alternative allegations,
probably only one theory or set of facts will justify recovery. One more
question-if this reasoning does not justify the use of alternative pleading in
all cases where the pleader is in doubt, what rational basis can be assigned
for permitting it in any case in West Virginia? See quotation from the West
Virginia case in note 168 supra.
371 This criticism of the rules which prevent joinder of certain forms of
action was developed in detail in the first part of this paper dealing with the
joinder of separate causes of action. See also note 370 supra.
372 See note 370 supra. The right to make such amendments was estab-
lished in Knotts v. McGregor, 47 W. Va. 566, 35 S.E. 899 (1900).
:;' This was true in Virginia even before West Virginia was created.
"The defendant in any action may plead as many several matters, whether
of law or fact, as he shall think necessary." VA. CODE c. 171, § 23 (1849). In
Nadenbousch v. Sharer, 2 W. Va. 285, 294 (1867), the court said that the
statute applied however inconsistent the defenses might be with each other.
Note that the Virginia statute did not even contain the present condition as
to a plea of non est factuni.
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to plead any other plea inconsistent therewith. . .. ,"34 The
defendant may therefore plead any number of defenses, how-
ever inconsistent they may be with each other,375 the only ex-
ception being that he must obtain leave of the court if he pleads
non est factum and desires to file a plea inconsistent therewith 78
The defendant may plead matters in the alternative as defenses,
and the facts stated in one plea cannot be used as evidence or ad-
mission to disprove anything contained in the other pleas nor to
sustain the plaintiff's declaration. 377 The following inconsistent
and contradictory defenses were permitted in Levy v. Scottish
Union & National Ins. Co.: 3 7s (1) the general issue, (2) a submis-
sion to an appraisement and award between the plaintiff and the
defendant along with another company and a tender of the de-
fendant's proportionate part of the award, (3) a plea similar to
the second plea except that it alleged the agreement of submission
and award had been between the plaintiff and the defendant alone,
(4) tender of the amount for which the defendant was liable under
the policy, (5) failure of the plaintiff to furnish proof of loss as
provided in the policy, (6) plaintiff's failure to submit to examina-
tion as required by the policy, and (7) failure of the plaintiff to
submit the loss to appraisement as provided in the policy.8 79  In
374 Jr. VA. CODE c. 56, art. 4, § 39 (Michie, 1949). It may be of interest
to note that the part of the statute not quoted above permits the plaintiff
to demur and also plead as many special replications, as he may deem neces-
sary, to any special plea pleaded by the defendant.
375 See the West Virginia case cited in note 373 supra.
7(; The exception is clearly expressed in the statute, but what pleas are
inconsistent with non est factum may raise some difficult questions. Some
aid may be obtained from the precedents in code states which enforce a rule
of consistency among defenses. The earlier decisions held that there was an
inconsistency "whenever the defenses could not all be good at the same
time either in fact or in law." But, the trend is to hold defenses improper
for this reason "only where they are inconsistent in point of fact", and incon-
sistency of legal theory is not objectionable. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 99.
Judge Clark suggests that the alternative defenses ought not be held improper
as long as the pleader has been as truthful as his knowledge of the case will
permit. Note that he took the same position as to what should be deemed
inconsistent causes of action. See note 352 supra. Will the West Virginia
court take a similar position in determining whether leave of court is necessary
where a plea of non est factum is filed? Of course, the safer procedure would
be to obtain leave of court which ought readily be granted if the test here
is applied. ) -1r,
377 Nadenbousch v. Sharer, 2 W. Va. 285 (1867). This is true under the
Federal Rules. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1706.
378 58 W. Va. 546, 52 S.E. 449 (1905).
3T9 Many code states would not permit such inconsistent defenses. CLARK,
CODE PLEADING § 99. They would be permitted under the Federal Rules. 2
MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1708-1709. Rule 8(e) (2) expressly provides that
two or more statements of a defense may be set forth alternatively either in
one defense or in separate defenses. Quoted in the text at note 218 supra.
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addition, the statute abolishing special demurrers3 80 permits the
defendant to set up distinct and different defenses alternatively
in the same plea.381
It may be said that these statutes merely removed technical
iules and that the defendant ought to be permitted to assert any
defense that he may have. But, only technical rules prevent the
plaintiff from pleading in the alternative in all cases in West Vir-
ginia, and the possibility of two actions seems no more necessary
in the cases where alternative pleading is not permitted than in
the instances where it is permitted. 8 2 The basic reason for per-
mitting the alternative statement of the case is the same in both
classes of cases, and that is the reason given at common law for
allowing many counts although only one cause of action was being
asserted. Stephen stated that the pleader should use this device
when, after setting forth his case in one view, he ". . . feels doubt-
ful whether as so stated it may not be insufficient in point of law,
or incapable of proof in point of fact, and at the same time per-
ceives another mode of statement by which the apprehended diffi-
culty may probably be avoided. ,"33 The law set no
limit on the number of counts which might be used for this
purpose, if the pleader's discretion was "fairly and rationally
exercised". 38 4  This is all that is being suggested here, except
that there be ignored the technicality of what forms of action
may be joined.385
The bona fide doubt that a pleader may have in deciding
whether the facts as they may develop in the proof or the law held
applicable thereto will entitle his client to legal or equitable relief
is another reason that either or both types of relief ought to be
obtainable in the same action. If this is possible, the pleader being
permitted to set up his case in the alternative, the second proceed-
ing necessitating substanitally the same proof would be unneces-
sary where the pleader originally thought relief was obtainable on
380 Quoted in the text at note 219 supra.
'I1 This would have been duplicity at common law, a formal defect which
can no longer be reached by special demurrer. Hunt v. DiBacco, 69 W. Va.
449, 71 S.E. 584 (1910); Poling v. Maddox, 41 W. Va. 779, 24 S.E. 999 (1896).
Both cases also indicate that no other method, such as objecting to the filing
of such pleas, can be used to prevent the alternative statements in one plea.
This is true under the Federal Rules. See note 379 supra.
382 See note 370 supra.
183 STEPHEN, PLEADING 361.
384 See note 169 supra.
3.81 See Judge Clark's statement in note 363 supra.
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the wrong side of the court s.3 8  The situation existing in United
States Stamping Co. v. Gall3 87 could be avoided. An executory
agreement existed under which the plaintiff was to receive specific
notes as collateral security for the payment of an obligation, and
the bank which agreed to make the delivery became insolvent.
The plaintiff first instituted an action of detinue against the re-
ceiver of the bank to secure possession of the notes. This action
was prosecuted to trial, judgment being entered for the defendant,
presumably on the basis that legal title had not passed to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff then sued in equity for specific enforce-
ment of the agreement to deliver the notes, joining the bank and
the receiver as defendants. The defendants assigned these grounds,
inter alia, for a demurrer to the bill: (1) an adequate remedy
exists at law, and (2) the judgment in the detinue action is res
adjudicata. The vicious circle was broken by an overruling of
the demurrer by the appellate court. Perhaps in this case the
pleader should have known that the legal title had not passed,
in itself a question often subject to doubt on the facts yet to be
proved and the law to be applied, but even so the court's time need
not have been consumed by a second action and the litigant's re-
covery delayed if the pleader had been allowed to plead his case
in the alternative and to obtain the relief to which he was entitled
on the proper alternative. This he would be permitted to do
under the Federal Rules. """
This case also serves to introduce another type of alternative
pleading which should be permitted. Suppose that it were un-
certain whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover from one per-
son or from another, for example, the bank or its receiver in the
case mentioned. Could he honestly set this forth in his pleadings,
.86 The delay incident even to a transfer of the case to the other side
of the court can be contrasted with the manner in which the hearing might
be expedited under a merged system. As to hearing a case in which both
legal and equitable issues are present, see text accompanying notes 121-128
supra. Here even if a jury were demanded, the entire case could be heard
by the court and jury in the same manner as a case in which both legal and
equitable issues are involved. Contrast the transfer procedure. See notes 37
and 42 supra.
-187 121 W. Va. 190, 2 S.E.2d 269 (1939).
.ss As an example, see Form 12 in the appendix to the rules and the
note thereto. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). The merged system
not only permits this procedure; it compels the pleader to seek all the relief
to which he may be entitled in one action. Contrast Perdue v. Ward, 88 W.
Va. 371, 106 S.E. 874 (1921), which permitted the plaintiff to bring a second
action for damages even though the damages could have been obtained in a
prior injunction suit.
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or is he required to make his guess and hope that a second action
will not be needed? The same question arises where the uncer-
tainty exists as to whether one person or another is entitled to the
recovery. Both of these questions must be answered with the
statement that two actions will be necessary if either the law or the
facts disclose that the pleader was wrong as to his best judgment
in the first case. Alternative pleading of this nature would not
be proper in West Virginia since the allegations would not show
any right to joint recovery or joint liability.35 9 The plaintiff must
elect to proceed against one of them, if the allegations show that
the defendants are not jointly liable, and dismiss his action as to
the others.39 If the plaintiff alleges a joint liability, he may intro-
duce his proof before being required to elect when the lack of joint
liability appears;39 ' but, not only is this less honest pleading, it
also fails to leave the question open for decision in the case.
3 92
The same situation exists where the plaintiffs allege a joint right.
Within limits the hardship caused by the refusal to -allow
pleading as to parties (or causes) in the alternative has been re-
moved by the Federal Rules and by statutes or rules in some
states .3 3  Rule 20(a), mentioned above, provides that either
plaintiffs or defendants may be joined in the alternative if the
rights asserted by the plaintiffs or against the defendants arise out
of the same transaction or occurrence and if any question of law
or fact common to the parties will arise in the action.3 9 4  If both
of those requirements are met, it is immaterial that the various
parties plaintiff or defendant have no interest in each other's cause
of action.39 5 A joint right as to plaintiffs or a joint duty as to
defendants need not be alleged or proved, and the causes joined
remain as separate in substance as if separate actions at common
law had been brought.
3S9 See the first part of this paper dealing with joinder of parties and
causes of action. ". . . There can be no question that distinct causes of action
cannot be joinded in the same suit against different parties ....... Draper v.
Crozier, 104 W. Va. 156, 161, 139 S.E. 648, 650 (1927).
300 Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920).
301 Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Nall, 178 Ky. 33, 198 S.W. 745 (1917).
392 Bennett, Alternative Parties and the Common Law Hangover, 32
MICH.. L. REv. 36 (1933). For a good example of how the statutes which
change the consequences where parties are misjoined has encouraged joinder
of all parties possibly interested, see Sutton v. Walton, 122 W. Va. 424, 10
S.E.2d 573 (1940), and Lugar, supra note 39, at 190.
393 The states are listed in CLARK, CODE PLEADING 394.
394 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
395 This point was developed in the first part of this paper under the
caption, "Joinder of Parties under Code Pleading and the Federal Rules".
See 3 MOOPM, FEDmRAL PR, aCTIE §§ 20.05-20.06.
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Typical instances in which the pleader might use this privilege
have been shown in decided cases. The plaintiff is injured in a
collision between two motor vehicles and is in doubt as to which
of the drivers was negligent; 39s or the plaintiff is injured by the
negligent operation of an automobile and is in doubt as to which
of two persons was driving at the time of the accident and no
relationship between the persons creating joint liability can be
shown;3 97 or the plaintiff contracts with one person who purports
to be the agent of another who later denies his authority, and the
plaintiff is in doubt as to whether the authority existed. 301 Other
hlypothetical or actual cases could be used, 99 but these will suffice
to show that under the federal rule the pleader is permitted to
protect himself where he is in doubt as to which person should
sue or be sued in the same manner that he is now permitted in
*West Virginia to protect himself in some cases by joining different
counts to set- forth possible variances as to the facts to be proved
or the law which will be held applicable. The present limitations
have been discussed. Should the pleader be required to state his
case with certainty, even though he has no way of removing a
doubt prior to trial, and another action be required if his choice
was unfortunate? Should he be required to take the chance that
he will lose both cases because of the facts proved in the different
trials or the reaction of different juries to the evidence introduced?
396 Jacobs v. Barron, 214 N.Y. Supp. 261 (Ist Dep't 1926). Compare the
recent West Virginia case in which the defendant contended that the trial
court had properly set aside the jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor because
"the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries was the negligence of the
driver of an automobile approaching the bus company's [defendant's) bus
in an opposite direction, . . . causing it [the bus] to come in contact with a
pole of the power company negligently installed inside the curb of the western
pavement of the street .... Laphew v. Consolidated Bus Lines, 55 S.E.2d
881, 883 (W. Va. 1949).
397 Fowler v. Baker, 32 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Pa. 1940). Compare Official
Form 10 used in federal courts, quoted in part in the text which follows,
Compare the recent West Virginia case in which father and son were joined
as defendants in a negligence case, the joinder being on the basis of the
family car doctrine. Evidence introduced by the defendants indicated that
a guest passenger in the automobile may have been driving at the time of
the accident. It was held that an amendment should have been permitted
to allege that the car was being operated by the guest passenger under the
direction and supervision of the son and thus show a basis of recovery against
the defendants. Buffa v. Baumgartner, 58 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1950). But,
suppose this relationship cannot be shown? Shall another action be required?
398 Stein, Hall & Co. v. A.M. Alison & Co., 205 N.Y. Supp. 422 (1st Dep't
1924). Compare Cochran v. Craig, 88 W. Va. 281, 106 S.E. 633 (1921) (dis-
cussed in text at note 365 supra).
399 CLAaK, CODE Pr..ING § 62; 3 MooR,, FEDRL PRAc:Tz §§ 20.05-
20.06.
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Official Form No. 10, in the appendix to the Federal Rules, is
an epitome of alternate pleading. The illustrative part reads:
"...defendant C.D. or defendant E.F., or both defendants
C.D. and E.F. wilfully or recklessly or negligently drove or
caused to be driven a motor vehicle against plaintiff....
"Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against G.D. or
against E.F. or against both in the sum of ten thousand dollars
and costs."400
The pleader may thus state his case honestly,401 and the defendants
receive fair notice that liability is being asserted against them
either jointly or in the alternative for an injury arising from a
factual situation in which they both participated and that either
or both of them may be liable depending upon a common question
of law or fact which will be more fully developed at the trial or
prior to that time in a pre-trial conference. The deposition and
discovery procedure established by the Federal Rules, if made
available, would also be useful in narrowing the issues.
Most of the other alternative allegations in this official form
have been discussed. The alternative prayer should be noted
briefly again. An alternative statement of the facts may not result
in any difference in the relief being sought. Where such allega-
tions are permitted in West Virginia that condition exists.
40 2
However, where greater liberality is allowed in stating the facts in
the alternative, the result may be that the relief will vary40 3 and
also the person who recovers or against whom recovery is obtained
will vary,40 4 depending upon the facts proved and the law applied
thereto. If the principle that the prayer for relief is not binding
is accepted, 40 5 the possible differences in the relief to be obtained
need not be stressed at the pleading stage.40°  The prayer would not
be controlling in any event if the facts proved show that the pleader
400 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.C.S.A. (1950). As to the form's sufficiency,
see note 261 supra. In some cases it might be better to plead the alter-
natives in separate sentences. See Keiser v. Walsh, 118 F.2d 13 (App. D.C. 1941).
401 Alternative pleadings are subject to the requirements of Federal Rule
11 as to honesty in pleading. See note 218 supra. Unless the pleader has a
bona fide doubt as to the law or facts, pleadings are not to be in the alter-
native.
402 This result follows from the limitations as to the forms of action
which are joinable and the two court systems.
403 For example, the pleader may be entitled to legal or equitable relief.
404 See the discussion above in the text as to joinder of parties plaintiff
or defendant in the alternative.
405 See text which accompanies notes 149-155 supra. See also note 188
supra.
406 "The demand for judgment is simply the pleader's suggestion to the
court." CrAR, CODE PLEADING 274.
85
Lugar: Common Law Pleading Modified Versus The Federal Rules: IV. Pleadi
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1951
COMMON LAW PLEADING
is entitled to another alternative relief.40 7 However, if judgment
is taken by default, the prayer is important as to the relief obtain-
able; 0 and in any event the pleader should set forth the theory
of his case including alternative prayers where the facts have been
pleaded in the alternative for that purpose.400 Accordingly, Rule
8 (a) permits the pleader to demand relief in the alternative or of
several different types. 410 In order to avoid any question concern-
ing the right to alternative relief because of the absence of a prayer
therefor, the careful pleader would make the demand in the alter-
native and it is usually so done.411 The West Virginia practitioner
would have no difficulty in framing such prayers for he is ac-
customed to doing this in bills in equity.41 2
A summary at this point of the thoughts expressed as to each
subject discussed in this paper seems inappropriate, especially
since each topic has been separated as much as possible from the
others. This was done to demonstrate in some detail what might
be accomplished by the adoption of rules comparable ot the Fed-
eral Rules to replace certain existing rules in West Virginia. The
rules chosen seemed to illustrate best the existence of limitations
which unnecessarily may delay or defeat determination of claims
on their merits.
As indicated at the beginning of this paper, no attempt has
been made herein to examine or appraise all of the differences
between the West Virginia rules of practice and procedure and
the Federal Rules. It was believed that a detailed comparison of
some segments of the differences between the two systems might be
more likely to stimulate or encourage members of the bench and
bar to consider these and other differences than would a more
generalized treatment of a greater number of variances between
the two systems.
407 See text accompanying notes 151-155 supra.
408 See text which accompanies notes 149-150 supra.
400 This may be necessary for a clear statement of the cause or causes of
action involved.
410 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
411 For example, the prayer to be used with Official Form 10, noted above
in the text, reads as follows: "Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment against
C.D. or against E.F. or against both in the sum of ten thousand dollars and
costs." See also the prayer in Official Form 12. Appendix of Forms, Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C.A. (1950).
412 E.g., Lockhart v. Hoke, 85 W. Va. 382, 101 S.E. 730 (1920).
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